Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

60. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 18, 1964, 6 p.m.

1183. While ouster of Khrushchev was sudden and complete with Khrushchev overnight becoming unperson in best Communist tradition, we should not assume that present installation is a stable one, nor that jockeying for position among power contenders will not soon become apparent. The successive steps in the removal process reveal some notable developments in the system relating to the method of rule and process of changing leadership which would tend support idea that what we have seen is perhaps only first of a series of moves, exact nature and intensity of which at moment unpredictable. The experience of and precedents established by the 1957 ouster of the “anti-party” group and the principles of rule touted in the de-Stalinization campaign have had their impact and were reflected in the current crisis in the leadership. Paradoxically, Khrushchev was the prime mover of both these events and, therefore, planted the seeds which eventually facilitated his own fall.

In reflecting on Khrushchev’s ouster in the context of the pattern of rule since Stalin’s death, the following points emerge:

• First, Khrushchev himself established principle that the party’s Central Committee is a custodian of legitimacy, although its policy-making role remains limited. In 1957 a majority of the Presidium attempted to unseat Khrushchev and were outmaneuvered by the latter’s summoning of the Central Committee and military backing to support him. This experience was not forgotten by the other leaders on this occasion (as well as in the shake-up of May 1960) and an advance sounding out of the key figures and provincial party bosses who are members of the Central Committee undoubtedly was completed before Presidium members initiated their removal action. While the vote in the Central Committee then became a perfunctory rubberstamp of a Presidium decision, the legitimizing role of the Central Committee has been further institutionalized.
• Second, the power to initiate such a removal action, on the other hand, as well as the basic policymaking power remains concentrated in the hands of the dozen or so Presidium members. While the Presidium now is constrained to legitimize major personnel shift with Central Committee endorsement, such endorsement of policymaking moves is not so apparent. Central Committee discussion of policy in its plenums in the last five years or so has increasingly become a mass gathering of members of the Central Committee plus many non-members, convoked to listen to a series of non-controversial speeches followed by approval of a prepared resolution. There are still many decisions issued in the name of the Central Committee without the convoking of a plenum.

• Third, there is a certain encouragement of conspiracy in present leadership arrangement. The role of the First Secretary is not always the all-powerful one that Stalin had made it and the situation develops at certain points (and may continue to in the future) where the next ranking secretary can acquire the power and prerogatives to engineer the overthrow of the top leader. It became obvious in the successive cases of Kirichenko and Kozlov that Khrushchev had to delegate and entrust powers to the next subordinate and each aggrandized his authority thereby. The significant factor in Brezhnev’s case is the speed with which he was able after only a few months as a fulltime secretary to line up the Presidium members to support the Khrushchev ouster (although we have heard Mikoyan initially spoke out against the drastic action contemplated-which, if true, may bode ill for Mikoyan), probably almost unanimously.

  Brezhnev, of course, now becomes subject to same pitfalls as Khrushchev. As First Secretary he is in a stronger position than other leaders to perpetuate his power for the near future, but it is still at the behest of the Presidium. If he aspires to wear two hats as First Secretary and Premier in the future (as he probably must in conformity with the power pattern set by his predecessors) he will have to worry even more about the conspiratorial activities which the next subordinate Party Secretary will be able to mount against him. A reversion to repressive action to preserve his position may only bring him down more surely in the end or convulse Soviet society.

• Fourth, for all of Khrushchev’s opening up of informational channels to the Soviet public and his use and manipulation of public opinion by grassroots tours and public appeals, no ground swell of public reaction has yet been apparent on his behalf. Thus far the precipitate action has evoked less popular reaction than that of Stalin, Beriya and the anti-party group (this may, of course, be a function of the almost total lack of support among the apparatchiks for Khrushchev’s mode of rule). Again, paradoxically, Khrushchev is the victim whose ouster demonstrates the correctness of his apparent belief that a great deal more relaxation and license could be granted Soviet society without a resultant significant increase in its political participation or role which would jeopardize the party’s political monopoly.

Lastly, the affair is not ended. As indicated in Embtel 1178² Brezhnev’s power is limited and collective leadership of the Presidium is the dominant feature of the regime at this moment. This collectively solidified in recent months although its origins probably go back as far as 1960 at least, at the time of the U–2 incident, and was augmented sporadically in the following years by successive failures of foreign and internal policies, which swayed individual leaders in their loyalty to Khrushchev. The ambitions and views of various leaders, however, will eventually break this calm of collectivity. The role of Podgorny, who was the most obvious of Khrushchev’s favorites in the past year, is unclear and unless he soon falls in the wake of Khrushchev, he may represent a curb and even a threat to the power of Brezhnev in the future. Similarly, other leaders, some of a younger generation, are undoubtedly waiting to find their opening to increase their personal role in the post-Khrushchev rearrangement of power. Polyansky, who reportedly also spoke at the Central Committee meeting on Khrushchev’s agricultural failures, could be a strong contender for either a party secretaryship or Kosygin’s job. In the background are also Voronov, the RSFSR Premier, Kirilenko, the virtual boss at present of the RSFSR Party apparatus, and candidate Presidium members and lesser party secretaries such as Yefremov, Polyakov and Andropov whose stature has been rising in the past few years. In sum, the arrangement of the top leaders devised for the near future is not necessarily permanent and is only the reflection of the present collective leadership which will erode as the dynamic of Presidium politics begins to operate again and as the immediate need for closing of ranks recedes in importance.

Kohler

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15 USSR. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Paris.
2. Dated October 17, it reported that Khrushchev over the past year seemed to be grooming Podgorny as his successor at the expense of Brezhnev. (Ibid.)