Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

49. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Johnson and Chancellor Erhard¹

Washington, June 12, 1964, 11:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Mr. Weber
• Mrs. Lejins

After the President presented the Chancellor with a number of gifts, Mr. Erhard expressed his pleasure at being in the United States again. He said despite a few discordant notes heard from time to time German-American friendship was firm and lasting. He considered the cooperation of the United States and Germany in NATO the guarantee for the maintenance of peace and freedom in the world. U.S.-German friendship went beyond bilateral considerations. It was a major element bringing North America and Europe together.

He expressed concern about the great inflationary trend presently at work which could break up Europe. But it was Germany’s task—for political, economic and social reasons—to guarantee the stability of Europe. The Chancellor felt his trip was very timely. Although he did not want to sound dramatic about the latest arrangements between the Soviet Union and East Germany, this most recent development could cause considerable concern and unrest. Therefore, the present visit and discussions could do much to allay fears in Germany.

Chancellor Erhard was sure the President was aware that the German press (although this did not, of course, affect German official policy) was asking when, in all the efforts being made to achieve a détente, the time would come to deal with the most important question which lay at the heart of everything—the German problem. Such discussions in Germany and their effect should not be underrated. Nine months after the U.S. elections, Germany also would be facing elections. At that time, the Chancellor would have to answer some of these questions. He certainly would not want to be disloyal to himself or his friends. But he would have to discuss these matters. Therefore, it would be most advantageous if something could come out of the present talks which could put German fears at rest and suppress certain nationalistic voices making themselves heard. He added he could not hide the fact that Goldwater’s statements had been a real shock to much of Europe and had awakened voices which had to be muted. But he wanted to make it clear that it was not the aim of his visit to bring about or set off any specific set of actions. Germany had been satisfied with the results of the NATO meetings at The Hague. All he wished at this time was that discussions continue so German concerns could be met.

There were other problems, too. Chief among these was the future course of certain NATO developments, and particularly the MLF. The German attitude on this had not changed. Germany considers the MLF desirable and necessary. Since taking office, the Chancellor had visited almost all the capitals of Western Europe and discussed the MLF. While he did not find widespread enthusiasm for the MLF, all seemed to realize that in the final analysis it was necessary to accept the MLF and to make whatever contributions were necessary. Unless this was done, de Gaulle might try to use the force de frappe, not as a military weapon, but as a political instrument to pursue his own independent European policy.

Then there was, too, the question of Israel and the Arab world which the Chancellor described as “a very hot one.” This represented a very delicate problem for Germany. Germany had done very much for Israel. There were the reparations and military assistance. But by the same token, Germany had to proceed very carefully because of possible adverse Arab reaction. The coming conference of the non-aligned nations in Cairo could take a very strong negative position (possibly recognize East Germany) which in turn could complicate the prospects for a German solution. Germany’s relations with the Arab world were very good. Germany was not burdened with a colonial past and there were no present disputes with the Arab states. Germany had a good name and great prestige in the Arab world. Consequently, Germany could not do too much too fast as far as aid for Israel was concerned. The Chancellor therefore felt that Germany had found a good way of solving the problem of supplying Israel with tanks. Germany was going to ship the tanks to Italy where they would remain for a while and be equipped with weapons and ammunition. Later, they would be sent on from Italy to Israel—the connection would not be immediately or readily visible, although the end result would be the same.

The Chancellor wanted the President to understand that Germany was not only thinking of her own problems. Other nations had theirs, too, and Germany shared these problems and was interested in them. He understood two of the President’s major problems—Cuba and South Vietnam. In the case of Cuba, Germany followed U.S. desires and broke off her trade with Cuba and would continue to do so. In South Vietnam, Germany stood ready to do all that could be done economically, politically and financially. Germany was also considering what humanitarian contribution it could make, such as perhaps sending a hospital ship to the area. These were questions, however, that should be discussed at another level.

With regard to Red China, the Chancellor did not envisage diplomatic recognition on the part of Germany. Matters of this sort would be carefully coordinated with the United States. Trade relations with Red China were very limited. No expansion would be undertaken without advance consultation with the United States, both as to time and substance. Moreover, Germany did not anticipate the establishment of any trade commissions.

These were all the items the Chancellor wanted to take up with the President.

