Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

174. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 25, 1966, 4:30 p.m.

AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Rusk
• Under Secretary Ball
• Ambassador McGhee
• Harry Obst (Interpreter)

GERMAN PARTICIPANTS

• Chancellor Erhard
• Foreign Minister Schroder
• Defense Minister Von Hassel
• Minister Westrick
• State Secretary Carstens
• State Secretary Von Hase
• Ambassador Knappstein
• Hermann Kusterer (Interpreter)

Secretary Rusk opened the conversation by telling the Chancellor about the meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko the night before in New York.² He said the actual conversation had taken place after dinner and Gromyko who had spoken English at a preceding meeting had reverted to the use of an interpreter.

Most of the discussion had centered around bilateral matters, like the release of certain individuals in Soviet custody and proposed changes in the mutual civil air agreement. Another topic had been the Space Treaty, originally proposed in Geneva. Much time was spent talking about Vietnam. The atmosphere was calm, no threats and violent adjectives were used, as opposed to what happened in the UNGA.³

Hanoi had instructed Moscow they would not begin any negotiations before the U.S. had unilaterally stopped the bombings in North Vietnam. On the other had they had not promised to be ready to talk if the bombings would stop.

Equally on the subject of non-proliferation no new lines had developed. The Soviets continued to resist a treaty proposal that would not bar the NATO countries (non-nuclear) from getting access to nuclear weapons in one form or another. No new conclusions were reached, no progress made on this subject. Mr. Foster and his delegation were present in New York and would try to follow up the subject.

The conversation had ended about 11 p.m. He was expecting to have another meeting with Mr. Gromyko in the near future.

Chancellor Erhard stated it was very hard to come up with satisfactory answers on some of these questions. As regarded the questions of Offset, a common strategy of defense, cooperation between the European partners, non-proliferation etc.—all these were intertwined and could hardly be discussed as separate entities.

How could one provide for a reasonable policy, make proper provisions for European Defense without knowing the exact concept of contemplated nuclear strategy. Old projects need not necessarily be revived (MLF/ANF) but the question was how to find a common solution for all concerned.

If the two blocs agreed not to give nuclear weapons to their allies (NATO-Warsaw Pact), there was still the question what would the “neutral” countries do. If the book was once closed, how could the cooperation continue, how could one still find a common solution?

The question was how to obtain a total nuclear strategy for the Alliance as a believable deterrent. This was a question that could not be evaded in the talks he (Erhard) had had with his delegation earlier that morning.

If the proposed tripartite talks would concentrate only on Offset, they would not be very useful. There should be talks first between the US and the FRG on the aspects of their mutual security. In this direction German government policy needed some support. There were many influential people, if not in the administration then certainly in Parliament, that are unhappy with the current state of affairs and are looking for more or less strong alternatives or changes in the status quo. Sure, in the same breath they will declare they needed the U.S., would remain loyal to the U.S., etc., but in reality they were also looking in new directions. Some solid arguments were needed before the German people in order to reassure them.

The government was under much pressure. Just to get the 1967 Budget through Congress would be a gigantic task. Some 30 existing laws would have to be changed in order to reduce expenditures. This would have psychological consequences. Add to this the Offset burden and other political problems and you can see how difficult our situation is.

Secretary Rusk assured the Chancellor the U.S. government was aware of these difficulties and shared the concern. The President would meet him with an open mind and sympathetic attitude.

The Chancellor added, he did not want to be misunderstood. There was no question of not keeping existing treaties and fulfilling obligations to the full amount. But under the circumstances an appropriate form would have to be found to allow the FRG to keep its commitments in a way consistent with realistic possibilities. The Central Bank was trying not to jeopardize the dollar, the FRG was buying no gold, the FRG was helping to support the Pound Sterling. Along similar lines, to be discussed in detail later, solutions may be found. This should be possible among close friends and allies. Among business partners too there was such a thing as a “prolongation”. A follow-up agreement could be worked out on June 1. An amicable solution of this matter among friends would be to the benefit of the President also, not just for the German government. It was important to successfully resolve this matter.

Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Ball to comment on some of these questions, as he (Ball) had been in touch with the President and Cabinet while he (Rusk) was away in New York.

Under Secretary Ball assured the Chancellor that the President had deep respect for the policy the FRG had followed domestically, with regard to NATO, its European policy, its Atlantic policy, its policy towards the underdeveloped nations and its support of the US position in Vietnam.

The US policy versus NATO had not changed. The US would keep its commitments. The US was paying a toll of a hundred lives a week to support a people of 14 million in SEA.

The major question was how all the NATO nations could find a way to act together. de Gaulle had taken a big step away. Belgium was contemplating reduction of troops. Britain was thinking about reducing their troop strength. This erosion process was a matter of deep concern. If there was going to be a double standard it would be hard for the US Administration to defend itself against domestic pressures for reduction.

The problem should be approached from the angle of not jeopardizing the security of anybody. He (Erhard) was right in saying certain things could not be looked at separately. There should be a way of finding an arrangement without disturbing your (FRG) problems further and without having to go to a postponement (of offset payments).

More flexible long-term agreements on balance of payment could be worked out that would include Britain. Britain had similar problems (Wilson Cabinet plans, reduction of BAOR) and domestic pressures that would have to be considered. Unilateral actions could further unravel the Alliance. One could have tripartite talks on these matters and still carry on bilateral talks. A solution would have to be found in terms of everybody’s security. Some aspects would have to be checked with all the NATO countries. This approach would take the focus away from the balance of payments in the direction of common security.

