Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

197. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, January 27, 1967, 1715Z.

8747. NATUS. Subj: Meeting with Brandt. I met today with FonMin Brandt at my request. I advised him that my basic purpose was to discuss with him his forthcoming visit to America starting Feb 8 in WashDC. I went over the present plans and asked him what subjects he had particularly in mind for discussion. I noted that he had already indicated that he wished to talk about the offset. Brandt replied that another important subject was East-West relations. He had no further specific ideas apart from the proposed non-proliferation treaty. The ensuing discussion centered around the following points:

(1) Offset. I reported to Brandt the consternation which has been caused in London and Washington, as well as their Embassies here in Bonn, by State Sec Schuetz’s statement in London that there would be no money in the 1967 German budget for offset payments beyond the current agreements. This would, of course, create a severe problem, particularly for the British. We hoped that the German Govt would take no firm decision with respect to the future of the offset until after full consultation within the Trilateral Commission and, hopefully, in agreement with the British and ourselves. The British are so committed to a troop reduction in the event the offset is not continued, that a completely negative position by Germany could result in a large-scale exodus of British troops later this year, which would also play into the hands of Senator Mansfield and others seeking a reduction of US forces. With respect to the long-range offset, I felt that a suitable formula could be worked out between the Germans and ourselves involving their defense purchases which they would obviously have to make, plus suitable financial neutralization for the remainder.

The FonMin replied that Schuetz’s statement had intended to refer only to funds available within the current budget. He hoped that the govt could go to the money market for additional sums. He himself was interested in the possibility of a financial neutralization of part of the US offset; however, his latest information from the Bundesbank indicated some difficulty. In response to my query, he said that no decision had been made with respect to the possible Phantom-Spey purchase from the US and UK which, I pointed out, would go a long way toward solving the British problem for some time ahead.

Brandt said that the new German rep to the Trilateral Commission, Amb Duckwitz, would shortly be in touch with his opposite numbers. He speculated on the possibility of his visiting them separately before convening a new meeting, in order to convey to them the seriousness of the difficulties faced by the Germans in their budget. I did not attempt to dissuade him from such a course; however, I pointed out that little progress could be expected towards the Tripartite objectives of the commission unless all three were present.

(2) Non-proliferation treaty. I advised the FonMin that Amb Foster had not intended to convey to Amb Knappstein, as we had heard he had reported, that the wording of the NPT must be accepted by the Germans on a take it or leave it basis. We welcome constructive suggestions from the Germans and others. However, we had only pointed out that great difficulties might arise, not necessarily with ourselves but with the Soviets, in attempting to get changes. I also told Brandt that we knew his attitude and that of the Cabinet, which had on Jan 11 approved the NPT in principle, but that I was concerned by the widespread criticism and suspicion of the treaty developing in Germany. In particular, I was concerned at the “straw man” being created to the effect that the treaty would stand in the way of European political unification. Such doubts would be increased by Amb Grewe’s speech before the German Foreign Policy Assn on Jan 25 (see Bonn 8688).² I hope that the govt will do what it can to clear up these misgivings.

Brandt replied that it was difficult to do this. He would not make speeches in defense of the treaty because of the secrecy imposed on the subject and the fact that the draft itself could not be shown. He hoped however, in the near future, to speak publicly on several matters of principle raised by the treaty. He expected to raise not only German objectives—but those held in common with others. He mentioned, in particular, Italy.

I pointed out that, according to our interpretation, which we had made clear to the Germans and would subsequently make public, the treaty would not deny them anything which was capable of their attainment or which they had not already foresworn. I was confident that the German Govt would ultimately approve; however, our relations would suffer if there resulted a widespread feeling that German interest had thereby been sacrificed by us as a contribution to our détente policy with the Soviets.

(3) UK and the Common Market. I asked Brandt whether he had any information regarding the results of PM Wilson’s recent visit to Paris.³ He replied that he did not; however, he was expecting a message shortly from Wilson. He explained that Germany’s attitude with regard to British entry into the Common Market is quite clear. Germany would like to see the Common Market enlarged, so she will have a larger trading area and thereby be better able to bear the burden of the charges forced on her in agriculture. However, Germany is not in a position to force the issue with the French. One cannot, Brandt said, “change the map of Europe.” (I assume he meant by this substitute England for France.)

(4) East-West policy. I expressed interest at the recent reports of the impending establishment of diplomatic relations between Germany and Romania.⁴ I asked how the prospects looked in the other capitals. Brandt replied that State Sec Lahr, who has just returned from Budapest, reported the Hungarians “may be willing” to follow the Romanian example. They must first, however, discuss the matter at a party meeting which is scheduled in the near future. In response to my query, he said that the Berlin clause question would not appear to be a problem. The Hungarians appeared willing to accept the formula worked out with the Romanians. Prague, however, posed greater difficulties. There was no trade mission there which, as in Bucharest and Budapest, could be transferred over to the economic section of the new Embassy as a going concern.

He would, in addition, while he is in Washington, wish to discuss German relations with the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, these are negative. I commented on the tough line that Soviet Amb Tsarapkin has been taking in private conversations (i.e. with the British Amb and myself, as reported in Bonn 8085).⁵ Brandt remarked that, following Tsarapkin’s recent return from Moscow, he had either very rigid instructions or no instructions.

(5) Indian wheat. I went over the general objectives of Under Sec Rostow’s recent visit to Bonn, pointing out the great importance we attach to the members of the consortium assuming responsibility in the future for emergency shipments of grain to India, and specifically for 1/2 of the requirements for the last half of this year. The President looked on this as comparable to a “community fund” operation in the US, where the leading citizens are all expected to help their less fortunate neighbors. The better endowed countries of the world could not ignore, on humanitarian grounds alone, the impending food crisis in India. We felt that Germany, one of the wealthiest of the free world countries, would certainly want to do her share. Having in mind Germany’s tight budget, we would be glad as Under Sec Rostow advised, for Germany to get credit under the current offset for any grain purchases she made from the US.

I pointed out that this would, of course, be limited to payments during the first six months of this year. It could not come from deposits made in the past, which had already been adopted into our balance of payments. I hoped that the German Govt would make its decisions within the two week period estimated by Min Wischnewski. It would be most favorably received in Washington, if he would come there with a positive response.

Brandt replied merely that he understood the importance of the US proposal and that he would discuss it with the Chancellor.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to London and Paris for the Embassy and USNATO.
2. Dated January 26. (Ibid., DEF 18–6)
3. Wilson visited Paris January 24–25.
4. For text of the January 31 communiqué announcing the exchange of diplomatic recognition, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, p. 181.
5. Dated January 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 GER W)