124. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State1
19. Subj: The reunification issue after the German elections.
Part 1 (of 2)—The case for an initiative.
In discussions of the reunification question with non-Germans one encounters: (1) The perennial question of whether the West German people really want reunification very strongly; (2) A current variation, whether the present professed interest of the German politicians is not mainly for electoral purposes; and (3) Independently of what the Germans think, whether an effort to reactivate negotiations with the Soviets is worthwhile so long as the latter clearly have no interest in changing the present situation.
My own judgment is that, after the question of their own security—which Germans naturally regard as their most vital interest—they have no political objective or interest more important to them than the achievement of national unity. Recent polls indicate that reunification remains the leading national preoccupation, particularly among the youth. Once it is introduced, any politician will subordinate every other question to the discussion of this theme.
It is not, moreover, merely a preoccupation of the politicians. One German out of five came from the East when the Federal Republic was established. There has been a movement of 3.7 million refugees from the Soviet Zone since 1950. Close to 40 percent of all West Germans have close relatives in the Zone. Particularly in light of the continuing vulnerability of West Berlin, the division of the country affects too many persons for the problem to subside. The prosperity of West Germans in comparison with their Eastern brothers weighs heavily on their conscience. The less decisive Soviet leadership combined with the increasing freedom of maneuver of the Eastern European states gives rise to more hope than during the regimes of Stalin and Khrushchev. In short, I do not think we can, after the German elections, avoid facing the reunification issue anew.
This is, I believe, true despite the fact that, in point of time, the Germans unquestionably regard the third basic tenet of their foreign policy, Western European integration, as realizable sooner. It is true that there is no great popular clamor about reunification—or signs of unrest. There is, however, a large and active lobby, the “indivisible Germany” organization [Page 307] —fortunately not extremist—which is supported across the board by all three parties, the government, and private concerns such as the Springer publications. Reunification is also the principal theme of the refugee organizations and their annual rallies.
I would, however, judge the attitude of the average German individual to be the realistic one that this is a problem for their government to do something about and that, in the last resort, progress will depend upon the four original Occupying Powers more than Bonn. Moreover, he recognizes that, given the present Soviet attitude, the reunification problem will take a long time to resolve. Finally, he would expect that Germany will still have to pay a heavy price for reunification.
All this, however, does not affect the average person’s critical question: What is being done about reunification? The answer to this, for the average man is—very little, certainly not enough. It is widely known that even the government’s modest efforts—such as FonMin Schroeder’s proposals at the NATO meetings in December and May for a Tripartite declaration, and the various suggestions submitted to the Ambassadorial Group—were not well received by the Allies. There is no public evidence, on the other hand, of new Allied proposals or enthusiasm for progress on reunification except for public statements of approval in principle—which, although the Germans continue to want, they have come to discount. The feeling is widespread that the Allied performance suffers by comparison with efforts made at the time of the Berlin and Geneva Conferences.
The question is not likely to arise in an acute form during the pre-electoral period. So far as the German Government is concerned, I believe that the Tripartite declaration of May 12 meets their requirements for the record, at least to remove the pressure for an initiative toward the Soviets at this time. However, after the elections, one of the first measuring rods that will be applied to the new government—regardless which party wins—is what it will try to do about reunification.
If the SPD wins, they are already committed toward a policy of more flexible and active efforts toward the East. If, as is more probable, the present CDU/FDP coalition remains in office, they must at least try to give new life to the efforts they have made in the past to enlist support for a new initiative on the German question. If—as cannot be excluded—a grand coalition of CDU/SPD should be formed, an agreed plank will almost certainly be the enhancement of efforts to achieve reunification. It would, moreover, be the first government so broadly based as to be able to pay an additional price if that became relevant (e.g. recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary).
To my mind it makes no great difference whether or at what point the Soviets reject a Western proposal, assuming, as the Soviet experts predict, that this is likely. If we were governed by the Soviet attitude [Page 308] toward outstanding issues across-the-board, we would have to refrain from making any proposal known to be unpalatable to them. I do not believe that there is any conclusive evidence that the Soviets would “hot up” Berlin just because the Allies made a peaceful reunification proposal. It seems more likely that such a move would be made only if it would serve some more vital current interest.
It seems to me elemental that if someone is “sitting on you,” as Moscow is on East Germany, you should be entitled from time to time to ask them to “get off.” Fundamentally, all that the Germans demand of us is that we join them in such a request. It keeps the record straight that the Communist take-over of East Germany is still regarded as an unsettled question by the Western Powers—as well as an affront to humanity. It prevents any misinterpretation—this is the point the Germans are interested in—that our various efforts towards increased contacts with the East, normalization of relations, relaxation of tensions, and all that is popularly described as “détente,” signify acquiescence in a status quo confirming the continued Soviet occupation and legitimizing the Communist government of the East Zone.
I regard our efforts toward increased contacts with the East, normalization of relations, etc., as of much importance and perhaps the only practicable course under present conditions. I am convinced that most Germans do too, if they can feel reassured that we are not resting with regard to reunification. I believe that we should, in order to so reassure them, be willing not only to support a revived and revised German initiative, but that we should, if necessary, be willing to take the lead with our Allies in formulating new proposals, as we did before the Berlin and Geneva Conferences. In any event, we must expect the Germans to approach us again about an initiative after September. I feel that, in the intervening period, we should prepare ourselves for the next German approach and I understand that studies directed toward this end are going forward in the Department. Preliminary suggestions with respect to an approach will be given in a following telegram.2