Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

69. Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Davis) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, November 9, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Signing of Bilateral Air Agreement with the Soviet Union

The long-standing draft bilateral air agreement with the Soviet Union provides an excellent vehicle for an initial step forward in our relations with the new Soviet regime. As you recall, the agreement was negotiated and initialed in August 1961 but signature was postponed because of the general deterioration in our relations with the Soviet Union. It is ready to be signed at any time and the Soviets have continuously indicated their desire to complete the agreement and initiate passenger service. If signed this winter, the agreement would permit the initiation of flights between New York and Moscow early next summer. In view of the significance of a final decision on this question you may wish to discuss it with Senator Fulbright and confirm our impression that conclusion of the air agreement should not jeopardize ratification of the consular convention. If Senator Fulbright believes that it would, then presumably we would wish to delay signature until after the Senate has acted on the consular convention.

For purpose of your discussion with the President tomorrow² you may wish to recommend that he authorize you to conclude the air agreement subject to Senator Fulbright’s concurrence in terms of timing.

The advantages of signing the air agreement would be:

1. Signing would be an important psychological step in improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

2. At a crucial juncture in Sino-Soviet relations, it would provide the Soviets with evidence of the success of their “peaceful coexistence” policy as an alternative to the Chinese hard line. Since major multilateral agreements with the Soviets seem unlikely, bilateral agreements take on added importance.

3. Additional Russian tourists and other visitors should be able to come to America, it will be easier for United States travelers to visit the Soviet Union, and a significant expansion of professional contacts in the civil aviation field will ensue—all these represent important strengthening of our program to increase and improve communication.

4. There are a number of secondary advantages, such as familiarization with Soviet aviation techniques, improved courier service to the Embassy, a modest enhancement of Scandinavian bargaining position against the USSR on aviation matters.

On March 4 of this year in a memorandum to the President³ on this subject you recommended that the question of signing the agreement be reassessed once prospects for OAS action against Cuba had been exhausted. In addition, in discussing the disadvantages it was assumed that the Brazilian Government under President Goulart would immediately follow our action by permitting Aeroflot to gain entry in Brazil. Both of these disadvantages have been reduced or removed since that time. Remaining disadvantages would be:

1. Our efforts to restrict air contact with Cuba might be impaired.

2. Bloc airlines might exploit the signature to gain access to Latin America, although this seems somewhat less likely given the change of government in Brazil.

3. Our ability to prevent air agreements by Communist countries which would permit their operation to other less developed countries would be reduced. However, this capability is already seriously diminished in Africa and the Middle East.

Should your talks with Gromyko at the UNGA proceed favorably, you may wish to consider signing the air agreement together with Gromyko in New York at that time.

ARA is sending you a separate memorandum expressing its dissent in terms of the effect on Latin American interests.⁴

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AV 4 US–USSR. Secret. Drafted by Henry and Jenkins and cleared by Harriman, Thompson, H, and E/OA. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Rusk saw it.
2. Rusk, together with McGeorge Bundy, met with the President for 2–1/2 hours on November 10 at the LBJ Ranch in Texas. McNamara and Vance joined them part way through the meeting. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary)
3. Presumably a reference to Document 22.
4. A copy of this memorandum, also dated November 9, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, AV 4 US–USSR.