Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

228. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 16, 1967, 11 a.m.

TITLE

• President Johnson’s Meeting with Chancellor Kiesinger on August 16, 1967

PARTICIPANTS

• Foreign
  • Kurt Kiesinger, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany
  • Mr. Heinz Weber, Interpreter
• United States
  • The President
  • Mr. Harry Obst, Interpreter

After an exchange of pleasantries the talk turned to the question of possible troop reductions:

The President expressed his disenchantment with an article in the Washington Post of the same morning.² He said it was important to make this matter clear to the Press so that there would be no further distortions. He suggested the Chancellor may want to quote to the Press directly from his minutes of their meeting on the previous day.³ The Chancellor might want to say:

• No decision had been made;
• In his judgment a cutback was not now necessary;
• A decision on such a matter would only be taken after discussing the matter with his cabinet, the United States and NATO.

He did not think it would even be good to talk about any figures on maximum cutbacks, like 15,000 or 19,000.

The Chancellor said he had even gone beyond that. He had stated that even the MOD and his generals were convinced that any needed cut would not have to exceed 15,000 or so.

The President replied it was not good to quote any specific figures. If the Chancellor would quote 15,000, for example, it was almost certain to be expected that other countries would take that figure as a basis for proportionate cuts. The British might say, they would then have to cut back 5,000, the Belgians 3,500, the US 35,000 etc.

The Chancellor stated he did not want to go back to Germany and have to say: President Johnson was adamant on this point, and he had to give in.

He would say that he personally was not convinced of the need of any cuts at this time. However, should that need arise the cuts would not be substantial.

The President said it was better to say “no substantial cuts” than to quote any figures. He did not want to use this as an excuse, but his experts had advised him that Congress may not be willing to allocate the money for the support of US troops in Europe if the FRG made any cuts. Such news would be ill-received on the Hill.

The Chancellor said he would stick to the language of “no substantial cuts”.

The President inquired if an upgrading of the reserves may be a solution to the problem.

The Chancellor pointed to some of the difficulties this would raise. There was a shortage of non-commissioned officers and officers. Relations between the three levels of the service (officers, non-coms, enlisted) were “not sound”. In a crisis non-commissioned officers may have to be supplemented by enlisted men functioning as NCOs. Rotation of reserves may aggravate that situation. Reserves also would have to be provided with periodic training exercises. There might be some merit to the reserve proposal, however, and he would have it examined.

The President suggested a sentence in the joint statement on their meeting dealing with Franco-German cooperation might be formulated differently.

The Chancellor, in agreeing to the change, spoke again of his intention to play a “harmonizing role” in US-French relations.

The President encouraged the Chancellor to be a bridge-builder between the two countries. The Chancellor may want to show de Gaulle notes of the transcript of their Washington meetings. The Chancellor was welcome to relay to de Gaulle the comments of the President on de Gaulle as stated in these meetings. He was anxious to avoid all quarreling among friends and allies. He was convinced, as he had stated before, that in times of real danger de Gaulle would be on our side.

The President then encouraged the Chancellor to take a little walk through the grounds. On the way out he showed him the folder with the “hot-line” transcripts⁴ and pointed to one message in particular which the Chancellor read with interest.

The President and the Chancellor then talked privately without interpreters in the Rose Garden and while walking. (At one point Mr. Walt W. Rostow was called by the President and joined them for about ten minutes.)

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, Kiesinger Visit. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Obst. The meeting was held in the White House.
2. “LBJ Is Cool to Cut in German Troops,” by Chalmers Roberts.
3. See footnote 2, Document 226.
4. The notebook of Hotline messages is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, USSR, Washington-Moscow “Hot Line” Exchange.