49. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
1010. Embtels 994, 995 to Dept.2 Soviet action against attachés reported reference telegrams was predictable in view of rich dividends of Khabarovsk Hotel room raid and regrettable publicity of incident.
Determining nature of our tactical response to Soviet moves presents serious problems. In first place British requirements in pre-electoral period, as Dept aware, likely be somewhat different from ours. Secondly, Sovs have good case in light of pertinent international law as well as in eyes of world public opinion (which they could support if they wished to do so by public display of equipment, maps and notes seized in Khabarovsk) when they argue that activities of attachés were not only illegal under Soviet law but impermissible under accepted diplomatic practices.
Thus it seems to me that if we are to go to the mat with the Sovs on this case we must focus our fire not on activities of attachés but rather on behavior of Soviet agents toward attachés. Certainly we can argue cogently that invasion of hotel rooms, forcible restraint of personnel, and denial of request to contact Emb are all in contravention of requirements placed on host state by concept of diplomatic immunity. This is fundamental question of principle which cannot be breached by acquiescing in Sov demand or by failure immediately to take issue with Sov position. Thus it seems to me that first order of business should be to support formally and at high level line taken by Toon this morning with Smirnovsky.
In light these considerations it seems to me our choice of immediate course of action lies among following:
- (1)
- Reject proposal contained in oral Smirnovsky statement thus forcing PNG action by Sov, and then retaliating in kind on one for one basis. This assumes attachés return to Moscow on schedule, which I regard as essential test, since Soviet prohibition of return would in fact amount to PNG action.
- (2)
- Accept proposal made orally by Smirnovsky and then retaliate in identical fashion. If we follow this course of action, ideally we should muster similar charges and evidence against Soviet personnel [Page 117] to be withdrawn. I assume from my own experience in the Dept that evidence against particular Sov personnel necessary for PNG action is already on file and available for immediate exploitation.
- (3)
- Reject or accept Soviet offer but in lieu of direct retaliation withdraw diplomatic immunity from all Soviet Attaché personnel pending clarification through bilateral consultations of unprecedented Soviet statement on immunity concept made to Aubrey in Khabarovsk.
My own preference is of course one. Conclusive consideration, in my mind is that while we are in weak position to counter Soviet charges, we cannot put ourselves in worse position of appearing to accept them by unilateral withdrawal of personnel involved. However, any of three suggested courses would be acceptable from my point of view, provided action taken is prompt and unequivocal. In any alternative, I would repeat that it should be made clear that action is taken in accordance with our refusal to acquiesce in fundamental breach of basic immunity concept rather than our insistence that activities of attaché personnel were legal and permissible in accordance with diplomatic norms.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 17–2 US–USSR. Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to London, Hong Kong, New Delhi for Colonel Aubrey, and DOD/DIA. Received in the Department State at 1:52 p.m. on October 6.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 48.↩