Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

80. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 7, 1965, 12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• German Ambassador’s Call on the Secretary Part 1 of 2—German Reunification

PARTICIPANTS

• Germans
  • Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
  • Minister Georg von Lilienfeld, German Embassy
  • Mr. Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German Embassy
• Americans
  • The Secretary
  • Assistant Secretary William R. Tyler,EUR
  • Mr. Alfred Puhan, Director, GER

Ambassador Knappstein said he was calling at his own initiative. He stated that he had two questions. The first was what do you consider we four do next on the German question? He said there was a strong and growing feeling regarding the reunification question in Germany. He cited an article by Zehrer in Die Welt entitled “The German Disquiet”. According to the Ambassador this urge for reunification was becoming more and more a trauma. The feeling regarding reunification was no longer entirely rational, but approaching a state of hysteria. The Ambassador said he felt personally that after twenty years of frustration, there might be hot-heads who would lead demonstrations. He said that this brought terrible pressure on the government. The upcoming elections had also to be kept in mind. At the same time, according to the Ambassador, there was greater recognition on the part of the Germans that they would not get something for nothing. He spoke of a certain readiness to consider other matters in connection with the reunification question, mentioning the territorial and boundary questions. The Ambassador said this growing readiness to consider other questions was, of course, not to be confused with concessions. The Ambassador thought this is what the Secretary had in mind when he gave his backgrounder at the end of the year.

The Ambassador said that the recent blow the Germans had suffered on the reunification initiative was actually one of two blows, the other one being what he called the change on MLF policy, from the old MLF to a combination of MLF/ANF. He said confidentially that this change had resulted in a storm in the Cabinet against Foreign Minister Schroeder and that he had been reproached for pursuing a policy already buried by the Americans. The Ambassador’s second question, therefore, was what do you envisage on the MLF?

The Secretary, referring to growing German anxieties, said that one can perhaps understand sensitivities without conceding they were justified. He added that we were growing sensitive about growing sensitivities in Germany. He said that we must understand that sensitivities create counter-sensitivities.

The Secretary said that on the reunification question, only the United States in the West had followed a clear, simple and persistent policy over the years. He pointed out that he had raised the German question in every serious conversation he had had with the Russians on any subject. He said that these attempts on his part to keep the question alive with the Russians had been made at least twice a year.

The Secretary said that there were two problems in this connection which bothered him. The first was that if we are to take an initiative, we must be serious about it. We cannot rely on a negative response from the Russians. We must be prepared for a Russian counter-suggestion. If the Russians seriously suggest that we get our troops out of Berlin, we would immediately have the crisis of 1958 with the concomitant expense of billions of dollars and tremendous expenditure of time and effort. The Secretary emphasized that we must be prepared to face the alternatives and the Four must be together on this. He reminded the Ambassador that he had been through this before. He reiterated that if we take an international step, we must be prepared for the consequences.

The Secretary said that his second observation on this subject was that reunification was very complex, having many parts. The most obvious problem related to reunification is the frontier question. The Secretary added you are really talking about a peace treaty when you are talking about reunification.

The Secretary said he had told Foreign Minister Schroeder that it was easy for him to envisage the first statement made by each of the participants at a reunification negotiation, but what he did not see as clearly were the second speeches on the second day. The Secretary said that he had had the impression during recent months that what the Germans wished to discuss was reunification in its narrowest sense, and that they had been reluctant to face the questions of frontiers, security arrangements and disarmament, elements which were inseparably linked.

The Secretary said that he would suggest for the immediate future that Chancellor Erhard, during his visit with de Gaulle, make sure that he have a private, serious and extended discussion with the General on the subject of reunification. The Secretary added that he was making this recommendation against the background of his own conversations with General de Gaulle.

The Secretary said that although he had not mentioned this to the British and French, he would see a point in having Schroeder come to New York some time during the United Nations General Assembly after Chancellor Erhard’s talk with de Gaulle, and possibly meet with him and the British and French for further discussion of the subject. The Secretary said that Ambassador McGhee had mentioned this to Chancellor Erhard.

The Secretary said that he was interested in the Ambassador’s observation, that there was now a readiness to look at substantive questions related to reunification.

The Ambassador repeated his belief that readiness is growing to discuss such topics. He referred in this connection to a recent speech by CDU Parliamentarian Gradl. He added that the difficulty was not reduced by discussion of the question by political parties in Germany during an election year. The Ambassador thought that CDU Parliamentary leader Barzel would discuss this subject when he visited the United States.

The Secretary said he had not had the opportunity to tell Foreign Minister Schroeder in Paris that questions raised by the Secretary with the Foreign Minister were really aimed at someone else. He reiterated the danger that if we joined in an initiative which provides the pretext for the USSR to return to its 1961 position, we would have to fly troops in and spend billions of dollars. He added that we were ready to do this, to face such an eventuality, but unless there was complete solidarity on the part of the Four the American people would question the Secretary’s actions in bringing about a repeat of the 1961 situation.

The Ambassador asked the Secretary if he had detected any point of receptivity in his talks with Gromyko. The Secretary replied in the negative. He said that Gromyko appeared more completely negative on the reunification issue than at any other time. The Secretary speculated that the twenty-two Soviet divisions in East Germany were no longer there for the security of troops in Eastern Germany, but for all of Eastern Europe. He could visualize that if the twenty-two divisions left the Soviet Zone of Germany, all of Eastern Europe would join Western Europe. The Secretary said that Gromyko had said that he was willing to resume a discussion bilaterally of questions discussed last year—Berlin, US troops, etc. Gromyko, the Secretary added, had told the President that he did not discount the possibility that some new elements might enter the discussion. The Secretary concluded that when he probed Gromyko on this point, he received no clue as to what Gromyko had in mind.

The Secretary said he did not believe the Soviets were prepared to discuss reunification, or saw any movement in that direction. Gromyko had indicated to the Secretary that he was aware of the feelings in Europe on this question and saw no sense in creating an illusion there is movement when there is none. The Secretary allowed for the possibility that the Soviets might come back at some later date with something else.

The Secretary assured the Ambassador that despite what Gromyko had said, we were prepared to take an initiative if, as he had said earlier, it was serious and we were all aware of the consequences. He reiterated his strong belief that considerable advantage was to be gained in Franco-German talks in depth and detail in a relaxed atmosphere.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 6. Secret. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S on January 21. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. A memorandum of the portion of the conversation covering MLF issues is ibid.