Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

188. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, December 8, 1966, 1940Z.

6936. Subj: Meeting with Brandt.

1. I called on ForMin Brandt today at his request. This was his first official day at the FonOff and I was his first visitor. He had come into the office only briefly yesterday and had met with the Ambassadors at a reception this morning. Brandt received me cordially and warmly reciprocated my expression of pleasure, personally and on behalf of my govt, in working with him in his new capacity. He appreciated Secretary Rusk’s message and looked forward to seeing him in Paris on Wednesday and Thursday of next week—also at the Quadripartite dinner. He was sorry that he could not meet him on Tuesday, as the Secretary had suggested, however, he was detained in Bonn by the Chancellor’s statement of policy to the Bundestag.

2. Brandt then made a brief statement of the new government’s foreign policy. He hoped that we would take it for granted that they reaffirm Germany’s traditional friendship with and confidence in the U.S. They hope to add to what has been accomplished together in the past. There had been problems, particularly in the area now under discussion by the Trilateral Commission, however, he understands that progress is being made. There are a number of problems now facing the government which they look forward to discussing with us frankly, both in seeking advice and soliciting our ideas. He mentioned three particular objectives to which he attached priority:

(A) He was anxious to speed up the progress of the Kennedy Round so that its success could be assured.

(B) He was anxious to take up the problem of Eastern Europe, and to discuss it at an early date with the French.

(C) He hoped that progress could be made concerning the problem of Britain (presumably Britain’s entry into the Common Market). He did not expect sensational changes to occur as the result of the government’s efforts. However, he did hope to put more energy into the solution of key problems.

3. Brandt admitted that he was not too familiar with the detailed problems facing NATO. However, he hoped to inform himself prior to the forthcoming Paris meeting. In his statement to the Bundestag, Chancellor Kiesinger will express the hope to see President Johnson. He will not, however, make reference to statements the President has made in the past of his intention to come to Europe (presumably because it was related to Erhard’s invitation). The new government will, of course, welcome the President if he does come.

4. I queried the FonMin as to what new impulses the govt might add to German foreign policy. Brandt replied that the discussions on foreign policy between the CDU/CSU and SPD, which had led to the formation of their coalition, revealed a high degree of common conviction on foreign policy, in particular, with respect to its presentation to the German people. The Germans need to be talked to as if they were grown up—as indeed they are. The government should not just say all is going well. The problems which Germany faces with the US and France must be explained to the people.

5. Brandt said that the new govt will attempt to make a new start with France. He did not know how far this would get. In his view the German-French Treaty had been more successful than de Gaulle had been willing to admit. This has been particularly true in the business field. Indeed, the treaty itself is only a skeleton—which must be fleshed out. He was glad that PriMin Wilson was going to Paris first, in connection with his talks on UK entry into the Common Market. This will enable Germany to use the apparatus of the German-French Treaty to precipitate long-range discussions with France on the subject—perhaps not immediately but certainly during the latter part of next year. Brandt commented as an aside that he believed the US and France had the same views with respect to East-West relations.

6. Brandt said that the new government was still considering how to approach the nuclear problem. It is clear that Germany does not want ownership of nuclear weapons. They hope that non-proliferation can be worked out so that the legitimate interests of non-nuclear powers can be taken care of. The new government will not take up the so-called “hardware solution”.

7. Turning to all-German matters, Brandt said that both parties—the CDU/CSU as well as the SPD—were determined not to give up the legitimate aim of Germans to reunify themselves. They hope to develop technical instrumentalities to strengthen ties with the Eastern Zone in the humanitarian, cultural, scientific and economic fields. This would not, however, involve recognition.