The President thanked the Chancellor for his visit. He expressed the high esteem in which the Chancellor is held in this country. As the Chancellor had said, Germany’s problems were our problems, too. The United States did not intend to act in any of these important questions, including matters pertaining to the Communists, without carefully reviewing them with the Chancellor, if at all possible. The President was happy to hear what the Chancellor had said concerning the recognition of and trade relations with Red China. Talk of more trade with Red China would create very serious alarm among the American people. The President had not yet recovered from the shock he had suffered as a result of the British bus sales to Cuba.

(Note: Part of this discussion submitted separately.)².

The President stated that it was important that the Chancellor recognize the problem in the Middle East. He wanted to congratulate him and encourage him with respect to what he had said about the tank deal via Italy. The United States will give all possible aid in these matters. But the next 90 days will be critical ones for the United States and therefore Germany’s help in working with Italy is most helpful and gives the United States great satisfaction. The President felt sure that it would be a long time before the true nature of the deal was recognized. In the meantime, it would be possible to extend a certain degree of aid to both Israel and the Arabs. This was the only intelligent way to handle the problem. Of course, the President indicated, this was only a drop in the bucket compared to the $300 million, in terms of which Khrushchev had spoken to Nasser.

One matter of great concern to the American people was whether the German defense budget and planned foreign assistance would be adequate. Rumors had it that there might not be enough money to permit carrying out the McNamara-Von Hassel agreement³ and certain matters discussed and agreed upon in the context of offset purchases which had been discussed at the Ranch in December and which were needed to help us maintain our six division presence to which we were committed. The President expressed the hope that these matters would not present a problem, because they would create very grave difficulties for us. Consequently, he hoped that these rumors were false.

The President indicated that no one could understand better than he matters of psychological pressure. Everyone was down on him at the present time because of the 15,000 men stationed in Vietnam. He would not yield, however. Instead of bringing them home, as he was asked to do, he would increase their number. He could understand the problem created for the German people by the new treaty. Justified or not, he realized there would be a psychological reaction. This would not, however, weaken American determination to help solve the German problem and U.S. friendship and loyalty toward the German people. He had already instructed his people to work closely with the Chancellor’s people on how to help the German psychological situation.

The President reverted to one matter about which the Chancellor had spoken earlier—the MLF. The President appreciated what the Chancellor had said on this score and hoped it would proceed satisfactorily. The President then indicated that it might be better to join the others in the Cabinet room. He had expected to speak with the Chancellor only for about 15 minutes, but his desire to have frank and useful talk with the Chancellor had prompted him to lengthen this into more than an hour. The President expressed the hope that the Chancellor would have the opportunity during the further course of his visit to discuss matters of trade with Governor Herter,⁴ matters pertaining to the treaty with Secretary Rusk (with whom the President had already discussed this problem), and matters pertaining to offset problems and tanks with Mr. McNamara.⁵ The President himself would be glad to discuss anything else of interest to the Chancellor.

The Chancellor then indicated that the offset agreements previously discussed should create no problem whatsoever. The Germans were ready to go through with what had been agreed upon and assume all responsibilities growing out of the U.S. presence in Germany. However, Germany did not want to discuss these matters too loudly. Germany feared that others, notably the British, would then approach Germany on the same score and it would be difficult to refuse them. The German trade balance was so excellent at the present time and there was such a surplus of orders that the Chancellor had already given the word that purchases should be carried out in the United States as agreed upon. Consequently, there was no cause for concern.

The President then, half-jokingly, raised the question of meat and indicated that he might have to ship some Texas steer to Germany if Australia and New Zealand continued their dumping tactics in the United States.

The meeting was then adjourned to the Cabinet room.⁶

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Erhard Visit, June 1964. Secret. No drafting information is on the source text, which was prepared on June 15. The President and Chancellor met privately in the Oval Office until 12:40 p.m. when they joined the two delegations (see footnote 6 below).
2. See Document 50.
3. See footnote 6, Document 38.
4. See Document 55.
5. See Documents 53 and 54.
6. According to a memorandum of conversation, the President and the Chancellor joined Rusk and Schroeder at 12:40 p.m. The President outlined the discussions with the Chancellor. Secretary Rusk and Erhard then discussed the public handling of the announcement of the Soviet-East German treaty before the Chancellor departed for a lunch meeting with Congressional members. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 GER W–US)