Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

249. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State ¹

Bonn, February 28, 1968, 1825Z.

8855. Dept pass White House. Subject: Franco-German relations in the light of the Paris visit. Ref: Bonn’s 8568, 8569, 8667, 8682, 8683, 8692, 8693.²

Begin summary: The Feb 15–16 Paris visit of Chancellor Kiesinger and FonMin Brandt, and the subsequent German reaction to the outcome are believed to provide evidence of: A) The continuing importance which the Fed Govt, and particularly Chancellor Kiesinger personally, attribute to relations with France; B) The extent of agreement and disagreement in German and French top-level thinking on the future shape of Europe; and C) The wide acceptance in Germany of the FRG’s policy of determined friendship toward France despite disillusionment over the past months with de Gaulle personally. The Germans appear reasonably satisfied for the present with the limited “progress” made with de Gaulle on enlarging the CM, but were not able to “smoke out” the French position on NPT and in particular on negotiations between EURATOM and IAEA on a verification procedure. Kiesinger’s thinking on the future role of Europe now seems to place more emphasis on the European, than on the Atlantic focus, but he is very firm that the Europe of the future must act in friendly agreement with the US. His concept, therefore, does not seem necessarily in conflict with that of an Atlantic partnership. While the depth of his commitment to France has been shown to be even greater than we earlier anticipated, he seems determined that it will not interfere with German vital interests, nor relations with us. End summary.

1. The Feb 15–16 Paris visit of Chancellor Kiesinger and a good part of his Cabinet, is being interpreted in quite different ways in the various European capitals. I have had an opportunity to discuss the visit both with the Chancellor and the FonMin (reftels), and we have also talked extensively with other German officials who were members of the party. This, together with the reaction of German politicians and the German press, has enabled us to reach certain conclusions concerning the significance of the visit, which I am setting forth in this message.

2. Gen de Gaulle had prepared the stage for the German visit by a very unfair exploitation of the false report of Brandt’s Ravensburg speech. A cloud seemed to hang over the visit, which when it happily disappeared, made the sun of French friendship seem all the brighter—as perhaps was de Gaulle’s intent all along. This was a matter of atmos-pherics, however, which can change again in the future just as they did before and during the visit. In assessing the present trend in Germany’s relations with France, it is considered more important to examine the actual substantive agreements and disagreements apparent during the meeting.

3. The greatest attention, in Germany as elsewhere, went to the British CM entry issue. From Kiesinger down, the Germans treated the outcome as a modest success in the continuing German efforts to find a solution which will lead to eventual British admission without a crisis within the CM. Although the view is widely held elsewhere, including in France, that the FRG “caved in” under French pressure, neither the German media nor any important German politicians have seriously suggested that this is so.

4. The Germans had much earlier considered but never defined a concept of British entry “by stages.” This may permit temporary accept-ance of the contention that what was agreed in Paris was in line with prior German ideas—even though State Sec Lahr, who is perhaps the most influential man in the German Govt on Common Market questions, was undoubtedly thinking in larger terms than those agreed with the French. It remains to be seen whether there can be any real advance on the question of British entry, however, the Germans have for the time being at least produced evidence that the door to British entry is not entirely closed and that opportunities exist for progress—if the British will take them. This was important from the German internal point of view and has been accomplished for the present to the general satisfaction of the German public. This can, of course, be changed if the Brussels meeting Feb 29 results in either the French backing out of their understanding with the Germans or strong opposition to the German-French understanding by the other CM countries.

5. A most interesting aspect of the Chancellor’s account of his talks with de Gaulle was the indication it provided of Kiesinger’s present thinking on Europe. He emphasized to me that he is seeking a Europe which would follow a European policy, but in harmony with the US. Whereas de Gaulle sees the future Europe as a third force between the two super powers, Kiesinger sees it as a bridge between them—a means of “distancing” them and helping relieve tensions between them. He opposes, as does de Gaulle but for different reasons, what he refers to as the “imperium concept” which would bring a tight Atlantic alliance up to the border of the Communist world, because it would put Germany at the point of contact between the two—and create a constant threat to peace.

