Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

221. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, July 18, 1967, 1607Z.

698. Subj: Meeting with Brandt. NATUS. I called on FonMin Brandt today at my request. The following topics were discussed:

1) Defense budget. Brandt said that he did not know precisely how the present unfortunate situation resulting from the defense budget decision had come about. There had been confusion and misunderstanding all around. The issue of “a change in defense concept” resulting from the budget decision had been injected into the Cabinet discussion by FinMin Strauss, but was included in the decision report only by accident. It will not be included in the final action. One thing he is sure of, however, is that the agreed overall defense budget figure will not be changed. He expects that the Germans will start discussions with respect to any changes in NATO commitments in September. This will be well in time for the NATO force planning and strategic decisions which will be taken in December.

There are several points of view, Brandt said, with respect to what steps the Germans should take in light of their defense budget decision. There is one point of view, which apparently includes the U.S. Congress, which is concerned principally with the number of divisions involved. General Lemnitzer tends, however, to look to the effectiveness rather than the number of divisions. Brandt believes that we should take into account the fact that there will be at least three or four days warning time and that “several divisions” might be left in skeleton form to be filled up in an emergency within the alert period. Although SACEUR is, in general, not interested in reserves as such, he might be interested in such divisions. Another proposal is to fold the territorial forces into the Bundeswehr.

2) German public attitude. I asked the FonMin how he could explain the apparent general apathy on the part of the German public to the defense cuts. I had been told that 64 percent believe that the cuts should be deeper. Brandt replied that there was no simple answer to my question. Since there had been no crises since that in Berlin in 1961–62, many considered there to be no immediate danger. Others believe a better defense can, with changes in the organization or concept, be obtained for less money. He did not believe that there was any general feeling that NATO in its present form had outlived its usefulness and required major revision. This feeling, should it ever come, will come much later and only after a change in the situation in Eastern Europe.

3) European security. I referred to recent public remarks Brandt had made regarding a European security system, particularly his statement on July 2. Did this represent a coherent plan which the German Government might put forward? Brandt replied to the contrary, stating that his remarks had indeed only been “tactical starting points.” He felt that they must not leave the search for peace as a monopoly for the other side. Brandt had recently told Couve de Murville that he was opposed to calling a peace conference, as had been recently proposed by French Prime Min Pompidou. This must come later. Brandt said that he is currently more interested in the substance of peace securing arrangements, concerning which his thinking has focused on the following points:

A) The renunciation of the use of force

B) Making clear that Germany is not aiming at ownership of nuclear weapons

C) The search for East-West arrangements which could result in a reciprocal lowering of troop levels without disadvantages to either side.

These are matters which NATO itself is seized with, and in which the Germans are already cooperating. In the meantime, no drastic changes in NATO are required. Brandt regrets the fact that unilateral decisions are in the meanwhile being taken in the West through reduction in forces, without obtaining corresponding Soviet reductions. Indeed, he opposed the recent budgetary cuts as FonMin for this reason—even though, as SPD leader, he had to support them in the end. Brandt said that the Chancellor’s recent statement to the effect that a reunified Germany could not be a member of either power bloc, reflected the view that the German question cannot be solved within the present context of East-West confrontation. This does not mean, however, that Germany would withdraw from NATO. Indeed, Germany could not withdraw from anything unless, at the same time, it enters something new. (I interpret this to mean either East-West security framework or a situation in which the East-West confrontation has disappeared.)

4) de Gaulle visit.² According to Brandt, the discussions during the recent de Gaulle visit went quite well in the bilateral field. The principal gain had been in the creation of organizational structures for intensified cooperation in the industrial and technical areas. In the political field, the talks had resulted in agreement for a greater exchange of information between the two affecting Eastern Europe, including telegrams received by both from their Embassies. (It is interesting to note that the FonOff has (Embtel 523)³ recently declined our offer for intensified intelligence exchange affecting Eastern Europe.) With regard to the big political issues, however, the situation after the meeting remains as before. de Gaulle had emphasized that the two countries must defend their national identities. Referring to “our American friends,” which Brandt thought an amusing slip, de Gaulle said that he did not think they aimed at domination, but that they were so big that they could not avoid it. The Germans, for their part, had said that they were concerned only with the threat imposed by the Soviets. With regard to England, de Gaulle had posed the question “What is England?”, mentioning Singapore and Hong Kong. He had warned against the special relationship between the UK and US and the threat of an Atlantic Europe. Brandt said that the attitude of de Gaulle toward UK entry posed a serious problem for Germany, which would become more acute before the end of the year. With regard to the Middle East, de Gaulle revealed the French objective as being basically to establish a presence there, without being too specific as to what it could accomplish. de Gaulle is convinced that the Arabs will not stick together in the long run. In Brandt’s view, it is not possible for Europe in its present state of organization to form a common policy toward the Middle East—or other similar problems.

5. Common Market political cooperation. Brandt pointed out that the EEC Ministers had in their meeting on May 30 agreed to consider the question of political cooperation, not however any particular subject. Brandt does not know how far France will be willing to go in discussing particular political questions. The Six Foreign Ministers will meet again towards the end of October and will attempt to arrange another heads of state meeting before the end of the year. de Gaulle had asked Kiesinger to take the initiative in proposing such a meeting. Brandt is contacting the Italians to check the possibility of their proposing Luxembourg as the meeting place. He is, however, not optimistic that the meeting will take place, since the Dutch are reluctant to take part in such a meeting without progress on UK admission. In the event no progress is made in the next Council Ministerial Meeting, Brandt will attempt to convince the Dutch that this is a necessity.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Paris. London, Moscow, Berlin, USAREUR, EUCOM, USAFE, and SHAPE.
2. July 12–13.
3. Dated July 13. (Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US)