Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

183. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State¹

Berlin, October 20, 1966, 1555Z.

528. NATUS. Subj: Brandt-Abrasimov meetings² as seen from both sides of the Wall.

1. In seeking to assess the Brandt-Abrasimov meetings one cannot but be impressed with the degree of mutual interest that lies behind them and that suggests their continuation.

2. From Abrasimov’s viewpoint there are important long and short-term advantages which seem to outweigh the disadvantages. An important long-range gain for the Soviets is the establishment of direct contacts and continuing discussions with a potential German government leader at a time when the ruling parties in Bonn appear to be in some disarray. This offers the Soviets both a certain assurance for the future and a shorter-term prospect that the present Bonn government might feel itself compelled to initiate new policies of its own toward the East, from which the Soviets may benefit. Continuance and expansion of the Brandt-Abrasimov relationship therefore offer possibilities for (A) giving further impetus to the SPD inclination, marked since the Dortmund Convention, to undertake new approaches toward the East; and (B) nurturing suspicion and friction between the principal parties on the domestic political scene, between Berlin and Bonn, and between Brandt and the Allies in Berlin.

3. On Berlin matters, Abrasimov will undoubtedly be considering ways in which the Soviets can capitalize on Brandt’s desire to give Berlin a new role in East-West matters. By encouraging Brandt in thinking that certain of his Berlin projects might get Soviet support he may see a means for obtaining Brandt’s backing, or at least tacit acceptance, of an increased Soviet presence and role in West Berlin. Direct dealings with Brandt as GovMayor would give substance to the Eastern thesis that West Berlin is a “special political entity,” they would tend to weaken the link between Berlin and the Federal Republic, and they would promote a de facto Quadripartite status in West Berlin alone.

4. The principal disadvantage for Abrasimov is the effect of his association with Brandt on his relations with Ulbricht. Ulbricht is certainly anything but pleased at the prospect of a continuing—and perhaps expanding—dialogue, since this reinforces the overriding role of the USSR as the most useful party for West Germans to talk with on all-German matters. It makes clear that the Soviets intend to maintain as many channels as possible for dealings on the German and Berlin problems. It undermines somewhat Ulbricht’s own efforts to foster “negotiations” in various channels with the FRG and the West Berlin Senat. Although the dialogue thus raises certain doubts and fears among the East German leaders, they certainly are aware that they cannot effectively prevent it. The Soviets doubtless know this too and will therefore want to press ahead without too much concern for East German anxieties and misgivings.

5. From Brandt’s viewpoint the dialogue with Abrasimov is another step forward in the SPD’s effort to open new avenues of approach to the East, an effort in which Brandt has himself taken the leading role. In domestic political terms he has seen the opportunity to build up his own prestige nationally by demonstrating imagination and initiative on East-West matters shortly before important elections in two West German Laender. In a broader sense he has achieved greater maneuverability for himself vis-à-vis the GDR and has undercut to some extent the latter’s hoped-for role on all-German matters. While the immediate political benefits are important to him, it is our belief that he conceives of his new relationship primarily as offering a hope for eventually breaking through the impasse that has characterized the German problem for many years, and regarding which he and many other Germans have concluded that the Allies are not going to create movement.

6. In West Berlin political terms these meetings mark a new phase in the post-Wall history of the city. Only about a year ago such encounters would have been criticized whereas now they are generally accepted and even widely approved. Brandt not only perceived this trend but helped to create the conditions that made such talks possible. While his primary interests are undoubtedly broader than Berlin, he sees the dialogue also as a step forward in his efforts to improve Berlin’s position in a changing East-West situation. He sees opportunities, moreover, for going around Pankow and establishing a direct line which can be helpful in getting the GDR to agree to improvements in the Berlin situation. Brandt may regard his contact with Abrasimov as being favorable to Allied interests as well, or at the least, he may consider that certain of his Berlin interests can be moved ahead without running into direct conflict with Allied rights and responsibilities.

7. It is in this area that the most difficult problems arise for the Allies. The Soviets, for example, might be led to believe that they can achieve certain objectives in Berlin regardless of Allied objections by dealing directly with Brandt. So long as Brandt sincerely pursues interests which are shared by the Allies and the Senat and so long as he is forthcoming with us about his talks, they may be advantageous to both. If, however, he established arrangements for a continuing dialogue with the Soviets, the contents of which may not be fully revealed to the Allies and which may touch on Allied interests, this could lead ultimately to an undermining of the Allied position in the city. In the past Brandt has been mindful of Allied interests and realistic in his handling of them, but it may be necessary for him to be reminded occasionally that he cannot deal with the Soviets officially and with commitment of matters relating to Berlin which affect Allied rights and responsibilities. In the most recent meeting (October 12) Brandt discussed certain specific Berlin problems which have heretofore been handled by the Allies and suggested continuing Soviet-Senat contact on them. This represents a departure from his earlier comments (September 29) to Abrasimov that such matters were for discussion with the Allies. As indicated in Bonn 4735³ an Allied approach to Brandt on this aspect of his talks is presently under consideration by the Bonn Embassies.⁴

Calhoun

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL GER W–USSR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, London, Moscow, Paris, USAREUR, CINCEUR, and USNMR SHAPE for POLAD.
2. The Mission reported on Brandt’s October 12 discussions with Abrasimov in telegram 494 from Berlin, October 14. (Ibid.) Brandt discussed the meetings in My Life in Politics, pp. 159–161.
3. Dated October 19. (Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–USSR)
4. In telegram 70626, the Department of State commented that while it objected to receiving short notice of these meetings, they might be of advantage to the Allies and, in any case, “There is little we can do to keep Brandt from seeing the Soviet Ambassador whenever he wants to.” (Ibid.)