Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

104. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 26, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Western Three Declaration

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Heinrich Knappstein, German Embassy
• Mr. Berndt von Staden, Counselor, German Embassy
• Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, S/AL
• Mr. Stuart H. McIntyre, GER

Ambassador Knappstein said it seems difficult for the four fathers which constitute the Ambassadorial Group to give birth to the child (Western Three Declaration on Germany).² Ambassador Thompson quipped “even a pygmy”.

Ambassador Knappstein said the situation with respect to the Declaration is “bad”. If no declaration at all were issued, that would be most unfortunate. Even if unilateral declarations were made, Moscow could use the differences in them to split the Allies. Knappstein said his instructions are: (1) to support the American suggestion of an added sentence which makes clear Four-Power responsibility for the reunification of Germany; (2) to see if a unanimous declaration can be found. Knappstein said that at lunch today Alphand had said that if the Americans continue to insist on their sentence or on the compromise which they offered and which Paris has already turned down, we will then have a deadlock and he will return to the original French draft.

Ambassador Thompson said if Alphand could accept our sentence there would be no impasse. Even if the sentence is somewhat repetitious of other language in the declaration, this should not be an obstacle to its acceptance. Knappstein agreed.

Knappstein said, speaking personally, he had told Alphand that perhaps paragraph one of the Declaration could be changed sufficiently to take account of the American requirements. Knappstein thought the word “continuing” might be inserted before “obligations and responsibilities”; also “German reunification” could replace the word “German”; the word “incumbent” could be changed to some other word which could more accurately reflect the meaning of the French text.

Ambassador Thompson said the real difficulty was that Ambassador Alphand had linked the Declaration to de Gaulle’s February 4 press conference. We did not agree with the French position as stated by de Gaulle. We have suggested a formula which does not mean acceptance of the French point of view by us nor of our point of view by them. This formula is the addition of the phrase “all of the peoples concerned” rather than the words “of Europe,” at the end of paragraph 3.

Knappstein said he contradicted Alphand strongly regarding the role of the US in relation to the German problem, pointing out that at the Peace Conference it was necessary for the US to be present. Under no circumstances could the Germans envisage the US not being present.

Ambassador Thompson said he felt that even though Paris had already rejected the “all of the peoples concerned” compromise he nevertheless felt this was still the best one from the French standpoint and should be acceptable to them. Thompson said we would rather have unilateral statements than buy the French line if it comes to that.

Mr. Von Staden asked if the placement of the sentence proposed by the US was important. Thompson replied our preference was for after the third paragraph but we could accept it at the end of the Declaration. Another possibility would be to drop the French sentence at the end of the third paragraph and drop our sentence too.

Ambassador Knappstein said that the Germans do not like the fact that the only reference to reunification is that the German people “asks for its reunification.” Thompson thought that paragraph one might be revised to include reunification. The US wants it clear that it retains its interests in the German problem and Europe; as he had stated in the Ambassadorial Group, we maintain six divisions as well as nuclear weapons there. Thompson said the future is what is important for us with respect to Europe.

Von Staden thought there were many possible changes which could be made. The real problem is the French rejection of the compromise “of all the peoples concerned”, which is neutral and protects their position.

Knappstein said Chancellor Erhard is strong on the need to emphasize Four-Power responsibility for the German question and supports the US suggested added statement.

Ambassador Thompson referred to an article appearing in Die Welt on the Western Three Declaration, and said it was regrettable that press leaks continue. Knappstein said that Federal Press Chief von Hase had already replied as follows to this article: “The responsibility of the Four Powers is the decisive foundation of German reunification policy. There is no thought of reducing or eliminating this Four-Power responsibility as the main element of German policy. The FRG would consider it unwise to alter anything in connection with this firmly agreed state of affairs.”

Thompson said that he had pointed out to Alphand that the first sentence of the fourth paragraph appeared to take adequate account of the main point raised by the French.

