Dear Mr. Secretary:
It was both pleasant and helpful for me to have a brief conversation with you
in Washington during the day that I was there in early June.4 I hope that there may
be an occasion for a further meeting before too many months pass, although I
realize that you are deeply immersed in many other more critical and urgent
problems.
I am sure that our relations with him will be as friendly and mutually
fruitful as they were with General Polk.
With warm personal regards.
Attachment6
RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND PEOPLES
I.
In increasing measure, Western political thought proceeds from the
premise that the Eastern European Communist states can no longer be
[Page 153]
regarded as mere satellites of
the Soviet Union. The effect of the Soviet/Chinese controversies, and
the process of economic and ideological differentiation (not directly
related to the first) are being observed with great interest.
Questions of communication with Eastern European states and peoples, of
practical cooperation, and of appropriate political action, have begun
to play a larger role. It may be assumed that the incipient union of
free Europe, despite all difficulties and obstacles, has exercised a
strong attraction, and that an all-European consciousness has survived
or been revived in the peoples located between Germany and Russia.
In his Lexington speech of May 23, 1964,7
President Johnson spoke of an
“all-European” perspective. President Kennedy told the Berlin students on June 26, 19638 that it was “not too early to think once again in
all-European terms;” the “winds of change,” he said, are blowing across
the Iron Curtain. The interests of French and British policy in this
problem area are obvious. Thus, the French Foreign Minister observed on
April 28, 1964 before the National Assembly that the countries of
Eastern Europe had already made use of the Soviet/Chinese conflict in
order to accelerate their already marked tendency towards
emancipation.
In his 1964 New Year’s broadcast,9 General de
Gaulle said that without engaging in illusions, one must
be prepared for the day when in the Eastern European capitals the
totalitarian Communist regime might undergo a gradual process of change.
“Then perspectives would open up for all of Europe which would be in
keeping with its means and capabilities.”
On June 26, 1963 Lord Home declared in the House of Lords10 that
there were numerous indications for the beginnings of a new mood:
“Country upon country in Eastern Europe begins to question the right of
the Soviet Government to dictate its forms of economic development … No
one can foretell the future with certainty, but there is evident a
possible development which will have to be observed with the greatest
care.”
In its Bonn declaration of June 1, 1964,11 the Action Committee for the United States of Europe
(Monnet Committee) advocated that “the beginnings of communication with
the nations of Eastern Europe should be strengthened through realistic
endeavors.”
[Page 154]
This, therefore, is the theme: For the immediate future it appears
desirable and not unpromising to engage the Eastern European states in
the largest possible volume of communications.
II.
It is in the Western interest to support the autonomy of the Eastern
European nations and not to curtail their maneuverability. However, it
would be grotesque if certain centrifugal tendencies in the Communist
world were to evoke an erosion of Western cooperation—in other words,
if—to paraphrase a statement of Bismarck—a new “nightmare of bilateral
or even multilateral constellations” should develop in Europe between
decaying power and interest blocs.
Obviously it cannot be in the Western interest to permit illusions
concerning the nature of the Eastern European regimes. On the other
hand, it would be foolish to set ideological conditions as a price for
communication.
Western policy will have to concentrate on measures in the economic and
cultural realm. It will have to treat any Eastern European state as a
full partner, but it will also have to take into account the military
and ideological ties maintained by such states.
Over and above concrete forms of economic and cultural cooperation (which
of necessity will have to remain limited, for the time being), it is of
decisive importance to work toward good-neighborly relations. In this
fashion evolutionary forces can be encouraged and furthered.
National consciousness in the Eastern European states, and their striving
for greater autonomy find expression in growing self-interest. This
tendency must be taken into account and should not be curbed by
unnecessary generalizations or inappropriate over-all propositions.
Differentiation in development makes it necessary to evolve a different
policy for each of the Eastern European countries. This aggravates
further the known difficulties which beset efforts to achieve a
coordinated Western position. However, it remains most desirable that
the Western countries should agree to certain joint principles in their
position vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, and that they should strengthen and
systematize their exchange of information and experience. This should be
done as effectively as possible and in a not particularly spectacular
manner within the framework of existing European and Atlantic
institutions.
The Common Market has had a liberalizing effect on economic thinking in
all Eastern Europe. Modest but purposeful progress on the road to
greater European unity and Atlantic partnership—as proposed by the
Monnet Committee—would strengthen this tendency.
The regulations governing relations with third countries create a
particular problem for the countries of the Common Market. A
clarification
[Page 155]
of the political
intentions of the EEC member-states is a
prerequisite for closer relations with the Eastern European
countries.
A formal relationship with the Common Market is dependent also on the
capabilities of the Eastern European states and, not least, upon the
“cohesion” of the Soviet-led bloc.
