Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

70. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, October 6, 1964, 3 p.m.

1340. Subj: Berlin’s relationship to the FRG. Although we have dealt with the German proposal to hold a Cabinet meeting in Berlin on an essentially ad hoc basis,² the British, French, and we agree that this action is likely to be only the first in a series of attempts to modify certain aspects of the existing relationship between the FedRep and Berlin. FonOff representatives have on occasion frankly stated that during the present period when significant progress toward reunification is not possible, the best that can be done is to strengthen further the ties between Berlin and Bonn. This one way, in German eyes, to prevent solidification of the status quo and to counter Soviet and East German contentions that West Berlin is a third German political entity alongside the FRG and the GDR.

In an electoral year, steps toward a closer integration of Berlin in the FRG will be good politics for the govt. It will help to steal some of the thunder which opposition leader Willy Brandt can still command as Governing Mayor of Berlin, and at the same time move in a direction consistent with the German theory that Berlin is legally a part of the FedRep, subject only to certain reservations imposed by the Western Occupying Powers.

It was perhaps inevitable, once Soviet pressures on Berlin had relaxed, that the Germans would attempt to resume the process of creeping amalgamation of the Western sectors with the FedRep which had characterized the years between 1950 and 1958. During this period, the US generally advocated a permissive policy on the part of the Occupying Powers and was prepared to accept virtual de facto absorption of Berlin within the Bonn system.

We have learned since, through our experience during the crisis years 1958–63, that the consistently formalistic and restrictive French approach, while extreme, had certain advantages. Apart from preserving the purity of our legal position vis-à-vis the Soviets, it tended to maintain a system of Western occupation control which could provide the operative basis for the kind of modus vivendi on Berlin which seems to have emerged after nearly five years of intense diplomatic crisis and struggle over the future of the city.

The Dept will recall that our differences with the FedRep over the status of Berlin last came to a head in the autumn of 1961, during Ambassadorial Group discussions following the submission of a German memorandum on the subject (reproduced as BQD 53).³ It became clear at the time that the opposing views could not be reconciled on the level of logical argument and that both sides could agree to disagree. It was felt better to let the issue remain dormant, since the FedRep was not then pressing for any specific actions which challenged the Allied view. It has proved feasible to operate quite successfully on the basis of this tacit agreement to disagree. We doubt if the FRG would wish at this point to push so far as to destroy this modus vivendi. The German objective is to achieve the maximum show of unity with Berlin without destroying the position of the Allies in Berlin—particularly of the US—on which they know the security of the city depends. The Allied requirements, on the other hand, would seem to depend on legal substance and power rather than show. Our primary interest is to prevent jeopardy to our de jure position or doubts as to our intention to remain in, and defend, Berlin.

It is within the context of these differing but not necessarily incompatible German and Allied objectives that we believe the three Occupying Powers should examine with some care the various courses of action open to the FedGovt and prepare considered responses so that they will not be caught by surprise when specific proposals are made.

There are broadly two categories of action which the FedRep could propose:

1. Further demonstrative gestures such as Cabinet meetings, which have no basic effect on the legal position of Berlin but which highlight the activities of the FedGovt in the city. A proposal for the resumption of Bundestag meetings in Berlin would fall in this category.

2. Changes which could be interpreted as affecting the legal structure of relationships between the FedRep and Berlin. In this category would fall proposals for the direct election of Bundestag members from Berlin, giving free voting rights to Berlin members of the Bundestag, or the substitution of a Globalgesetz procedure for the existing Mantelgesetz procedure for the adoption of Federal legislation in Berlin.

At this point, we are inclined to think that we could swallow occasional Bundestag meetings in Berlin. We would have greater difficulty in accepting proposals requiring formal changes in the existing structure of law. In the latter category, we could perhaps most easily permit direct election of Bundestag members from Berlin who would continue without voting rights in the Bundestag. In any event we believe we should think our way carefully to a final position, and would as a start appreciate receiving Berlin’s comments.⁴

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 28 GER B. Confidential. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, Moscow, CINCEUR, USAREUR, USELMLO, USNMR, and SHAPE.
2. In telegram 1197 from Bonn, September 26, McGhee reported that Carstens had informed him of the decision of the Erhard Cabinet to hold a meeting in Berlin on September 30. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 5)
3. Not found.
4. Not found.