6. This concept permits Kiesinger, in long-range terms, to find as he undoubtedly wishes—a fairly wide area of philosophical agreement with de Gaulle, since both place emphasis on a Europe of the future with a European policy. A part of Kiesinger’s thinking embraces the idea that Europe “should put its house in order” so that it can achieve an independent role—which is, of course, what de Gaulle also demands.

7. There are, however, important differences between the German and French views. The Germans still, in principle, seek a greater degree of European political unity than de Gaulle, although Kiesinger’s faith in its achievement may be wavering. The Germans wish to maintain the Alliance at least until a new European order is achieved. I think the essential difference, however, is the point which Kiesinger made three times to me—that Europe as it goes forward must act “in friendly agreement” with the United States. It is also noteworthy that he made this point very clear in public, immediately after the Paris meeting.

8. Implicit in the bilateral agreement reached between France and Germany on broad questions affecting Europe’s future is the suggestion of an emergent German-French leadership of the CM. This was put into words by French Amb Seydoux at a large dinner here last week, when he spoke of the comforting fact that the Paris talks had shown Europe now to be under outstanding leadership, i.e., that of de Gaulle and Kiesinger. We detect a good bit of satisfaction in German quarters at this prospect, and less concern than in the past over the predictably adverse reaction in the smaller European countries who tend to equate French-German “leadership” with French-German domination. Germans perhaps derive some satisfaction in being, for the present, even second man in such a combination. They are increasingly sought out by those who wish them to use their influence with de Gaulle—i.e. by US in trade and monetary talks, the UK for CM entry, and the Italians on various CM issues.

9. The German side considered NPT the second most important topic to be discussed in Paris, and they certainly hoped to achieve a clarification of the French position on NPT and in particular on negotiations between EURATOM and IAEA on a verification agreement. They appear, however, to have made no real progress on these questions. The French, as in the past, repeated their disapproval of the principle of the treaty. Franz Josef Strauss, in a television interview from Paris, suggested that the French had no interest in the Germans signing the treaty, since the Germans were already committed under the WEU not to manufacture nuclear weapons. The FonOff, however, has categorically denied to us that the French in any way suggested that the Germans should not sign the treaty. We think it is fair assumption that the Germans were told again by the French that the treaty is an iniquitous example of Soviet-American power politics, but that the decision to sign is their own. They did not follow this to the logical conclusion, however, in giving insight into their own future course of action on matters of vital importance to the German decision. Thus, elements in the German Govt opposed to the treaty such as Strauss returned from Paris strengthened in their opposition. Those like Brandt and possibly Kiesinger, who were seeking some sign of French intentions in EURATOM which might permit the German side to move forward toward acceptance of the treaty, unfortunately returned without much satisfaction.

10. From the point of view of US interests, I realize that the vague French-German proposal for an enlarged free trade area without foreseeable political unity is disturbing. We can only take comfort in Kiesinger’s assertion to us that this must lead to UK entry, and in the still doubtful prospects of success of this approach. If it does gain momentum, however, I frankly doubt that there is much we can do about it, unless we have a demonstrably better alternative to offer the British. Our Western European allies view this problem as essentially European, and I believe we shall have to accept the solution they find. Active intervention by us on this issue now would give de Gaulle an excellent pretext for claiming that the “Americans” wrecked the chances for any progress on UK entry.

11. In light of all of the evidence, I do not believe that Kiesinger’s concept of the future of Europe is in conflict with our Atlantic partnership concept. There is no evidence that such a Europe will, for a long time, be willing to make an important contribution toward the world’s “trouble spots.” If, however, the Europe Kiesinger is speaking of can eventually build the capacity to defend itself without the indefinite presence of US forces this would, as Kiesinger suggests, permit us to be relieved of an unwelcome burden. Moreover, a Europe which would no longer be a direct scene of the Soviet-US confrontation might indeed move more easily toward friendly cohesion. Certainly, the concept is broad enough to permit the Germans to work on it constructively, both with France and with their other allies, including the US. This seems to me to be in our interest, even if some adjustment in our concept of Europe’s future role may be required in the process.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, Brussels, and USNATO.
2. Telegram 8568 from Bonn is Document 247. Regarding telegram 8659 from Bonn, see footnote 2 thereto. Regarding telegrams 8667 through 8693, see footnote 3, Document 248.