Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

9. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, January 30, 1964, 9:02 p.m.

2109. Bonn’s 2571, Moscow’s 2302.² Plan for settlement German problem outlined Bonn’s 2571 has been given careful study here and will continue receive our serious consideration. Meanwhile, we have following comments:

1. As specified in para 4 Bonn’s 2571, plan as outlined depends on validity two basic assumptions:

a) that there is possibility, over period of years, to influence readjustment of Soviet long-range political objectives and basic political philosophy through device of offering economic assistance to USSR, and

b) that it would be possible develop unified Western position on trade and credits to USSR along lines and on scale outlined in plan.

2. We are impressed by arguments advanced in Moscow’s 2302 to support conclusion that there is no realistic basis for believing Soviets can be induced to accept radical reorientation of their long-range political objectives in exchange for Western assistance in overcoming their current economic difficulties. This is same conclusion arrived at in SNIE 11–5–64 dated Jan 8, 1964 on “Soviet Economic Problems and Outlook,”³ which, after expressing view that current economic pressures in USSR are likely be productive of foreign policy of “relative restraint,” goes on to state (para 22): “We do not, however, believe that the Soviets would make major concessions in exchange for expanded Western credits or reduced Western defense expenditures.”

3. On this basis, plan as outlined would seem afford no basis for hoping that result desired re German settlement could be achieved. Moreover, as seen from Washington, there are truly formidable difficulties in way of trying reach agreement at this time on unified Western program of grants and credits to USSR, especially on scale contemplated (total of $40 billion of which US contribution would be $8 billion). Even an attempt to seek agreement on such a program could bring about stimulation of credit race to point of greatly easing Soviet economic difficulties and thereby removing major restraining factor in Soviet foreign policy.

4. In view above considerations we do not believe Erhard should be encouraged at this point to solicit US approach to Soviets on behalf scheme for major Western initiative in trade and credit field. At same time we should avoid any course of action tending discourage Germans from coming up with new ideas and there would be no objection to inquiring of Erhard, in low key and on non-committal basis, whether he had further developed his thinking on ways and means to settle German problem.⁴

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 32–4 GER. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Creel; cleared by Tyler, Thompson, and SOV; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Moscow.
2. Documents 5 and 6.
3. See footnote 5, Document 5.
4. In telegram 2855 from Bonn, February 12, McGhee offered further comment on the possibility of finding a basis for agreement over Germany with the Soviet Union and reported that he would pass on U.S. views to Erhard. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–4 GER)