Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

12. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, February 13, 1964, 10 p.m.

2884. (Conversation with Chancellor Erhard) (For Dept: Part III of IV)²

Passes to the East Sector of Berlin.

1. During a brief interruption in the conversation, when the Chancellor had been called away, State Secretary Westrick referred to the Berlin Passierschein situation. He said that the German Government had reached the decision that they did not wish to repeat the Christmas pass precedent. It was quite clear that the Communists were only trying to make political capital out of a renewal of the Christmas pass arrangements, and this the German Government wished to avoid. The East German radio had said that East German officials had actually performed consular type functions in West Berlin. The German Government was interested in a continuation of visiting arrangements only if conditions could be improved over those for the Christmas passes.

2. One possible improvement, Westrick said, lay in prohibiting East German officials from coming to West Berlin, by their granting the necessary authority to appropriate West Berlin officials. The fact that the East Germans resist this proves that what they desire is only a political result. The East Germans have proposed the creation of an office in West Berlin for the handling of hardship cases. The German Government has asked why passes in such cases cannot be granted by telegram. The Federal Government will not accept any new arrangements which will have the effect of advancing the “three state” theory, with the city of West Berlin as the third state.

3. Westrick reported a difference in views within the Senat with respect to future visiting arrangements. Senator Arndt had resigned, pre-sumably in expression of his own differences with the Governing Mayor. Senator Schiller also proposed to resign. (The British Ambassador informs me that Arndt has in fact resigned because of ill health, and Schiller is considering merely the carrying out of long-held plans.) The Chancellor had that day conveyed to Mayor Brandt the views of the German Government and asked him to come to Bonn next week to discuss the matter further. According to Westrick, Brandt himself may show a greater tendency than the FRG to compromise on issues with the East German officials. The difficulty lay in keeping a human problem from becoming a political problem. Westrick admitted that the FRG decision may have an effect on other existing arrangements, such as interzonal trade.

4. The Chancellor, who rejoined us at this point, added that the German Government was encountering considerable adverse reaction about the Christmas pass policy. Representatives of other nations (unspecified) had asked why they could not have relations with East Germany, since the West Germans themselves had established relations with East German officials in connection with the Christmas passes. The Chancellor said that he had that day told Mayor Brandt and Wehner, the deputy leader of the SPD, that Germany would be exposed to national disaster if the political parties were not able to agree on the question of further exchanges in Berlin.

5. In thanking the Chancellor for informing me about the latest developments, I said that, as at the time of the pre-Christmas negotiations, we had no wish to intervene in this matter, since in its present context we did not consider that it endangered Allied interests. As the FRG and the Berlin Senat were fully aware of the risks involved, as well as the opportunities, we had confidence that any arrangements they made between them would provide adequate safeguards.

McGhee

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files,POL 7 GER W. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, Paris for the Embassy and USRO, and USAREUR for POLAD.
2. See footnote 2, Document 11.