The West must demonstrate that it is working towards a framework of
commercial policy in which also the national economies of the Eastern
European peoples will be able to find a place. There are important
reasons for allowing the countries of Eastern Europe to share in the
liberalization resulting from the Kennedy Round. Objectionable political influences from
the East would, of course, have to be avoided.
Economic facts of life in the Communist realm, and conditions in the West
make it difficult at present materially to increase East-West trade. In
order to achieve a substantial increase, the West will have to be
prepared to grant far-reaching economic and financial supports, and the
East will have to be ready to undertake far-reaching liberalization
measures. The time is not ripe for either condition.
It might be useful to refer to the studies undertaken by the ECE in Geneva concerning questions of
expanding East-West trade. This applies also to considerations
concerning the question of introducing a multilateral payments and
accounting system among the members of the ECE.
With respect to efforts to develop bilateral trade relations, however, it
remains true, even under changed conditions, that the West is at a
disadvantage vis-à-vis countries with a government monopoly on trade,
when on the Western side there is unbridled competition among states and
business firms.
It must be made clear over and over that the West is prepared, through
practical cooperation, to promote economic progress and raise the
standard of living for its own and for other peoples. This does not
contradict the fact that the West must undertake no move which might
jeopardize its security, and that it cannot consider unacceptable
conditions. At present it no longer appears possible to find a unified
solution for the problem of longterm credits. However, this remains an
important problem.
Trade with the Eastern European states is not an end in itself. It must
be evaluated and reviewed on a continuing basis within the over-all
framework of Western policy. Wherever possible, economic agreements
should be coupled with cultural agreements (“the more information, the
more intellectual communication”) and—whenever it appears indicated—with
humanitarian arrangements.
IV.12
[Page 156]
The study and development of joint, major technical projects is of great
psychological importance and, in the long run, also of concrete
significance. In this field the self-interest of the Eastern European
countries will have to be the starting point.
In the first instance, consideration should be given to endeavors within
the framework of an all-European power-economy, as, for example, the
merger of supply lines (oil, electric power). These endeavors might lead
to a delivery union (Lieferungsverband vielfaeltiger Form) and promote
an awareness of European unity and over-all responsibility in line with
the principle of balanced, mutual advantage. As regards the trends to be
observed in this process, preliminary studies in various fields by the
ECE would be useful.
The Geneva declaration of September 16, 195013 concerning construction of international main
highways, to which nearly all Eastern European states subscribed, might
serve as an example in the field of transport. At issue here are
convincing possibilities for joint planning, with a view to future
all-European transport needs which the EEC commission also emphasized in a paper of April 10,
1961: “Particularly in the field of transport, it will not be possible
to solve certain questions exclusively within the framework of the Six.”
The European Conference of Transport Ministers, of which Yugoslavia is
already a member, would probably be an appropriate body for long-range
planning.
This is true also for the planning, construction, and improvement of
waterways (Rhine-Main-Danube canal, Elbe traffic, Danube-Oder canal, and
other connecting links). In this context, the Federal Republic of
Germany will have to study whether or how it might participate in the
settlement of questions concerning Danube shipping.
ECE investigations concerning European
specific questions, such as gas problems and water supply, water and air
pollution should be utilized. The establishment of new, and the
improvement of existing, connections in the civil aviation network are
of increasing importance. (“What is possible between the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. should be possible also between Western and Eastern
Europe.”)
V.
Cultural agreements should be based on the principle of reciprocity.
Under the special conditions obtaining in Germany, participation by
responsible non-governmental agencies should also be considered. Films,
particularly television films, are of special importance. Artistically
valuable films from Poland and Czechoslovakia already have proven to be
an
[Page 157]
important contribution to
better understanding, where Germany is concerned. In general, cultural
agreements should include as many old as well as new media as
possible.
The area of scientific exchange and cooperation could open up a wide
field of bilateral and multilateral endeavors. Here one might argue
persuasively: “If the Americans and the Russians can work together, why
not the Europeans also?”
If full reciprocity cannot be achieved, it is in the interest of the West
in some areas also to make use of limited liberalization. For instance,
it is desirable that the Eastern European countries should open their
borders to visitors from the West, even if these countries are not
prepared to permit movement in the opposite direction.
Here, however, it is important that the Western perspective become clear
and is not blurred. This means: As much cultural exchange as possible in
both directions. This means further: We should do whatever lies in our
power to open our borders also to the youth of the Eastern European
states.
Over and above the useful activity of travel bureaus, consideration could
be given to promoting low-cost tourism with the cooperation of the
pertinent institutions and organizations, and with self-administration
for the exchange groups. This should not apply, however, to
government-controlled propaganda trips. Furthermore, the agencies
responsible for public health might consider an agreement concerning the
mutual use of their facilities in spas and resort towns.
A “European youth organization,” as proposed by the German Social
Democrats would have to include, in whatever form, a youth exchange with
Eastern European countries. Reference is made further to the proposal of
German youth organizations to prepare a general youth festival. Special
agencies of the United Nations (UNESCO ?) might assume sponsorship or lend assistance.
