Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

74. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 19, 1964, 1 p.m.

1559. Embtel 1333.² Developments since submission reftel have helped to point up some of trends which I then discussed, and provide further indications of shape of Sov foreign relations in coming period.

1. Internally, this week’s organizational and personnel changes reflect leaderships preoccupation with need to establish control of party and administrative apparatus. In general, they seem not only to be reworking party structure, but continuing search for economic reforms and improvement of methods of industrial management.

2. Chou visit and related statements (Embtel 1546)³ have reinforced indications that basic differences between USSR and CPR will continue and that Soviets will be faced with need to try to avoid complete fragmentation of world movement, while trying to forestall airing of dispute which would help bring this about.

3. Responses of EE leaders and of such major free world CPs as Italian and French to Khrushchev’s removal, while varied, have given current Sov leadership little reason for confidence that CPSU’s leading role in movement is enhanced or even undamaged by last month’s events. Soviets may well be able to improve relations with some friendly bloc parties, utilizing argument that they have amended tactics in Sino-Soviet dispute along lines recommended by Poles, Rumanians, Italians in order establish modus vivendi without sacrifice of principle. However, with bargaining position weakened, Sovs likely to be unable to restore fully their central role and will continue to face pressures for greater autonomy.

4. To extent that Soviet policy toward free world has been thought out and restated in past month, it consists of cautious repetition of main lines with increased emphasis on peaceful coexistence and improved relations with West. This appears most clearly in latest Brezhnev speech (Nov 6) and Pravda leader (Nov 13). Latter while essentially exegesis on former, increasingly highlighted positive aspects of E–W and underplayed anti-imperialism, military vigilance, etc. (Note that Gromyko’s remarks at signing desalting agreement (Embtel 1557)⁴ were unusually positive.)

It would be erroneous to infer shift in Sov outlook toward West, nor is there any reason to believe Khrushchev’s departure from scene would cause such shift. With no change in goals or even in major policies Sovs have, however, signalled shift in tone and probable tactics. If nothing else, combination of private and public expression reflects desire for period of calm in E–W relations.

Reasons for this would seem to lie along two lines. First, with strong reiteration of peaceful coexistence line in confrontation with Chinese, not only are Soviets turning down alternative, vigilant, hardened line which Chinese would wish, but Moscow puts itself under pressure to demonstrate some success for its approach. Second, and probably more basic reason lies in totality of pressures in domestic and intra-Communist areas which enforce need for period of relative quiet in relations with non-Communist world.

If this so, we can expect period of some passivity in E–W relations coupled with interest in indications of détente, particularly in areas such as expansion of trade and exchanges, but lacking in serious initiatives leading either to improvement or to tensions.

On other hand, however, leadership can be expected to be more defensive and to show concern to avoid actions reflecting its weakness. This would include both sharp reactions to moves which seem to challenge Sovs and verbal restatement of firm position on contentious issues where this brought into question. This pattern of action likely to become most apparent on such major problems as Article 19, Berlin, SEA.

Forthcoming period may be one in which—even more than in past—Soviet actions in E–W relations will often seem contradictory or inconsistent. Most important, however, it promises to be period in which, while tactical shifts may occur, continuation of main lines of policy which current leadership has inherited will not be altered.

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential. Repeated to London, Paris, and Bonn.
2. Document 65.
3. Dated November 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, CSM 1–1 CHICOM–USSR)
4. Dated November 18. (Ibid., E 11–3 US–USSR)