The Chancellor stated he was not in principle against tripartite talks. It seemed more important, however, for the US and the FRG to talk bilaterally about their mutual problems (Offset, nuclear sharing). Some solution should first be found between the two, be it anywhere along the spectrum from a “hardware” solution to “Any kind of a voice” with regard to the nuclear question. Then one could also talk to the British. We are in touch with the British on foreign exchange matters already. A committee of top experts is to present proposals to the two governments by Oct. 13/14. This might provide a basis. Of course, he was attaching the necessary attention and importance to the British position on NATO (transport large units quickly once depots are available) troop strategy. Nor did he want to say that US troops should remain on German soil in all eternity. But at present their presence was very important. He needed to have a clear picture for himself and for the German people of their security within the Alliance. He must have a clear picture on nuclear matters. This was no longer avoidable.

Also the EEC countries may soon grow into a political union which would have to be considered as a factor.

(From this point in this memorandum comments from the American side are not included, as simultaneous interpretation allowed no note-taking. Ambassador McGhee was taking notes that might be available.)⁴

Chancellor Erhard said he could not only look at the non-proliferation question from the standpoint of German security, but would also have to consider the problem of reunification. The Germans knew reunification could only be achieved peacefully, but a number of peace-loving Germans that were trusting the US were very much concerned about an agreement that could perpetuate the status quo.

Secretary Rusk asked the Chancellor’s opinion on the German public attitude towards tripartite talks.

The Chancellor replied there was no unfavorable public opinion other than the simple fear that the US wanted money of the FRG and Britain wanted money of the FRG, and now they wanted to gang up together to put Germany in a 2:1 minority. (Laughter)

Foreign Minister Schroder commented what was needed was a clarification of the common objectives.

Sitting at the point of confrontation the German public was very sensitive about certain simple aspects of security. People ask what would happen in the first minutes of a confrontation. Would the little region of the FRG really be defended? What would it take to release a nuclear counter attack? Any reduction of troops by allies, any talk in this direction from the Pentagon was making them more insecure and nervous. Some say why should we bother to maintain a high level of conventional troops, if others do not even maintain their low levels?

What was needed were some long-term assurances (like no reductions by 1970 or so) about maintaining levels. Any necessary reduction should be proposed within a general clear security strategy and be counterbalanced somehow, not done unilaterally or out of context.

The US, Germany and Britain should have some long-term consolidation, though not at the expense of other partners. A clear picture on this was necessary for any German government, even an SPD government, if such government was to meet its responsibility to its people.

Chancellor Erhard followed this up by pointing out the relative security felt by the people during the period of “massive retaliation”, when nobody ever criticized extra expenses in the defense sector, as opposed to the insecurity felt since the introduction of the “flexible response” strategy with its “thresholds” and “pauses”.

Should the Russians for example want to take Hamburg, the FRG might reply with tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets might answer with tactical nuclear weapons first also and might attack at another point. Would at this point, or a little later, the decision to employ a full response be made any easier for the US President with the fires of war already on the world’s horizons?

To us, you and the Russians a big nuclear war is unthinkable as a solution. But then how believable is our strategy of deterrent to the man in the street in Germany. As long as there was the strategy of full response and sure retaliation it sounded believable.

Foreign Minister Schroder suggested a military briefing of 45 minutes or so might be included during this visit (or if not now possibly at a later date). This briefing to be in the presence of the President, maybe by Mr. McNamara, similar to a briefing Chancellor Adenauer received in 1961.

Chancellor Erhard supported this idea. He once again conjured up the image of a small-scale Soviet attack on German territory. Somewhere along the line of escalation, the Soviets would have to be told: one more step will unleash the full nuclear force. With all our trust in the US and our allies will we and the man in the street be sure the rest of the world would be ready to die for the sake of saving Germany?

These are very realistic fears disturbing the German people.

Mr. Schroder added, it was exactly because of this why the presence of US troops was so important as a symbol of US involvment and a token and pledge of commitment. To him, frankly, the thesis of “massive retaliation” never made any military sense but sounded just like a political argument that was convenient.

Chancellor Erhard stated that for the reasons cited by Schroder the US stand in Vietnam was so important and encouraging to the Germans.

Secretary Rusk emphasized that the US had never abandoned any of the territory of its Allies and taken enormous casualties to honor their commitments. They had 7,000 warheads in Europe they would certainly not abandon to the Russians, and the only way the Russians could get them is “to have them stuffed down their throat”.

Chancellor Erhard said he fully trusted the US but had to consider the theoretical possibility of an agreement between the US and the Soviets never to attack each other to which the FRG could fall victim not having even a voice in nuclear defense. Such arguments could be heard in the Bundestag.

Secretary Rusk assured the Chancellor he could understand his concern. He hoped the forthcoming talks would clarify many points. He had noted with curiosity that during the talks with East European foreign ministers at the UN in New York the usual invective against the FRG was missing. There was a noticeable response to Mr. Schroder’s policy of rapprochement. This was an encouraging sign.

(The meeting broke up about 6:30 p.m.)

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL GER W–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Obst. A note on the source text reads: “Uncleared interpreter’s notes.” The meeting was held at Blair House.
2. A memorandum of conversation is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 586, CF 84.
3. Although Vietnam was not an item on the General Assembly agenda, the Soviet Union used the time allotted to it in debate to charge that the United States and its South Vietnamese allies were waging a war of “aggression” and to call for U.S. military withdrawal and a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Soviet charges were set out in a letter to the Secretary-General, July 11. (U.N. doc. S/7401)
4. Not found.