Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

181. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 10, 1966, 10:15 a.m.

Mr. President:

In connection with our position on non-proliferation, this [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report, which I take to be accurate, should be read.

It shows clearly both the German commitment to non-proliferation and the problem they would have if we tried to jam down their throats the sort of agreement now proposed to us by the Russians.

In particular it shows that we will have problems, which I believe are surmountable, if we make explicit in a treaty our position on the veto.

If we go beyond, with the Soviet language, I think we have a better than even chance that the Germans would not go with us.

Walt

Attachment²

Washington, September 23, 1966.

[2 paragraphs (7 lines of source text) not declassified]

The following is a position paper on the problem of nuclear non-proliferation prepared by the CDU/CSU Bundestag Fraktion Committee for defense and foreign policy. The draft, which is dated 29 June 1966, was prepared by the Committee after presentations made by the German observer in Geneva, Ambassador Schnippenkoetter, on 15 February and 19 April. The drafting committee consisted of Dr. Kurt Birrenbach, Theodor Baron Von Und Zu Guttenberg and Dr. Werner Marx.

The Committee recognizes the decision of the Federal Government to support in principle non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, i.e., not to put these at the disposition of the national authorities of non-nuclear powers.

The Committee doubts whether a global agreement, as sought by the nuclear powers, is the most practical method to achieve non-proliferation.

The Committee is working on the assumption that none of the powers now in possession of nuclear weapons has any intention of giving such weapons to other states. In view of the special structure of the Warsaw Pact, this hypothesis is considered to be particularly valid for the Soviet Union.

The Committee notes that the Federal Republic surrendered the right to manufacture nuclear weapons when it signed the Paris Agreement of 1954.³ The Committee therefore expects other states whose status is comparable to that of the Federal Republic to make a similar renunciation before the Federal Republic is asked to offer additional concessions.

The Committee views an unqualified ban against proliferation as tantamount to a division of the world into nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Such an arrangement, chartered as it would be in international law, could prejudice the security and the political roles of the non-nuclear powers for an unforeseeable future. It would have a particularly negative effect on a united Europe of the future.

It is the opinion of the Committee that a non-proliferation accord must be reached within the wider framework of a disarmament agreement. Such an agreement should provide for a step-by-step reduction of nuclear weapons and carriers currently in the possession of the nuclear powers, make arrangements for appropriate controls, and ensure that the strategic balance of power both on the European continent as well as in the world as a whole is not disturbed. This requirement appears to the Committee all the more necessary because the non-nuclear powers of Europe obviously feel themselves threatened by the more than 700 Soviet medium-range missiles emplaced along the Western frontier of the Soviet Union.

The Committee sees a decisive difference between a waiver to the right to possess nuclear weapons which is made to an ally and an agreement involving a third power such as is proposed in the present drafts. The latter would make the Soviet Union the arbiter over the nuclear structure of the Western Alliance.

The Committee is firm in the belief that the Federal Republic should participate in a non-proliferation agreement if the following conditions are met:

a. That the possibility for an agreement providing for the shared control of nuclear weapons among the powers of the Atlantic or European areas is neither excluded nor prejudiced.

b. That an agreement is reached which safeguards the interests of the Federal Republic and of the other free nations of Europe.

c. That the international situation of the Federal Republic and especially its objectives in respect to all-German policy should not be prejudiced in either a formal or a substantive sense as a result of its participation in an agreement to which the Soviet Union is also a signatory.

d. Within the context of Section V, Item 1 of the German Peace Note of 25 March 1966,⁴ the above signifies:

1. That the Federal Republic’s claim to be the only legal representative of Germany is fully recognized in the agreement.

2. That the regulation of the military status of Germany, the implementation of which is reserved for an all-German Peace Treaty, should not be prematurely applied to a divided Germany.

End Report

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 11. No classification marking. A notation on the source text reads: “Rec’d 10/10/66—11 a.m.”
2. No classification marking.
3. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 425–434.
4. For an extract of the note, see ibid., pp. 914–918.