Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

16. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 6, 1964.

SUBJECT

• German “Peace Plan”

PARTICIPANTS

• Heinrich Knappstein, German Ambassador
• William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary

(Reference: Mem/Con dated March 5, 1964, by Ambassador Thompson)²

Ambassador Knappstein called to ask if he could have an informal talk with me about the German peace plan. He would have preferred our having a lunch together, but since I was not free for several days, he said he would like to come to my office and talk with me alone on a completely unofficial basis. To this I agreed.

He asked me what was my own view of the German proposals. I said that if they were to be plausible as a serious initiative on reunification, they would have to be much more specific, particularly in the field of European security. For example, what does Bonn mean by reunification on a basis of no change in the balance of power to the detriment of either side? The Ambassador did not think it was desirable to attempt to spell this concept out in detail in the proposals because if one did, the Russians would put any concession offered in their pocket and brush the rest of the proposals aside. He said that the French had from the start taken the position that it was, in present circumstances, impossible to arrive at an acceptable practical formula whereby Germany could be reunified without a change to the detriment of one of the two sides. The Ambassador said that the proposals must be considered as constituting one single package, whose component elements could not be isolated or extracted from the rest of the package.

The Ambassador went on to say that several factors had conspired to convince Bonn that proposals on German reunification should be made within the next few months.

• First of all, five years had elapsed since the last round of talks with the Russians on reunification, and the general impression was gradually being created in the world that reunification was something which was no longer topical, or relevant to the present evolution in East-West relations.
• Second, there had latterly been an increase in public pressures in Germany in favor of some initiative on the part of the government to bring reunification to the fore again. What was more interesting, he said, was that there was an unmistakable increase of interest in reunification on the part of the youth of university age, together with increasing criticism of the government for its passivity in this field.
• Third, there was evidence that in the rest of the world, the impression was growing that unification was becoming progressively less important to the German government, and that it was therefore increasingly possible to recognize or do business with the GDR with impunity, witness: recent developments in Ceylon, Zanzibar, and increased activities and initiatives by the GDR in the LDC’s.³
• Fourthly, there was an increasing tendency, particularly since the Moscow Test Ban Treaty,⁴ for East-West discussions and negotiations to be concerned with matters other than reunification, witness: commercial and cultural relations, the ENDC in Geneva, talks about observation posts and other measures in the general field of security and disarmament, rather than political solutions of the causes of tension between the Soviet Union and the West, of which the chief in Europe is the problem of Germany and Berlin. Bonn feels it is essential, for the foregoing reasons, to put reunification back in the middle of the table so as to make it clear not only to the Soviet Union but to everyone that reunification of Germany remains, and will continue to remain a major Western goal.

The Ambassador said he had recently been called by Reinkemeyer (In Charge of Soviet Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn), who had reflected some impatience with the slowness of discussion in the Ambassadorial Group, and had pressed to know when the next step would be taken. The Ambassador told him that the British and the French were awaiting instructions and that it was hoped to meet again early next week. Reinkemeyer had said that it was Bonn’s definite hope that four-power agreement could be reached before the NATO meeting in early May.

I told the Ambassador that I was familiar with his talk with Ambassador Thompson yesterday. I wondered whether it was desirable to put forward proposals unless they were likely to appear convincing to public opinion as a sincere attempt to move forward toward a basis of negotiation with the Russians. There was also the question whether, if proposals were made now, the Russians might take the opportunity to uncork some counter proposals of their own which could stir things up in an unhelpful manner.

I asked whether the Federal Government was thinking of proposals in terms of their appeal to the Soviet government, or whether it wanted to make some gesture which would focus world attention on German reunification, and which would serve to refute any charge of inactivity in this field on the part of the Federal Government. The Ambassador said his instructions made it clear that the degree of appeal the proposals might have for the Soviet Union is, in the view of the FRG, of secondary importance. The primary objective is to counteract the present trend, to which he had already referred, of talking with the Russians about everything other than German reunification.

I asked whether Bonn had given any consideration to some kind of a manifesto or declaration on reunification which could be submitted to the four powers and publicized suitably, and which would serve the political purpose his government had in mind without incurring the possible dangers of putting forward an inadequate proposal which might complicate things for Germany and the West in general. I emphasized that I was not suggesting this and that I was speaking only for myself. The Ambassador said he did not know whether any such idea had been considered.

Toward the end of our talk the Ambassador came back to his central point of the need “to do something about reunification.” He said we had doubtless noticed that in the present German proposals Berlin plays a minor role. He said this was because the FRG does not want to give prominence to a possible access agreement for fear that the Russians would again do what they did in Geneva in 1959, i.e.: concentrate on Berlin to the exclusion of the central issue of reunification.

In conclusion the Ambassador said he appreciated this opportunity of discussing the situation with me and he repeated that he considered our conversation as private and unofficial.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–4 GER. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.
2. Not found.
3. On February 14, the German Democratic Republic and Ceylon signed a consular exchange agreement. East Germany recognized the revolutionary government of Zanzibar on January 28 and exchanged diplomatic representatives in early February.
4. For text of the Test Ban Treaty, signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, and entered into force for the United States on October 10, see 14 UST 1313.