8. It is not yet clear what the policy of the new govt will be toward Eastern Europe. He and the Chancellor agree that they should express the hope that the progress already made can be extended. They were prepared to normalize diplomatic relations if a formula could be found in accordance with German interests. They are, however, not yet ready to name particular countries in this connection. The Chancellor will, in his statement to the Bundestag, say something special about Poland and Czechoslovakia, something going beyond the German peace note of March 25. It will, for example, be more specific than the peace note with respect to the Munich Agreement. At the same time, the government would make a gesture to the expellees—including a clear statement that the govt does not approve of their expulsion. The Chancellor’s statement will not mention the Oder-Neisse Line, but will talk of Poland’s future role in Europe.

It will show sympathy and understanding for Poland’s suffering as a result of its divisions and its desire for security. The Chancellor will say that, in connection with a peace settlement, Germany will be prepared for solutions that will not “be easy for them.” No reference, however, will be made to the sacrificing of any specific vital interests—an indication will only be given of the general direction of German policy.

9. At this point I gave orally to Brandt, almost verbatim, the statement of policy which had been approved by the Dept (see State 98003 and Bonn 6525).² To this I added the US policy towards emergency legislation, namely, that we, the British and French hope that legislation will be passed which would permit the lapse of Allied reserve rights to act in an emergency. We would particularly welcome legislation covering the monitoring of post and telecommunications which would enable the Allies to relinquish the rights and responsibilities they are now exercising in this field.

10. In response, Brandt expressed appreciation for the fact that we had prepared such a statement and for the specific statement with respect to German reunification and Berlin. Brandt thereupon raised the question of Berlin voting rights. He did not wish to revert to statements that he had made before assuming his present responsibilities. He did, however, think that the Embassy statement on this issue could have been expressed in a different way. He now wished to discuss this whole question with us fully. As a result of my approach to StateSec Carstens (see Embtel 6737),³ he had “taken care of the Parliamentary initiative (of the FDP).” “There would be no coup d’etat.” He assured me that, although he has issues to raise with us, they would in no way be directed against the rights of the Allies.

11. Brandt said that, as a matter of fact, he also wished to discuss with the Three Powers and the Senat a broader range of questions affecting Berlin, including its future economic situation. This was not with the objective of seeking new aid for Berlin, but rather advice as to how the city should proceed as had been sought after the building of the Wall.

12. I assured Brandt that we would be glad to discuss the voting rights issue or any other Berlin issue at any time. The Secretary hoped in particular to discuss this with him when he saw him in Paris. I did not wish to go into the details of the recent role of the Allies in this connection. I felt sure that if there were time to explain the situation from our viewpoint he would agree that we had no alternative than to take the course we did. I stressed that what we had done was a result of Allied positions taken in capitals. We had not made a statement but had responded to questions after a situation had developed which we felt necessitated the affirmation of our position.

13. Brandt stated that the new govt will, of course, fulfill its offset obligation. Also, it will in its discussions in the Trilateral Commission, seek to clarify its budget problems. (There was no time to clarify whether he meant this with respect to the present or only future offsets.) He expressed appreciation for our interest in the problem of the “technological gap.” This will be appreciated by the EconMin Prof. Schiller. In the German presentation in Euratom with respect to the Polish proposal, they emphasized that the FedRep did not wish to break up the European cooperation which has been developed under Euratom. However, they hoped an agreement could be worked out with IAEA. Brandt expressed the intention of the govt to proceed with preparation of emergency legislation.⁴

McGhee

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 12. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London, Paris, Berlin, Moscow, Brussels, The Hague, and Rome, and pouched to all other NATO capitals and Consulates.
2. Telegram 6525 from Bonn, November 30, contained the text of a suggested statement of policy. (Ibid.) In telegram 98003, December 7, the Department of State gave its approval to the overall tone of the statement, suggesting a series of additions and modifications in the wording. (Department of State, Central Files,POL 1 GER W–US)
3. Telegram 6737 from Bonn, December 5, reported McGhee’s discussions with German officials concerning voting rights. (Ibid., POL 14 GER W)
4. McGhee provided further observations on his first talk with Brandt in telegram 6976 from Bonn, December 9. (Ibid., POL 15–1 GER W)