44. Memorandum for the Record1


  • Discussion with Rusk in his office Saturday, September 12th—10:00 to 11:30 a.m.

I told Rusk of my increasing concern over the evidences of dynamic military effort on the part of the Soviets, the appearance of more single silos, the continuation of the testing of new and larger missiles, evidences that they are engaged in an extensive radar development which may mean ABM deployment or an anti-satellite effort—we could not tell, continuing improvement of their nuclear submarine program, etc. I said that I was so concerned about all of this that I felt immediately upon the completion of 11–8 and 11–32 that the President, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy and I must sit down and review those estimates and concern ourselves with the consequences. I said that it was apparent to me that the Soviets were saying one thing in Geneva publicly and doing quite another thing privately, from the standpoint of the arms race. Rusk agreed and said the meeting was necessary. He [Page 106]hoped that the issue might not get into public print prior to the election.

[Here follows material on the Chinese nuclear weapons program and other topics.]

Rusk asked what I thought was going on in the Communist world. He noted that growing indications of independence on the part of satellite leaders, deepening rift between Russia and Communist China, and he wondered just what Khrushchev had in mind trying to organize an international conference. I said that we too had observed the indicators. I was particularly interested in Tito’s trip to Hungary and I didn’t think Tito was trying to mend Khrushchev’s fences, that on the contrary, he was trying to increase his own independent strength. I also said that we agreed that the Sino-Soviet rift was deepening, we had noted the deployment of the Soviet division to the Chinese border and also the differing positions of local Communist parties, such as North Korean castigation of the Russians and their apparent cooperation with the ChiComs.

Rusk questioned the publication of the Togliatti letter3 in Moscow which I could not explain. I agreed that our demonologists would take a fresh look at the situation and report from time to time on our analysis as the situation evolved and unfolded.

[Here follows material on Vietnam.]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–BO1285A, DCI McCone Memos for Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone and transcribed in his office on September 13. The memorandum is marked “Noted by DCI.”
  2. National Intelligence Estimate 11–8–64, “Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack,” October 8; and NIE 11–3–64, “Soviet Air Missile Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1970,” December 16. Both are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume X.
  3. For text, see Pravda, September 10, 1964. Palmeiro Togliatti was the late Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party.