Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

253. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, March 22, 1968, 1310Z.

9894. For the Secretary. Pass to the White House for the President. Subj: Kiesinger disturbed over reports from Washington.

1. I called on Chancellor Kiesinger yesterday to accompany Amb Schaetzel whom the Chancellor received, as an old friend, on the occasion of his current visit to Bonn. With some emotion, the Chancellor turned to me and said that he had been disturbed to hear reports from “recent German visitors to Washington” of “worries and doubts around the President” with respect to him and his govt. It was the form in which these doubts were expressed, as well as their content, which worried him. “Evidently our recent actions have not been understood in Washington.” German visitors were told “by someone close to the Pres” that “the Pres feels cheated (by Kiesinger)”. He would like to repeat that “as long as I am Chancellor I will steer the course that I discussed with the Pres when I met with him last year.”

2. Moreover he has not, as alleged in Washington, engaged in any conspiracy with the Communists. It is true that he is trying to improve relations with the Eastern countries; however, he was not trying to “woo the Reds” as had been charged in Washington. It had also been said that he had knowledge of and had acquiesced in “certain conversations” which had taken place. (I refer that he referred to conversations between SPD officials and rep of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) reported in Embtel 3682,² which Kiesinger appears to have discovered only in mid-February, see Embtel 8934.)³ He had also heard the reproach that the “SPD was the real master” of coalition Eastern policy, and that the Chancellor merely followed. He wanted to make it clear that the govt’s policy was his policy. He was not moving to the left; the SPD was moving to the right. There were forces in the SPD trying to push the govt into a different policy; however, he had intervened to block this. The FonMin himself had given him to reason for doubt, although he did not like the SPD attitude toward Viet-Nam. He was not in favor of being “a school master to Americans.”

3. Kiesinger continued that he had also heard from German visitors to Washington accusations that he was following a Gaullist policy. He had been accused of making a secret agreement with de Gaulle in their last meeting. As he had told me when he returned from the meeting (Embtel 8667),⁴ he was unhappy that France had left the NATO. de Gaulle had assured him, however, that he would not leave the Alliance and that he welcomed US troops in Europe. He had told de Gaulle that de Gaulle underrated the Sov danger and had criticized de Gaulle for having said that “the US could not help but dominate.” He had pointed out to de Gaulle that his anti-American feeling was losing him support in Germany, whereupon de Gaulle had explained to him that he had to take this attitude for domestic reasons.

4. de Gaulle, said Kiesinger, knows the FRG’s opinion about currency and balance of payments problems—the FRG rejection of his efforts to create a new gold standard. He regretted that despite Germany’s efforts de Gaulle would not accept an accelerated KR. He and de Gaulle differed on UK entry, and some have accused him of not talking forcefully enough to de Gaulle on this issue. He had not done more because he knew de Gaulle would not agree. Since he had no effective way of putting on pressure, he had to be content with a modest step forward. He had purposely left the arrangements made in Paris regarding UK entry vague; otherwise all of his efforts would have failed. The French have since pressed for a narrow interpretation of what was agreed in Paris, whereas the Germans have sought a liberal interpretation. President Johnson had told him in their meeting last year that he must be “the harmonizer” between the US and de Gaulle. He had made no secret agreements with de Gaulle. He had nothing to hide. He still believed, however, in the Franco-German treaty. Any rupture between France and Germany would be the end of efforts to build Europe. Indeed, he hoped in the future to come closer to de Gaulle in Eastern policy.

5. With respect to his views toward Europe, he had told de Gaulle of his belief in an “independent Europe in friendly partnership with the US.” He corrected himself to say that “independent” was not quite the word—that what he sought could be better described as a “Europe that stood on its own feet.” This was his firm decision. Any discussion with de Gaulle was a struggle—“A heavy battle.” He knew, however, that de Gaulle cannot realize that role that he has in mind for himself and France.

