Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XV, Germany and Berlin

101. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany¹

Washington, April 15, 1965, 3:09 p.m.

3141. Following summary of Brandt-Erler visit is FYI only, Noforn, uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcons.²

1. President saw Brandt and Erler for twenty minutes evening April 14. Background statement issued by White House being sent septel summarizes their discussions.³

2. Vice President Humphrey, toasting Mayor Brandt at luncheon he gave for him at Blair House, said after heavy harassment of Berlin we respect Berlin more. After recent harassment we and our Allies took another good look at situation. It caused us to remember importance of our Alliance and we hope every member noticed. Brandt called Berlin success story of West and especially of US.

Brandt told Vice President after luncheon FRG was not interested in becoming a nuclear power but felt it was legitimate for Germans to participate in shaping of strategy involving nuclear arms. The Vice President told Brandt our long-range missiles and Polaris submarines were most reliable and most important substitute for IRBMs. Vice President said Soviets were under no illusion re purpose and dependability of US deterrent.

3. During call on Secretary, Brandt and Erler asked for Secretary’s assessment of Viet-Nam situation. Both deeply impressed with Secretary’s presentation and promised to contribute to greater understanding in Germany for US position and intentions in Viet-Nam.

On German reunification Brandt expressed hope for some kind of expression, hopefully tripartite but at minimum from US alone, on German reunification on May 8. Brandt recognized such appeal as morale factor and not substantive move toward reunification. Felt it would be useful particularly for German voters and especially youth born in 1944 who would cast first ballot on Sept. 19. Brandt hoped for more substantive moves after elections. Secretary said we were still hoping for tripartite declaration but without doubt as minimum would do something on our own on May 8.

On Berlin Brandt saw recent Soviet harassment⁴ as support pried out of Soviets by GDR, praised US “massive political-diplomatic steps,” suggested we seek to discuss with Soviets recent “military maneuvers” so that they could not become weapon used repeatedly against Berlin. Secretary stated we had underestimated degree of Soviet-GDR reaction to Bundestag meeting. Secretary added we did not use all possible countermeasures because of pre-announced limitations of harassment and subsequent short duration.

Last major theme raised by Brandt and Erler was European unity. Brandt and Erler both said British were changing their views on Common Market. Under Secretary Ball stated we would like to see UK join Common Market on Common Market, not EFTA, terms.

Erler asked that we coordinate better our trade policies with Eastern Europe. Suggested that OECD be improved. He considered long-term credits for USSR nothing more than development aid.

4. In meeting with Secretary McNamara, Brandt suggested effort be made to reach understanding with Soviets re future Communist military maneuvers around Berlin so that Western access would not be interfered with. Brandt said he saw no present indication that Communists would interfere with access in future. McNamara expressed view Communists had achieved some psychological impact by showing force that they could bring to bear around Berlin. On French policy, Brandt and Erler thought French position in Common Market had passed point of no return. Erler considered French flirtation with Moscow to have nuisance value rather than as serious effort to establish alliance with Russians.

On alliance nuclear organization Erler felt FRG unwilling make any decisions before September elections and eager to avoid hassle with French. Erler implied Germans would prefer greater role in strategic planning and targeting without creation of new nuclear force and felt this was also British approach. McNamara stressed US desire to be helpful to its non-nuclear allies in Europe. McNamara and Erler agreed that NATO should employ whatever weapons might be necessary to achieve its objectives and that study is required to determine that conventional weapons are available as necessary. Erler suggested that Germans should talk frankly to French about French policies indicating in which areas they could follow French and where they could not follow, as in French policy toward NATO. Erler said nuclear problem has not been solved and will recur.

5. In meeting with McGeorge Bundy, Brandt said that he thought foreign policy would not be election issue, that he does not plan go Moscow before elections but would not close door to ultimate visit. In connection with Hallstein Doctrine Brandt said problem essentially one of maintaining and broadening contacts. He agreed with FRG’s present course in Eastern Europe of building relations gradually, with initial emphasis on economic contacts.

Rusk

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 8. Confidential. Drafted by Puhan and Finn, cleared by Klein of the NSC staff, and approved by Tyler. Repeated to Berlin, Paris for USRO, and Moscow.
2. A memorandum of Brandt’s conversation with Secretary McNamara is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 28 GER. Memoranda of the Brandt-Rusk conversation are ibid., POL 32–4 GER. No memorandum of Brandt’s conversation with President Johnson was found. The briefing paper prepared for the President is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Germany, vol. 9.
3. Telegram 3096 to Bonn, April 15. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 38–8)
4. See footnote 2, Document 100.