The present study is not designed to present detailed proposals for
economic, technical, scientific, and cultural cooperation. That will
have to be the task of experts. Their work will have to be based in part
on carefully developed knowledge of the wishes and concepts of the
various Eastern European states.
VI.
Within this framework the position and treatment of the Soviet Zone of
Germany—the so-called GDR—constitutes a
special problem.
It is a problem, in part, because Western policy in the German question
(self-determination, non-recognition, safeguarding of the peace) must
not be affected and jeopardized in this context. Secondly, the problem
arises because the Ulbricht regime
reacts, or, rather, must react, to developments in the Communist world
in a manner which is diametrically
[Page 158]
opposed to the behavior of the Eastern European
governments: Not more autonomy in relation to the Soviet Union, but
rather additional evidence of “reliability.”
Nevertheless, a German policy designed to wrest from the Ulbricht regime alleviations for the
human beings affected by the division, and for the population in the
Zone, is in keeping with the interests of the West. The Interzonal Trade
between the two parts of Germany, based on Allied orders, must be viewed
also in this context, in addition to its significance for Berlin
access.
The possibilities for economic and cultural communication with the Soviet
Zone are primarily a German problem, but the need for consultation and
agreement with the three Powers is self-evident.
All in all, it may be assumed that more intensive communication between
the Western and Eastern European peoples cannot and will not bypass the
Zone. Already in preparing for this objective, we should consider how,
for example, Soviet Zone youth might be brought into general youth
events.
In multilateral economic endeavors it is not necessary to forego a priori
the possibility of including the Zone, in third place, for instance. The
equal status desired by the Zone regime could be avoided by the (West)
German side by making the Federal German contribution through private
business firms or business associations.
VII.
A flexible policy designed to achieve a high degree of communication with
Eastern Europe requires appropriate preparation of the Western peoples.
It must be made clear that such a policy is neither weak nor illusory,
but that it proceeds from changing realities and is designed to bring
about a better future—the objectives which President Kennedy sketched out in his speech of
July 4, 1962. The conviction must be reaffirmed that the free society
possesses greater vigor and vitality. Furthermore, there can be no
doubting the fact that the free peoples cannot find salvation in
bilateralism but, rather, in a meaningful, integrated and organized
community.
On the basis of the so-called Jaksch Report, the German Bundestag
resolved unanimously on June 14, 1961 “to make use of every opportunity
to achieve a normalization of relations between the Federal Republic and
the Eastern European states, without sacrificing vital German
interests.”
In his Government Declaration of October 28, 1963,14 Professor Erhard observed: “Within the limits of
its ability, the Federal Government is
[Page 159]
prepared to expand the economic exchange with
these countries. In the same manner it welcomes increased cultural
contacts.” In his New York speech of May 15, 1964,15
Willy Brandt urged: “Our wish to
work together must be made visible also to the Eastern European peoples.
It is time to recognize more clearly that Europe does not end at the
Iron Curtain.” In the same speech Brandt said: “We should propose joint projects to the
peoples of Eastern Europe and make them understand that we do not fear
but that, on the contrary, we desire a rise in their living standard to
a level comparable to ours. This accords also with the original idea of
the Marshall Plan.”
The Americans in particular have made clear the connection between
European developments and the German question. In Berlin, Kennedy spoke about “the course leading
to the re-unification of Germany and the restoration of Europe,” which
would not be an easy one. Johnson said in his Lexington speech: “It is
our belief that the wise and skillful development of relations with the
nations of Eastern Europe can bring closer the day on which Germany will
be reunified.”
It is in the joint interest of the West to guard against the
stabilization of conditions which, by promoting the recognition of more
than one state in Germany, would prejudice efforts to achieve an
all-German peace treaty. This accounts in part also for the problems
inherent in developing German trade missions in the Eastern European
countries.
In the present interim phase we must insist, above all, that the ties
between Berlin and the Federal Republic are respected. The differences
which have become manifest in this area (between the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia, and in the intermediate positions taken by the Eastern
European governments) are of significance.
From the German point of view it is most important that agreements
concerning economic and technical matters should be accompanied by an
amelioration of human distress. It is obvious that on the German side,
concern about the fate of German nationals and ethnic groups in Eastern
Europe must play a special role. The question of family reunion also
plays a significant role for emigrants and expellees of other
nationalities.
In conclusion, the main issues at present appear to be:
- 1.
- In awareness of existing differences of opinion, to bring
about a consensus of Western views on these questions, in order
to find a basis for joint policy;
- 2.
- To inform the governments and peoples of the Eastern European
countries about the prerequisites and possibilities for fruitful
cooperation;
- 3.
- To convince public opinion in our countries that even minor
progress can help to influence in a positive sense structural
change in an important field of world politics and to advance,
in the long run, the restoration of Europe.