6. Kiesinger referred to his “Atlantic imperium” concept, which he outlined on March 11 in his speech to the Bundestag.⁵ There appears to have been a misunderstanding of his remarks on the part of certain sections of the American press, and certain American individuals. For example, Birrenbach has heard that Mr. McCloy was disturbed. Perhaps his use of the word “imperium” was a bad one. Some people might as a result consider what he had said Gaullism. He had hesitated, however, to use the word community, since he did not feel it was descriptive.

7. Amb Schaetzel commented that the views as reported to the Chancellor did not accord with those he had heard during his recent visit to Washington. Quite to the contrary, there was widespread appreciation for the Chancellor’s support which had been particularly helpful during the recent gold crisis. He stressed that, during the present unsettled period when both of us are under great tension and pressure, we must make a particular effort to avoid misunderstandings.

8. I assured the Chancellor that the views which he reported did not conform with those that I had encountered in my recent visit to Washington, nor with any reports from this Embassy nor comments in messages from my govt. I had reported fully what he had told me about his last meeting with de Gaulle, and my interpretation that he had not let us down was to my knowledge the view in Washington. As I had under instructions told him in our meeting on Feb. 22 we had no concerns with Germany’s Eastern policy. Indeed, it is wholly in line with the President’s views as expressed in his speech of Oct. 7, 1966.⁶ I thought I knew what he was referring to when he spoke of conversations with the Communists. We knew that he was unaware of these discussions at the time and of his reaction when they were later reported to him. No one suspected him of collusion with the Communists. I had repeated to Washington his full views on the future of Europe, as he had expressed them to me on Feb 22 (Bonn 8692).⁷ Apart from his use of the word imperium, which could create some ambiguity, his views were in full accord with our wellknown European unity-Atlantic partnership approach. Nothing that I had heard from Washington had indicated any concern over his remarks. I expressed doubt that any responsible US official could have made any considered remarks of the nature he described. Certainly they did not reflect the views of the Pres or the SecState. Particularly in time of tension and under informal circumstances with old German friends, it was possible that loose remarks could have been made which could be misinterpreted.

9. The Chancellor appeared somewhat assuaged by Amb Schaetzel’s and my remarks. However, it is clear that he believes in the authenticity of the reports of German visitors which have upset him. Naturally, he did not volunteer nor did I question him on the personalities involved.

10. Comment: I feel sure that whatever was said in Washington—if it was said—has been badly misquoted and misinterpreted to the Chancellor. The reports are obviously irresponsible, and I do not exclude the possibility that they constitute a deliberate effort to cause trouble. In addition to German visitors, it is conceivable that members of the German Emb are involved. We are not able, however, from what we know here, to pin the matter down further.

11. The important thing, however, is that the Chancellor is disturbed over false rumors, at a time when we need him most. We must be absolutely sure that nothing is done to upset the excellent relationship of mutual confidence between Kiesinger and the Pres. We must reassure Kiesinger that we do not doubt him.

12. Particularly in the light of the important contribution which Germany made through Bundesbank Pres Blessing to the success of the monetary meeting held in Washington on March 16–17, I strongly recommend that the Pres send a letter to Kiesinger expressing our appreciation for this assistance. At the same time I believe it would be appropriate, without referring to the present conversation, for the Pres to add a few remarks expressing full confidence in the Chancellor in his relations with de Gaulle and in his Eastern policy.⁸

13. In the future I hope that all high officials will be most cautious that their remarks do not cast doubt as to our own attitude toward the Chancellor or Germany—or suggest that we suspect any disloyalty or change in their attitude toward us.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. McGhee summarized this telegram and commented on it in At the Creation of a New Germany, pp. 249–250.
2. Dated October 4, 1967. (Ibid., DEF 4 NATO)
3. Dated February 29. (Ibid., POL 12 GER W)
4. Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIII, Document 292.
5. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 990–997.
6. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book II, pp. 1125–1130.
7. See footnote 3, Document 248.
8. In a March 27 letter to Kiesinger, transmitted in telegram 136964 to Bonn, President Johnson praised the “contribution” that his exchanges with the German Chancellor were having in creating progress in trade, finance, and security for Europe. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence, Germany)