Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

291. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 28, 1968, 1615Z.

17480. For the President and the Secretary from Lodge.

1. This message concerns American policy toward Germany in the light of the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

2. This event—deeply shocking to virtually all Germans—has resulted in increased readiness to provide more money for defense and to move further on European integration, including British entry into the Common Market. Although movement in this direction is hesitant and as yet inconclusive, it is more positive than any heretofore under the present government and clearly marks a waning of de Gaulle’s influence here.

3. I welcome this evolution and believe it is in the interests of the US. Conversely, I believe that if the Germans do not act now, the opportunity to strengthen NATO in the light of the Czechoslovak crisis will have been missed. This will make the invasion of Czechoslovakia an even greater short term Soviet success than it is already and will sharply reduce the possibility of converting it into a long term Soviet failure.

4. If the crisis does not lead to strengthening NATO, I believe the result in Germany will be a mood of pessimism and of accommodation towards the USSR. The result in the US will be disappointment over the lack of European response and continuing pressures to withdraw more American troops from Europe. The outcome either way may be a historic turning point. If it is negative, it will give impetus to a downward spiral in the US relationship with Europe, which, Germans tell me, must eventually result in Western Europe’s becoming an enlarged Finland.

5. The German decision is not firm yet. It may not take final form for several weeks. Perhaps the major concern of German leaders with regard to it is that, if they finally decide on a go-ahead policy, they will be left in isolation by their Allies, and thus exposed to Soviet attack and to both European and German criticism as being hasty and foolish “hardliners.”

6. I hope I appreciate at least some of the difficulties of your present situation, but I believe it most desirable in view of the importance of the German decision to give them some encouragement by positive moves of our own in response to some positive prior European moves. One such move would be a statement from you that you will recommend to the incoming administration that the US should commit itself to continued adherence to the NATO Treaty beyond the 1969 deadline. Another would be a similar recommendation to retain at least the present level of troops in Europe in the face of the new situation caused by the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, and preferably, to return to Europe permanently the two withdrawn brigades of the 24th Division.

7. The reports about strategic arms talks with the Soviets are a real worry here—at whatever level talks might be held. Although I know little of current plans, I accept the proposition that a workable arrangement on this subject would be in the interest of Europe as well as the US and that the matter should be pursued with the Soviets in the future.

8. Nonetheless, given the present atmosphere in Germany, a decision apparently to reward Soviet aggression by embarking on arms talks would, I fear, be incomprehensible here. How, it would be asked, can one explain a willingness to trust the Soviet word when they have just broken it so flagrantly in Czechoslovakia?

9. Another effect of an expression of US willingness to start talks with the Soviets now would put in doubt the judgment and good sense of German leaders in pressing for increases in defense. Such a US decision might well eliminate the possibility of a positive German decision on our defense.

10. You may have a different perspective in Washington. But as I view it, the chance for strengthening NATO, and the damage which would arise from not doing so, outweigh in terms of our national interest the potential gain from opening the talks with Soviets this time.

Lodge

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 16. Secret; Nodis.