Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

122. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 25, 1965, 0917Z.

5015. Subject: Chancellor Erhard’s views on Berlin. Chancellor Erhard called in the French Ambassador and British and U.S. Charges on June 24 to impress on the three Occupation Powers the seriousness with which his govt regards the developing situation in Berlin. Surrounded by Vice Chancellor Mende, Minister Westrick, State Secretaries Carstens and Hrautwig, and other German officials, he made a lengthy opening presentation lasting some thirty minutes along the following lines:

1. The situation in Berlin, which was causing great concern to the FRG, should not be played down. It was the result of a conscious and concerted policy clearly aimed at the enhancement of GDR status and intended also to cause trouble in the FRG before elections by raising the level of insecurity and fear. GDR threats and actions were obviously supported if not stimulated by Moscow. Ever since the Bundestag session in April (about which he did not wish to speak at this time), a developing pattern of harassments had emerged.

2. After enumerating the various GDR actions which fell within this pattern, he stressed that the helicopter flights over West Berlin were the most serious and dramatic. (He actually said “Soviet helicopter flights” but Westrick corrected him by noting that the flights in question were East German.)

Erhard had spoken to Bundestag Fraktion leaders earlier in the day and all had agreed that something must be done. The helicopters over West Berlin had to be forced to land, and the German Govt would welcome it if—without launching an air war of course—this could be achieved. The East Germans were probing to see how far they could go and they had to be resisted.

3. As to the Interzonal Trade agreement, the German Govt would give it up tomorrow if it were not for the connection between the IZT and free access to Berlin. If such a step were to be taken, the FRG would have to consider, in consultation with its Allies, the effects on Berlin and what must as a consequence be done.

4. It was necessary to make a basic distinction between trade with the Eastern European countries and trade with the GDR. The former were at least partly independent national entities. As Erhard had previously suggested to President Johnson and President de Gaulle, it was desirable that the subject of trade with the GDR be discussed in the OECD. The German Govt had noted that the IZT was becoming progressively less interesting to the GDR, since it was getting increasing deliveries from other countries as well as long-term credits. Since the FRG’s allies supported her opposition to the two-German-state theory, it was inconsistent and wrong to undermine this opposition by giving trade and credit assistance to the Soviet Zone.

5. After repeating that his views had the support of all party leaders in the Bundestag, Erhard again stressed the importance of action against GDR helicopter flights in order to maintain West Berlin morale. Mere protests would not suffice; the helicopter flights had to be stopped.

6. It was also essential to prevent any upgrading of the GDR. If the IZT were to be involved as a countermeasure and access to Berlin were interrupted as a result, the Western Powers would have to proceed on the assumption that an airlift of the 1948–49 variety would no longer suffice to keep Berlin supplied with its basic requirements.

7. The German Govt had lived through August 13, 1961, when the initial erection of the Wall took place, without sufficiently serious reactions. The Allies likewise had limited themselves to protests. The experience of 1961 could simply not be repeated.

8. Erhard requested that the Allied representatives present report the German position back to their governments, and hoped that official responses would soon be available so that a further exchange of views could take place and agreement on action could be reached.

French Ambassador Seydoux responded that he could assure Erhard the three Occupying Powers were concerned about the Berlin situation and efforts to enhance the status of the GDR. The three Embassies in Bonn were consulting on a daily basis with German Foreign Office representatives as well as keeping in close touch with all pertinent developments. The Wall had been a brutal and decisive act, Seydoux observed, which was different in kind from the isolated actions under discussion today. It was too soon to know the precise scope and significance of the GDR threats and harassments. The French Embassy still saw the possibility that Ulbricht was acting largely on his own initiative although obviously with general Soviet permission, and it was not clear how far the Soviets would permit him to go.

It was necessary to distinguish, Seydoux continued, between the helicopter problem, which clearly fell within the responsibility of the three Occupying Powers for the security of West Berlin, and the various other issues raised by the GDR, which were initially matters of German concern. The three governments were presently considering the helicopter problem and following the Berlin situation closely. It was obviously desirable and necessary that a common policy be worked out on problems of mutual concern.

In response to Seydoux’s query, Erhard repeated that the German Government would like Allied support when the Germans raised the problem of Western trade with the GDR and the extensions of credits in the OECD. When Westrick pointed out that no OECD meeting was scheduled in the near future, Erhard said he would then ask for a special session. He believed it better to use the OECD for this purpose rather than NATO, since discussion in the latter forum would seem to give the subject an aggressive character. If there were a united Western front against the GDR in this field, Erhard continued, Ulbricht would soon retreat in order to avoid losing prestige. The German Government wanted to disabuse other countries of the idea that the IZT was simply a matter of business for the Germans which as such they were reluctant to sacrifice. But assurances first were necessary that the whole exercise of cancelling the IZT would not be futile because other Western countries would move into the gap with the GDR.

The U.S. and British Charges concurred generally in Seydoux’s remarks, pointing out that the evidence was still not conclusive that a major Berlin crisis was in the offing but that the Four Powers had to be vigilant and united in meeting any difficulties that might arise. U.S. Charge noted that, while the West was being confronted with new challenges, at the same time we were winning some victories, for example, the East German backdown after a nine-month refusal to acknowledge in writing that the basis of civil rail access to Berlin was Allied instead of purely intra-German; abandonment by the Reichsbahn on June 15 of the demand that international rail rates be introduced as of July 1; GDR concession on the Hof Bridge reconstruction project; and GDR return this month of one of two West German aircraft downed in East Germany without FRG compliance with the original demand for negotiations at the plenipotentiary level. In all these instances, Western perseverance and firmness had won out. Hence it was hard to claim that a clear pattern of obdurate GDR harassment had emerged in June.

Erhard concluded by emphasizing again the necessity for some Allied action beyond mere protests against GDR helicopters over West Berlin. Otherwise West Berlin morale would suffer seriously. Mende chimed in to say that he had just heard from former Berlin Mayor Friedensburg. The latter had confirmed that it was psychologically of greatest importance to West Berlin that the Occupying Powers do something about the helicopter flights. Otherwise the effect would be much worse than over the Allied failure to react sufficiently against the harassments attendant upon the April Bundestag meeting in Berlin. Finally, Westrick added that Senator Schutz of Berlin had telephoned him just before this meeting to stress the need for action against helicopter infringements.

Comment: It seems clear that the Germans have already worked themselves up very much over the Berlin situation, with special emphasis on the Allied failure so far to do anything effective against East German helicopter flights over West Berlin. Erhard and the other officials present were in a somber mood, and their concern was obviously genuine, though the Chancellor was occasionally a bit shaky on his facts. He seemed particularly sensitive about criticisms which seemed to have reached him as to German reluctance to use the IZT weapon against the GDR.

Osterheld, the Chancellor’s personal assistant, later told U.S. Charge that in his view Erhard’s dominating fear was of being caught short again in an election year, as was Adenauer’s government in August 1961, after the time of the Wall, by unexpected and drastic East German actions to which no adequate response had been prepared.²

Hillenbrand

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 28 GER B. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, Paris, London, Moscow, CINCEUR, USAREUR,USAFE, and USELMLO.
2. In telegram 3892 to Bonn, June 25, the Department of State expressed agreement with the line taken by Hillenbrand and expressed concern with Erhard’s suggestion that East German trade issues be taken up in the OECD. (Ibid.)