Von Staden suggested one compromise might be to drop the final sentence of paragraph one of the French draft and put in the sentence the US was advocating. Ambassador Thompson questioned the usefulness of this but said he would have to refer the suggestion to his government. He said he wanted to be clear that we were not going to agree in the draft Declaration or any other place to the emphasis on Europe which the French were attempting to urge. Speaking personally, he thought that there were five possibilities: (1) drop the second sentence of the first paragraph and the final sentence of the third paragraph and insert in its stead, at an appropriate place, the responsibility of the Western Three governments to work for reunification. (2) The words “of all the peoples in Europe” could be replaced by “of all peoples concerned” at the end of the third paragraph. (3) The last sentence of the third paragraph could be dropped and our sentence could come later in the Declaration. (4) Eliminate both the final sentence of the third paragraph and the sentence proposed by the US. (5) We could all issue differing unilateral statements if agreement on a Western Three Declaration is not possible.

Ambassador Knappstein said that on the question of the date of issuance the FRG prefers May 5, 6, or 7 to other dates that have been suggested, Ambassador Thompson thought the French may wish to make a statement on May 8 themselves. He said Ambassador Alphand had told him that the French may have to make their position clear in the public mind on the effort to arrive at a Western Three Declaration. If the French do go to the press we will probably get a polemical statement, Ambassador Thompson thought.

Mr. McIntyre said that he had been told by Mr. Morizet, Counselor of the French Embassy, that the French cannot report possible compromises to Paris at this time—their instructions are so strict, Morizet said, that without an Ambassadorial Group meeting they would not be able to take up with Paris the question of possible compromises. Morizet had noted that compromises which the Americans had put forward so far had all been previously rejected by Paris in any case. Ambassador Thompson said that the French cannot run our business for us. He thought it would be better if a declaration could be worked out without having an Ambasssadorial Group meeting, but stated that we are ready to meet if the others wish a meeting, Knappstein said that the only compromise which Alphand had discussed with him was to broaden the language of the second sentence of the first paragraph so that it read “obligations and responsibilities concerning Germany as a whole” rather than “obligations and responsibilities concerning Germany”.

Ambassador Thompson emphasized that it is important to stress that Four-Power responsibility continues into the future. When de Gaulle spoke on February 4 he was speaking of the future and it is important that we not lend support to his conception of how the German problem will be solved. Ambassador Thompson said that he hoped Ambassador Knappstein agreed with him that it was important, if an Ambassadorial Group meeting is held, that we do not permit the French to split the FRG and the US.

Knappstein thought that the clarification issued by the French Foreign Office on February 5, which followed on the heels of de Gaulle’s February 4 press conference, could perhaps be worked into a declaration. He expressed the view that if a declaration is not agreed and it becomes necessary for individual members of the Ambassadorial Group to issue unilateral statements, it will be particularly bad for the French in German public opinion. Ambassador Thompson said we should hold firm—the French are now in an impossible position.

Mr. Von Staden said the FRG would prefer the language “in the whole of Germany” to “in the two parts of Germany” in paragraph three. Knappstein did not think that the FRG should press for the change, however, and Ambassador Thompson agreed. Thompson said that is the language “in the whole of Germany” were used we would open ourselves to a propaganda onslaught by the Soviets since they would argue that self-determination applied in the whole of Germany would give an unfair advantage to the FRG since it is far more populous than the GDR.

Ambassador Thompson thought, although other possibilities might exist, the most promising possibilities for reaching agreement are: (1) inclusion of our sentence at either the end of the third paragraph or the end of the Declaration; (2) drop the French final sentence of paragraph 3 and our sentence; or (3) substitute “of all the peoples concerned” for “of all the peoples of Europe”.

1. Source: Department of State, Thompson Files: Lot 67 D 2. Confidential. Drafted by McIntyre.
2. At the April 20 Ambassadorial Group meeting, the French had introduced their draft statement and the United States had outlined requests for modifications in its language. A report on these discussions is in telegram 3169 to Bonn, April 20. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 32–4 GER)