116. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- de Gaulle and NATO
PARTICIPANTS
- [Here follows the same list of participants as Document 115.]
The Chancellor stated that as for de Gaulle’s solution of the German problem in strictly European terms, this is entirely unacceptable to the Germans. The Chancellor wanted to emphasize that point.
The Chancellor said he had no objections to Gromyko’s going to Paris. What was sought after there was a certain tactical effect.
The Chancellor stated that German reunification must be achieved by peaceful means. It was not possible for the Germans, however, to make advance concessions which would be cashed in by the other side without granting anything in return. He said the Germans would be ready to discuss substantive matters when serious discussions were in order, but there could be no advance concessions.
The Secretary said we pay no attention to de Gaulle’s suggestion to solve the German problem in the European context. He said that we were [Page 290] not children, that we had important rights derived from our victory over the Nazis which we would not surrender to either the USSR or the French.
The Chancellor assured him that he never doubted this, but was glad to hear it from us from time to time nonetheless.
The Secretary asked if he expected in his upcoming talks with de Gaulle to get more specific information about the prospects for NATO.2
The Chancellor replied that he was somewhat confident that de Gaulle would not reveal a great deal. de Gaulle may realize that he has gone too far. Erhard said de Gaulle had not kept his promises to him on the MLF, moreover he knows that his pawns in the Federal Republic, the Gaullists, have grown more skeptical. He said de Gaulle knows he is running the danger of losing the Germans. At the same time we were all in agreement that we should try to keep de Gaulle in the Alliance. As for the French elections, the Chancellor thought even de Gaulle cannot afford to show consistent stubbornness, disclose new and violent differences and still keep the French people behind him. The Chancellor said he was not ready to make concessions to de Gaulle and assured the Secretary that he intended to represent German interests. This involved standing by those who helped the Germans.
The Secretary said he had had interesting talks with Foreign Minister Schroeder about the timing of de Gaulle’s moves against NATO. The Secretary said this was a vital matter. He cited as an illustration of the importance of this question the fact that de Gaulle had asked his people not to discuss with us the question of a new headquarters building for SHAPE.
Erhard suggested jokingly that we ask him after September 19, but said we can’t face this issue now before the German elections. He said that the Federal Republic was the most loyal ally in NATO. He referred to a German poll which indicated that the German people had twenty-four times as much confidence in the US as in France.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 8. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan and approved in S and U on July 8. The meeting was held in the Under Secretary’s conference room. The source text is marked “Part 2 of 4”; a memorandum of conversation of the portion of the discussion dealing with trade with the Soviet Bloc is Document 115.↩
- The Chancellor and de Gaulle met June 11–12 at Bonn.↩