223. Letter From John J. McCloy to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
Dear Walt:
I have been increasingly impressed by the importance of the coming talks with Kiesinger so much so that I am taking the liberty of writing you directly in the thought that you might convey some of my concern and some of my thinking to the President in preparation for the visit.
We are at a point of history where some very important decisions must be taken soon in respect of the Alliance and Germany, as an extremely important part of Europe, is one of the focal points on which a number of these far-reaching decisions have to be made.
The Alliance is coming up for review in 1969. Perhaps the review will be precipitated in 1968 by a formal notice of the renunciation of the Alliance by France. There are some in this country who are already advocating “some dilution of the Alliance” in the form of a détente with the Soviet Union. There are others who instinctively favor a return to a form of opportunistic isolationism on our part. There are those who feel that difficult as the prospect of reinvigorating NATO in the light of the French defection appears to be, that it is still the best clear chance for peace and security and for a reasonable modus vivendi with the Soviet Union.
deGaulle has not only defected from NATO, he is from all the signs seeking an outright reversal of the Alliance.2 On top of this, we have an equivocal position on the part of Germany—equivocal due in part to a domestic political diversion which has taken the form of a pro-French-pro-U.S. division in Germany. This division has become a bit overheated by a very strong and very virulent campaign on the part of France to convince the Germans that the only way they can prove their loyalty to the Franco-German treaty is to follow the French lead in its present anti-American phobia. There is also some equivocation apparent in respect to the German Government’s attitude toward the East as has been evidenced by some recent speeches of Brandt and even in some of Kiesin-ger’s.
[Page 562]A new phenomenon has entered into the picture in the form of the emergence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and the Mediterranean as an aggressive political force there. It is clear that the Soviets intend to expand their position there if only to remove the sting of their miscalculation of the Israeli capacities. They intend to gain a position, if possible, which will enable them to influence the flow of oil from the area. They have seen the long-range potentialities of new pro-Soviet forces on the southern flank of NATO and astride the strategic nexus which the Mediterranean represents between the East and the West and between Europe and Africa. This only accentuates the pressing need for the Germans and the Americans to understand each other’s objectives very clearly at this critical period in the history of the Alliance. The Soviets have not become benign merely because they seek to avoid a nuclear exchange. Their actions in the Middle East clearly demonstrate this.
On the other hand they have been hearing much from us on the subject of détente with the Soviet Union. This is not only in the nuclear field but in other areas as well. The article by Gilpatric in the Sunday Times will set them off again. What are our intentions? They are not going to be satisfied with general protestations any more than we should be. The Germans are great ones to insist on new assurances every week, but in the political world in which Europe moves, I have no doubt our position seems equivocal and disturbing too.
The important thing is to achieve, if at all possible, a real meeting of the minds as to what our respective objectives really are and what steps should be taken to bring them about. What do we intend to do about the Alliance if France does withdraw? What are the actual steps Brandt has in mind to take in furtherance of his long-range objectives in respect of the East? What do we really wish the Germans would do in respect of France?
It is important also to understand what should be avoided at the meeting. I suppose all would agree that we should not start out by berating the Chancellor for the reduction of his forward budget. We should not, I repeat, not, attempt to replay the record of the Erhardt visit. I doubt that it would be wise to even bring up offsets again. We should not take the budget cut as a new excuse to move in on our own troop levels. If we did this so close to the 1969 date, I think the base for a convincing reconfirmation of the Alliance and NATO would be too dangerously narrowed. I should assume that the tripartite agreements carried us beyond the need for that. It was implicit in them that we would not proceed unilaterally toward the reduction of troop levels except in conjunction with each other and with a real discussion of what the strategic and tactical needs were. It was also agreed that the Foreign Exchange problem was a common problem. I would leave it at that assuming that both they and we intended to operate under those principles. This whole issue is one [Page 563] which is so dependent on what our long-range objectives in respect of Europe and the Soviet Union are that the time should be spent in exploring those objectives in real depth rather than threatening further troop reductions or bickering with them over the budgetary developments or the way they handled the deGaulle visit.
We have a real opportunity now with the decline of deGaulle’s prestige to begin now to lay a base for more meaningful discussion of our relations with Germany and Western Europe than we have had for some time. The disenchantment with deGaulle in Germany goes very deep and if we can show Europe that in spite of our domestic problems and with Viet Nam, we are prepared to think seriously of our future relations with Europe, this will be impressive. At the same time we ask that they be aware of our problems and relations with the rest of the world. Neither Europe nor we can afford these days to be provincial in our thinking.
I hope this may be of some help.
Sincerely,
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, vol. 38. No classification marking. In an August 14 memorandum to the President, attached to the source text, Rostow provided a brief summary of the contents of the letter and commented: “You will, I believe, wish to read this letter from John McCloy. He underlines that the critical objective of the [Kiesinger] visit should be to achieve a significant meeting of the minds on détente.” President Johnson appointed McCloy as U.S. Special Representative to the United States-United Kingdom-Federal Republic of Germany talks on Central European Defense on October 11, 1966.↩
- Maybe this is too strong, but it certainly is an outright neutralization of the Alliance. [Footnote in the source text.]↩