67. Message From the Soviet Government to President Johnson1

The Soviet Government received with satisfaction the statement of President Johnson in his discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin2 that the desire of the Government of the U.S.A. for peace has never been so strong and decisive as at present, and that the President hopes upon his reelection for another term for the possibility of progress in the reduction of tension, in the field of disarmament, and in the reduction of military activity. We likewise do not wish to bury anyone or be buried, and we are convinced that the difference of views over whose social system is better should not be an obstacle to the development of relations between the Soviet Union and U.S.A. in the interests of broadening international cooperation and strengthening peace.

The President said in that discussion that the U.S.A. needs to do many more necessary things than the production of bombs, and that it is in no way pleasing to him to spend $50 billion per year solely in order to be prepared to destroy someone. We understand this train of thought. It goes against our grain as well to divert enormous resources to military purposes, which however we must do since the U.S.A. and its allies continue to expand their armaments. We are convinced that many other countries as well, which now strive to follow the greater powers, would likewise prefer to cast from their shoulders the burden of military expenditures. Must we together acknowledge impotence in the face of the arms race, admit its inevitability instead of first restraining and limiting it, and then decisively reversing it? The Soviet Government advocates this.

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Why not for instance pursue a further reduction of military budgets, and a more substantial one than was done by the Governments of our countries in the last budgetary year? This could be accomplished without any formal agreement as parallel measures by the governments of our countries.

To give concrete form to the expression of President Johnson concerning the desirability of reducing military activity, in our view the possibility of a further mutual reduction of troops in Europe deserves attention.

In this connection we would like to inform President Johnson that the Soviet Government has already reduced its troops stationed outside Soviet borders in Europe by 15,000 men, i.e., it has fulfilled the intention concerning which it informed the President in June of this year.3 In its turn, as could be understood from the statements of Secretary of State Rusk in his recent conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, the Government of the U.S.A. has also undertaken a similar reduction of its troops in Europe. Why don’t we follow this path further? We believe that in this case also it is not the form of agreement which is important but the concrete results, and if it suits the Government of the U.S.A. more, then appropriate measures can be undertaken in the form of mutual example.

In a word far from all possibilities have yet been exploited to move forward the reduction of international tension which has been noted since the signing of the Moscow treaty on the banning of nuclear tests in three environments. In our belief there are still large potentials, for instance, in the field of disarmament, problems of effective security in Europe and the peaceful regularization of Germany, as well as in other current international questions.

We share the opinion of the President on the necessity for a display of greater flexibility in the approach to the resolution of problems on our agenda and in reaching agreements on questions which arise touching the interests of our countries. It is also very important that an agreement reached between us on one or another question be honestly observed by both sides. We are sure that the President will agree with this, since departure from this principle in our relations would not only deprive our efforts to seek genuine mutual understanding of a real basis but could result in situations the consequences of which it would be difficult even to foresee now. We speak of this not because any doubts have arisen on our part for example concerning the observance by the American side of certain obligations concerning non-attack on Cuba, we trust the word of the President and trust the agreement [Page 167] which was reached between the U.S.A. and the USSR on this score. What is at issue is that the fruits of an easing of international tension must be enjoyed by all states—large and small, friends of your country and friends of our country, no matter how far removed they may be from the U.S.A. or the Soviet Union. The state of affairs in the world at the present time is such that any infringement of the sovereign rights and legitimate interests of small countries is inadmissible in and of itself, inevitably creates or intensifies centers of tension and introduces additional complications in relations among large powers, and primarily between the USSR and the U.S.A.

Speaking about the necessity for manifesting flexibility in policy, the President mentioned the so-called problem of UN financing. In Moscow, attention was paid to Secretary of State Rusk’s statement in a recent conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin4 to the effect that the U.S. Government is not interested in a confrontation with the USSR on this question. The Soviet Government also would not want this.

We have already said more than once and emphasize again that the USSR advocates the strengthening in every way possible of the United Nations in its activity aimed at the maintenance of peace and security in conformity with the UN Charter. In this we are prepared for the closest cooperation with the U.S.A. However, the way out of the “financial crisis of the UN” should be sought not by means of violating the UN Charter, i.e., of the arbitrary application to one or another state of Article 19, but on the basis of strict observance of the UN Charter.

Unfortunately, there are manifestations of U.S. foreign policy which cause an exacerbation of the international situation, lead to the creation of centers of tension, including also in relations between our states. But at the present time we would like to emphasize not those questions on which there are differences of opinion between us, but those areas where there are points of convergence between us.

On the whole we feel that it is necessary to seek agreements, to achieve concrete decisions on unsettled questions, to eliminate everything that hinders mutual understanding, to expand the spheres of Soviet-American cooperation, including in the exploration of outer space, about which the President has spoken, and we note with satisfaction that the intentions expressed on this score by the leaders of both of our governments coincide. We think that a useful and practical beginning could be made in this matter by continuing the exchange of opinions on questions of interest to both sides between the U.S. Secretary [Page 168] of State and the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs during the forthcoming UN General Assembly Session.

We would like to say once again that the Soviet Government values relations of trust with President Johnson and considers it mutually useful to maintain and develop them, using all the channels which have been established.

There have been different periods in the history of Soviet-American relations. There were times when our countries conducted mutually profitable trade. In the recent past we were allies in the grim war against the forces of fascism. The Soviet people treasure the memory of the great American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who did much to create the anti-Hitlerite coalition and under whom the principle of mutual respect and understanding of the interests of one another was laid as the basis of relations between our countries. We speak about this, knowing how highly President Johnson values the activity of President F.D. Roosevelt, and believing, that if both our countries will adhere strictly to this tested principle, Soviet-American relations will attain the character of genuine good-neighborliness and mutually advantageous cooperation.5

  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret. Attached to a November 3 covering memorandum from Thompson to Bundy that reads: “Ambassador came in to see me this morning at 10:15 and left the attached.” In recalling handing the message to Thompson on Election Day, Dobrynin commented in his memoirs, “Brezhnev was so pleased by Johnson’s favorable reaction to his accession to power that the Politburo then decided to send Johnson a detailed reply even before his election.” (In Confidence, p. 133) Rusk told the President during a telephone conversation on November 3 that there was “nothing very significant about it except that it was a thoughtful message from the new team about a number of subjects.” Rusk then briefly summarized its points about military budget reductions and troop pullbacks in Europe, concluding, “in other words they were exploring a little bit to see how much movement there is and the possibilities. But I was on the whole encouraged with it.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation between the President and Rusk, Tape 6411.01, PNO 10)
  2. See Document 55.
  3. See Document 36.
  4. Presumably a reference to the meeting on October 20, also attended by Ambassador Stevenson. The text of the memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII.
  5. A draft reply to this message, dated November 24, addressed to Mr. Chairman, and marked “Not Sent,” is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163.