334. Message From the Soviet Government to President-elect Nixon1
I have informed Moscow of our conversation on the 8th of December when you stated President Nixon’s considerations concerning a possible meeting of President Johnson with the Soviet leaders.
In this connection I am instructed to convey you for President Nixon the following.
Since, as it is apparent now, Mr. Nixon is obviously not aware of all the circumstances of this matter, we would like to state for his information that the question of President Johnson’s wish to meet with the Soviet leaders was raised on the initiative of the American side at the beginning of July this year. Then in the middle of September and again at the end of November the American side—on its own initiative as well—returned to this question.
Supposing that Mr. Nixon was informed of the course of affairs in the exchange of opinions between Moscow and Washington on this matter, we on our part were planning nevertheless to find out his attitude towards the possibility of President Johnson’s meeting with the Soviet leaders before any final decision was reached on this matter.
Now the situation in this respect has been clarified. It is of course difficult for us to judge the character of American side’s intentions concerning a summit meeting and hence—how successful it could be under present circumstances. Mr. Nixon is of course in a better position to judge this.
[Page 789]So far as our own attitude to such meetings is concerned we can say absolute firmly that this attitude is being determined not by any motivations of the moment. We approached and still approach the question of such meetings with all seriousness, having in mind that for the leaders of such two states as the United States and the Soviet Union there is always something to exchange the opinions of in the interests of our two countries as well as in the interests of universal peace and security.
As to the problem of curbing the race in the strategic armaments we can state also with all certainty that our approach to the discussion of this problem—be it at summit, be it at any other level—is most serious. We had proceeded precisely from this when an agreement was reached between the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States, which was proclaimed on the 1st of July this year, to enter in the near future into negotiations concerning complex limitation and reduction of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems as well as systems of defense against ballistic missiles.
The problem of limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic weapons is undoubtedly one of the biggest questions in the relations between our countries. The results of discussion of this problem will, of course, depend on positions of both sides. If the Government of the United States really wishes, as we do, to facilitate the cessation of armaments race then there is no doubt that these results can be positive.
Verbal:
If there is any reply to this, Tcherniakoff is ready to receive it and convey it to Moscow.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Administrative and Staff Files, Transition, Nov. 1968–Jan. 1969, Robert Ellsworth, Box 1. No classification marking. A typed note at the top of page 1 states: “Hand delivered 4:00 p.m. Palm Court Plaza Hotel New York City 12/18/68.” Presumably the message was handed to Robert Ellsworth by Yuri Tcherniakov. A handwritten version of the same message (the printed version is typed) is attached to a note that reads: “Ellsworth from Tcherniakoff (USSR).” (Ibid., Country Files-Europe-U.S.S.R., Box 66, Soviet Contacts (Sedov), 1968–69) Yuri Tcherniakov was Minister Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. Robert Ellsworth was a Nixon aide who, according to Dobrynin in In Confidence, pp. 186–187, informed Dobrynin at a private dinner on November 24 that President-elect Nixon had authorized him to maintain informal contacts with Dobrynin on problems of mutual interest to Nixon and the Soviet leaders. Dobrynin states further that at a second meeting, “some days later,” Ellsworth explained that Nixon “seriously objected” to President Johnson’s plans for a summit meeting; and “a week later,” Dobrynin passed to Ellsworth a Soviet reply stating that Nixon might not have been aware that it was President Johnson who wanted a meeting and that “‘it is up to the American side to form its attitude to such a summit. As to us, we do not adjust our views to momentary advantages.’” (Ibid., p. 187) Although Dobrynin’s excerpt from the Soviet message differs in wording from the message, he is presumably referring to the same one.↩