145. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- German Question
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Alfred Puhan, Director, Office of German Affairs
- Dr. Rainer Barzel, German Parliament Majority Leader
- Heinrich Knappstein, FRG Ambassador to US
- Minister Von Lilienfeld
- Counselor Kusterer, Interpreter
Dr. Barzel said the Secretary must be aware of recent German efforts to get some movement on the German question, the question of reunification. He thought it was very important for the Germans to do something about this at this time where there is considerable dismay over the Franco-German relationship. He cited the German peace note of March 25, 1966,2 referred to the German proposals of February 1962 and September 1963,3 and asked if they could not be dusted off for another try at resolving the German question. In this connection, he said he appreciated the advice we had given Parliament President Gerstenmaier regarding the holding of a Bundestag meeting in Berlin,4 but he thought it was important to reexamine this question. He said some little progress had been made in the matter of passes, prisoner releases, etc. More was needed.
The Secretary replied with three observations: (1) He would urge Dr. Barzel not to believe Viet-Nam diverted us from Europe. (2) We feel a policy of movement with respect to Eastern Europe has had a constructive influence and has reawakened in the states of Eastern Europe a nostalgic interest in Western Europe. (3) If we embark on a new approach to settle the German question we must be prepared to look down the long trail and make sure everybody will continue on it once we embark on it. He reminded Dr. Barzel that the problem of central Europe is virtually the only problem over which we and the Soviets could wage a nuclear [Page 356] war. It represented a tremendous outlay for us in terms of money and effort, over 5 hundred billion dollars since 1947. It represented an equally great expense to the USSR. In the main, we have carried the principal burden in the free world. France did not participate in the crisis of Berlin in 1961. The Secretary added he was not for giving away East Germany but he thought the time would come when what happens to 17 million Germans will not be the important question to a billion people that it is today. He said we were serious in resolving the question on the basis of what the 17 million East Germans wanted. It was futile and nerve-wracking, however, to stir up these questions without being able to solve them.
Dr. Barzel agreed that we must know in advance the steps which will be taken. He felt however the dynamics of the situation required some new attention. He thought the German peace note had been useful. He said if the Soviet Union asked what the reunified Germany will look like, we must be able to say what a reunified Germany will look like. On the other hand, the agreements of 1945 to settle the final borders of Germany were a promise both to the Allies as well as to the Germans. The problem was to get around the table and then we can come to terms on the frontiers.
The Secretary thought the question of the Soviet Zone may be more difficult for the Russians because of their fears that by losing it they would surrender all of Eastern Europe. He reiterated his principal point that we were prepared to work seriously with our Allies on the German question. We are most anxious to rid ourselves of this most dangerous and expensive question. He reminded Dr. Barzel that when he saw Gromyko, the latter warned him that even though the German situation appeared to be quiet, the German question remained for the Soviets also the most important outstanding unresolved question.
Dr. Barzel thanked the Secretary for his candid views.
The Secretary asked Dr. Barzel to convey his kindest regards to Chancellor Erhard and Foreign Minister Schroeder. In parting, he emphasized again that the Germans must not exaggerate Viet-Nam and decide that it is the only thing we are talking or thinking about. We will keep our eyes on Europe.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–4 GER. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan on April 14 and approved in S on April 25. The source text is marked “Part IV of IV.”↩
- For text, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 914–918.↩
- For texts of the February 21, 1962, German memorandum and the September 14, 1963, statement by Barzel, see Meissner, Die deutsche Ostpolitik, pp. 28–33, 55–56.↩
- The U.S. position was conveyed in an April 7, 1965, message to the Soviet Union. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 483–484.↩