63. Letter From the Ambassador to Germany (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk1
Dear Mr. Secretary:
When the Attorney General was here recently,2 both Erhard and Schroeder made a point of speaking to him about their interest in improving relations with Poland, and their hope that he might be able to put in a word for the Federal Republic while in Warsaw. They admitted that their difficulty with regard to the Poles lay in their inability to give assurances with respect to the Oder-Neisse frontier. The Chancellor said that the Germans could not hand over to the Poles the Oder-Neisse territory on a golden tray, since according to the Potsdam Agreement the 1937 frontiers were valid until the peace treaty was signed. The Chancellor added that it was implicit, however, that the new frontiers would not be the old frontiers.
As can be gathered from the press accounts (which is all that we have received), the Attorney General has done yeoman’s work in Poland3 by his public references to the urgency of overcoming the division in Europe following from the division in Germany, and by intimating that in his opinion a way could be found to settle the frontier question satisfactorily. The Germans have been very grateful for this. It has been commented upon by the press, by officials to me personally, and by a number of high ecclesiastics who were at the Papal Nuncio’s reception recently. It has set me thinking—indeed crystallized a feeling that I have had for some time—that conceivably we might, through Foy Kohler, be able in Moscow to do something toward the same end.
The question of whether we could do something—by quiet private talks, more or less directed towards planting a seed—is easier to answer than the question of what precisely we would put up to the Soviets. I have no illusions about the political and psychological difficulties which have brought about the impasse during the past 19 years. In essence the problem is whether there is anything which can be done which would lead Moscow to take a more friendly attitude toward Bonn.
I am well aware, for example, of the obstacles here to any significant actions by the Germans on their frontier problem, such as a relinquishment of the hypothetical legal claim to the Oder-Neisse territories which is still stubbornly maintained by all elements in Germany. I can easily [Page 143] imagine the questions about this and other issues that would confront Foy during his discussions in Moscow. All the same, the more I reflect about it, the more I am convinced that these people are still victims of a false perspective, a perspective which may have had some validity a dozen years ago, but with each passing year becomes more unrealistic—and that they will in time see this.
The Soviet leadership will undoubtedly continue to evaluate its relationships with “capitalist” countries in terms of Communist ideological and tactical considerations. This would presumably apply to the Federal Republic as well as to us. However, there have been indications in recent years that Khrushchev is willing to adopt a somewhat more flexible approach in his relations with certain key countries, without regard to whether these relations may seem entirely consistent with the long-run goal of establishing the Communist system throughout the world.
As you know, the Germans, despite their stress on the continuing Communist menace and the argument made by many that the Soviet Union rather than Communist China remains the primary menace to the free world, are quite willing to consider ways and means of improving their relations with the Russians. Erhard, for example, continues to toy with the notion that German economic resources can somehow be brought to bear in a favorable way to move towards the solution of the reunification problem. I know that the Department does not consider this feasible, but perhaps there is some hope in a step-to-step approach which might at least lead to a bettering of relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union and the end of mutual name-calling.
What I have in mind is that by a process of very careful exploration, by Foy in Moscow and by me in Bonn, we might plant the useful idea that the Federal Republic is interested in improving its relations with the Soviet Union, is even prepared to pay a certain price for this and that consequently, at least in part, the admittedly sincere Soviet fears of the Federal Republic might bear reexamining.
We might, first of all, attempt to persuade the Soviets that present-day Germany is not militaristic—nor in any way controlled by militarists. It might, for example, be suggested that the present agitation in the Federal Republic over its armed forces, precipitated by the Heye Report,4 is a healthy sign of both popular and governmental concern. Propaganda aside, the new German army is not simply a latter-day model of the old imperial or Nazi army. It places special emphasis on the role of the individual in a “citizen” army. They have a special institute and training in [Page 144] this concept. All German forces are fully integrated into NATO, and their role is conceived of as purely defensive. We are in a position to vouch for the fact that the Federal Republic has no aggressive intentions and that there is neither governmental nor popular support for any adventuristic policy.
It might also be pointed out that the Federal Republic continues to grow rapidly in economic prosperity and has become one of the foremost trading nations of the world. It is prepared to expand its trade relations, on a basis of mutual interest, with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It might be noted that there are obvious limits to what can be done here, but that the German attitude appears reasonable and does provide a basis for improved relations (we would not at this point, of course, want to get into the subject of long-term credits).
Another point which might be made is that the Federal Republic has renounced the use of force to effect any changes in national frontiers or demarcation lines. This, in our view, is a solid and lasting commitment, and propaganda implying that the Federal Republic is in the hands of militarists who are ready to spring at any moment is both unrealistic and self-defeating. Such propaganda cannot really be taken seriously as an estimate either of German capabilities or of German public opinion and the intentions of its leaders.
It might be stressed that a very convincing proof of the real attitude of the Federal Government to Germany’s Nazi past is the fact that the Government has, in a spirit of contrition and reparation, sponsored programs involving the expenditure of many billions of marks in an effort to make restitution to victims of Nazi persecution. These programs continue up to the present and have recently been supplemented by new legislation.
I will, of course, be willing to do anything in Bonn which might be useful to supplement what Foy does in Moscow. I should welcome receiving any thoughts or advice you may have on the feasibility of this approach. I have taken the liberty of sending a copy of this to Foy, with the suggestion that he comment directly to us both.
With best regards,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 1 GER W–US. Secret.↩
- The Embassy reported on Robert Kennedy’s June 25 visit to Bonn in telegram 4867, June 26. (Ibid., POL 32–4 GER)↩
- Kennedy visited Poland June 27–July 1.↩
- Reference is to statements in the annual report of the Federal Parliament’s Defense Commissioner, retired Admiral Heye, criticizing “excessive elite consciousness” in the military.↩