170. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson1

Mr. President:

Herewith Bob McNamara’s memorandum to you on how to handle the offset problem with Erhard.

State has been working all day on a plan to deal with the offset problem without a radical unilateral troop reduction.

Tonight George McGhee has come in with a strong cable, which I am getting typed for you,2 underlining the danger of a substantial troop reduction arrived at unilaterally and making certain proposals for alternative offsets.

I suspect this will be the major item for discussion at lunch tomorrow. I will get you George McGhee’s cable and, I trust, the State Department paper before then.

The object at lunch should not be to make final decisions but for you to hear from George Ball and Bob McNamara their somewhat different perspective on the problem we face and the options open to us.

We shall be coming back to you for final decisions before McNamara leaves for Europe.

W.W. Rostow 3

Attachment

Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson4

Chancellor Erhard, in December 1963 and again in December 1965, reaffirmed his intention to fulfill the offset arrangement. In 1963, the [Page 414] Communiqué5 stated, “The President expressed appreciation for the cooperative arrangement whereby United States dollar expenditures for American military forces in Germany are offset by German purchases of military equipment in the United States. It was agreed that this arrangement should continue.” Last December 21, the joint Communiqué6 said that you and he “discussed the arrangements between the two governments whereby United States military expenditures in Germany entering the balance of payments are offset by the Federal Republic through its purchase of United States military equipment and services. It was agreed that these arrangements were of great value to both governments and should be fully executed and continued.”

The current German commitment is to place $1,350,000,000 of military orders in the US in calendar years 1965–1966 and to make payments of that amount in US fiscal years 1966–1967. As of September 1, the orders (with three months to go) have reached only $665 million, or less than half of the commitment, and payments (with nine months to go) have reached only $261 million, or about 20% of the commitment. A September 9 cable from Ambassador McGhee7 reported that the German Assist-ant Secretary for Economic Affairs in the Chancellor’s office said “as matters now stand he sees no real alternative to a large shortfall in the present offset payments target next June 30 and a stretchout of the period in which to meet the target.”

It is clear that the difficulty arises from the inadequacy of the German military budget. That budget increased annually until 1963. It has leveled off since then. Indeed, in real terms (taking account of inflation), the 1967 German military budget is almost 10% less than in 1963. Germany now devotes 5% of her Gross National Product to defense, compared to 6% in 1963. The UK spends 6.8% and the US 8.8%. While the Gross National Product of Germany is increasing on an average of 5% a year, none of the increase is being devoted to military expenditures. The Chancellor states that the reason for this allocation of resources is domestic political pressures.

It should be remembered and understood that the German shortfall in meeting the offset is not because Germany has no military requirements to make purchases in the United States. US policy has been to ask Germany (1) to do only what she promised to do—namely, to meet the offset, (2) to buy only what she needs to bring her forces up to NATO standards, and (3) to buy from us only those items which it is most economical to purchase in the US. With respect to German requirements to meet NATO standards, the German forces are seriously deficient. The [Page 415] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and USCINCEUR have concurred in a report which indicated some $4 billion in German requirements for initial equipping, modernizing and training and for reserve stocks. By way of comparison: The US has a division slice of more than 41,000 men in Europe while the Germans have 27,000; the US has been maintaining 90 days of war reserve stocks in Europe while the Germans barely meet 30 days on some items and considerably less than that in the major equipment area; the US is at 100% of equipment levels in all its divisions while the Germans are not only less fully equipped, but equipped with less modern arms. Another comparison: The United States has 230,000 tons of bombs either in or in transit to Southeast Asia; the German Air Force’s total inventory amounts to approximately 4400 tons—an obviously inadequate amount. If Germany were to procure proper conventional ordnance for her aircraft, expenditures on the order of $150 million would be involved for this item alone. German statements to the effect that they do not need the military items involved in the offset are therefore clearly untrue.

Our best estimates are that, unless something is done, there will be a very large gap between the foreign exchange costs of US deployments to Germany (an average of approximately $850 million a year over the next five years) and German foreign-exchange expenditures on the military account in the US (predicted by the Germans to average $350 million a year). Therefore, unless changes are made, a gap of $500 million a year should be expected next year and probably every year thereafter.

It would not be wise for the United States to accept this gap as a continuing situation.

I believe that we should break the problem into two parts. The first part is the current offset referred to above; the second part is the follow-on offset arrangement.

With respect to the current offset, the agreement to place $1,350,000,000 of orders by the end of December 1966 cannot be fulfilled. Payment, however, of the $1,350,000,000 by June 1967, in accordance with that part of the offset arrangement, could be made despite the reduced budget by German borrowing for prepayment against future orders. This approach is not fully satisfactory, but is probably the most we can now ask for. The Chancellor almost certainly will object to such an approach, but in my view we should push hard for this form of fulfillment of the current offset.

With respect to the follow-on offset arrangement, we should:

a.
Press the Chancellor for a larger defense budget and consequent offset. In view of the Chancellor’s political problems, the pay-off from this pressure may not be great in the next two years, but it may produce returns in the longer run. (In this connection, the Chancellor may propose the inclusion in the offset of purchases of space items, items destined [Page 416] for foreign military assistance, passenger aircraft for the German airline, and so on. We should accept any items which are truly “additional” and not merely a “giving of credit” to Germany for purchases, such as the passenger aircraft, which Germany would make here anyway. The total of such “additional” items will be very small and therefore almost irrelevant to the basic problem.
b.
Insist on trilateral (US–UK-Germany) discussions to address the question of how the remaining gap will be closed—including arrangements for US troop reductions.

We must face the fact that the United States can deal with any remaining gap only (1) by cutting US military expenditures in Germany or (2) by absorbing the balance of payments drain caused by the excess of US expenditures over German offset.

I believe we can cut US military expenditures in Europe by about $200 million ($160 million in Germany) without significantly reducing our military effectiveness. (The JCS do not concur.) This $200 million total is reached by reducing each division slice by 10,000 support personnel (a total of 50,000 men, producing a saving of $125 million); by “dual-basing” approximately half of our 700 reconnaissance and fighter aircraft (saving $60 million); and by other economies ($15 million). But a deficit in the vicinity of $300 million is likely to remain. This $300 million cannot be saved without removing major combat units.

Even the $200 million adjustments may have a traumatic psychological impact in Germany, in NATO and in the United States. Adjustments to close all of the remaining $300 million gap, by cutting US combat power, would be even more traumatic and, in my view, dangerous; but I believe some reductions in US combat power will have to be considered if the problem cannot be solved in any other way.

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury have received copies of this memorandum. The Secretary of the Treasury concurs in it. I believe the Secretary of State does also; however, he is planning to supplement this memorandum with a paper describing the political pressures which today limit the Chancellor’s freedom of action.

Robert S. McNamara 8
  1. Source: Johnson Library, Bator Papers, Erhard 1966. Secret. Drafted by Rostow.
  2. Document 171.
  3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
  4. Secret. Copies were sent to Rostow, Rusk, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  5. For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 860–862.
  6. For text, see ibid., pp. 910–912.
  7. Not found.
  8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.