Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

289. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, September 18, 1968, 1525Z.

17052. Subject: Ambassador’s talk with Chancellor on implications of Czechoslovakia. Ref: State 239442.²

1. Summary: The Ambassador presented the instructions in the reftel, supplemented by State 238789³ on the Birrenbach visit, to Chancellor Kiesinger. The most significant points in the Chancellor’s reply were (A) satisfaction with the Birrenbach visit, (B) willingness to consider later increases in the German defense budget if based on a careful NATO appraisal of the new security situation, (C) willingness also, hedged with expressions of real concern to consider at least the possibility of defense budget increases to assist us on our military balance of payments problem, (D) pessimism regarding the prospects of getting increased collaboration from de Gaulle, coupled with no apparent willingness by the Chancellor to press him very hard. End summary.

2. The conversation, which lasted more than an hour and a half, took place in a relaxed, frank atmosphere. Carstens and the DCM were also present.

3. The Chancellor began by saying that he had had only a brief conversation with Birrenbach, who was tired after his trip, but that he was pleased to learn that the US analysis in all its essentials was the same as that of the FRG. The central problem, the Chancellor said, is that we are confronted with a serious new military situation, involving a forward position of many additional Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe. It was essential that NATO draw the right conclusions from this situation.

4. Responding to this, the Ambassador then made the following presentation, based on the reftel: the Soviets have done something hazardous in Czechoslovakia which presents new dangers for the Western Alliance. We believe there is a strong German and Alliance view that a NATO response is required in the present situation. Without being provocative, such a response should involve specific actions to improve the Allied defense position in Europe. It should also be prompt if it is to be effective. A NATO Ministerial meeting in the near future would be useful—provided substantive results can be achieved. Following our consultations with Germany and other members of NATO, we intend to propose a special meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the Permanent Representative level to be held in Brussels in late September or early October to determine what governments are willing and able to do. The Secretary also plans a dinner October 8 of those NATO Foreign Ministers who are in New York. This meeting could appraise whether progress on real substance justified a special, early Ministers’ meeting in Brussels. To sum up the general NATO situation, the key question is the willingness of Allied governments to take firm decisions regarding their contributions to the common defense effort.

5. The Ambassador continued that this is a highly important juncture in the development of postwar Europe. There is a necessity for real action. To take it can set us ahead and start somewhat of a an upward spiral; failure to take it will have serious effects on the future of NATO and of Europe. NATO can be compared to a boat in front of a boathouse on a lake; it either goes forwards or backwards; it does not stay still. All NATO countries—in common indeed with countries everywhere—confront complex domestic and international difficulties. This may perhaps be truer for the US at present than for others because of our elections. Certainly what is done between now and the end of this year in NATO will have a very strong effect on the new American government, whoever heads the government. Germany is the country most directly affected by the Soviet move in Czechoslovakia. If Germany shows within NATO that it thinks the situation is sufficiently serious for them to take concrete steps, then we are confident that this will lead to positive action by others. This means decisions on the military budget, both in the sense of money spent for Germany’s own forces and for balance of payments purposes arising from the presence of US forces. A statesmanlike German decision on this latter subject could be politically very important in determining the position of the new American government. The Chancellor has heard the talk of a decline in the American public interest in Europe in recent years. The Czechoslovak events present an opportunity to reverse this trend if positive action is taken to energize NATO and resume progress toward European integration. They also present a risk of its intensification if action is not taken.

6. The Chancellor replied that he wanted to make the German position clear on increased military effort. The FRG felt that it made no sense, as an immediate reflex reaction to the Soviet invasion, to increase indiscriminately the German defense budget. Any decisions on the defense budget must be based on a careful German and NATO study of the new situation. Defense Minister Schroeder must first make considered proposals to the Cabinet. He will soon have an opportunity to do this in the form of the annual white paper on defense which must be submitted to the Bundestag.

7. More specifically, on neutralization of US military expenditures, the Chancellor said that he understood the US position. He added that, however, any solutions involving an increase in the German defense budget presented very serious problems. It could involve a kind of double burden coming on top of any general increase required to strengthen the Bundeswehr itself. He pointed to the very great difficulties recently in hammering out the budget decisions in the medium term financial plan. Nevertheless, the Chancellor said, the FRG was prepared to “look very carefully into this.”

8. Regarding de Gaulle, Chancellor said that he will hear from him September 27 how he sees the new situation created by Czechoslovakia, but that he does not expect any great change in de Gaulle’s willingness to cooperate. It is likely that the only positive thing which can be expected from de Gaulle is a commitment that he will not withdraw from NATO at this time. The Chancellor said that the Germans will look into whether it is possible to work out more collaboration between NATO forces and French forces, but that he was not at all certain that something could be worked out.

9. Regarding the situation in general, the Chancellor said that the Germans had no new reports of an imminent military threat to Romania or Yugoslavia. The Ambassador pointed out that we also had no new information pointing in this direction. The Chancellor said that it is now very difficult to predict how the Soviet leadership will react in a given situation. The German appraisal is that the Kremlin is a disunited, leaderless team, which makes it potentially more dangerous. Khrushchev, although he embarked on some very dangerous ventures indeed, was sufficiently in charge to back down again when the situation required (e.g. Cuba). The difficulty with the present disunited Kremlin team is that it is much harder for it to decide to pull back when it has made an obvious mistake. The Chancellor said that, although he, like others, could hardly say he predicted the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, looking back on it now he realizes that there was a certain inevitability to it. There were certain things, both from the point of view of their ideology and their strategic views, which the Soviets “simply could not let happen.” What their brutal invasion can only mean is that they lost their heads in the Kremlin. The Chancellor also felt that Czechoslovakia really went too far; perhaps Dubcek realized this, but lost control of the situation. He stressed again, as he had in the previous conversation, how the FRG had really bent over backwards to avoid giving the Soviets any pretext whatever to charge German involvement in the liberalization process in Czechoslovakia. He even felt at one point that a Western leader should have warned Dubcek to “take it easy” in his contacts with the West.

10. On the NATO reaction to Czechoslovakia, the Chancellor said that he has been concerned with the slow erosion of NATO over the past few years. He agreed that the events in Czechoslovakia provide a new opportunity for revitalization. He also agreed fully that whatever NATO does should not be dramatic, but measured and considered. The Chancellor felt a stronger and united NATO does have an effect in Eastern Europe and on the Soviet Union. The Soviets will negotiate differently and more responsibly if NATO is stronger and more united. The other Eastern European countries will also be heartened. The Chancellor also mentioned, although quite briefly, the need for the US to exercise at least full co-leadership in the process of developing a proper NATO reaction. The Chancellor concluded by saying that “we will do all that it is possible for us to do to bring about a proper NATO response.”

11. The Chancellor’s comments on his trip to Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan will be reported in subsequent message.⁴

Lodge

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 16. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Moscow, Paris, London, and USNATO. A memorandum attached to the source text indicates that Walt Rostow transmitted the telegram to President Johnson at the LBJ Ranch.
2. Telegram 239442 to Bonn, September 16, provided instructions for requesting a special high-level meeting of NATO members. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 1 NATO)
3. Telegram 238789 to Bonn, September 15, reported on Birrenbach’s visit to Washington. (Ibid.,POL 7 GER W)
4. Telegram 17078 from Bonn, September 18. (Ibid., DEF 1 NATO)