323. Notes on Foreign Policy Meeting1
THOSE PRESENT
- The President
- Secretary Rusk
- Secretary Clifford
- Walt Rostow
- Senator Fulbright
- Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: The logjam is broken. We expect Saigon to send a delegation to Paris.
In Paris, we worked out an arrangement with Hanoi where we agreed to disagree. It was a “Your side, our side” arrangement. On October 28 we had agreed language with Thieu to announce this, but when the horse came to the hurdle he would not jump.
There will be a good deal of confusion.
They are shooting at our reconnaissance planes and there have been violations of the DMZ.
Briefed on NATO.
Briefed on the Mideast.
This is a dangerous situation. The Arabs want total withdrawal from June 5 line before they talk. Jarring is working on this.
The Soviets have replaced all lost arms.
The Israeli Cabinet is split over terms of settlement. Eshkol is fighting for his political life.
Delay on the NPT.
Non-nuclear countries are building up resistance to the treaty because of our delay in approving it. Some of the non-nuclear countries want firm guarantees against aggression. We can’t do that. That literally would make us policemen of the world.
Germany would not approve it without our doing so. We expect Italy to sign.
[Page 764]We are concerned about what is going on in Israel. We want some satisfaction for Israel on this. If they are 5-months pregnant, it may not be too late to stop it.
Japan will probably sign it.
Brazil, Argentina and Chile haven’t signed it.
We have the same problem with India and Pakistan.
It could be dangerous in the months ahead.
At the moment when the Soviets moved into Czechoslovakia we were about to announce talks with them on the following:
- 1.
- Strategic Missiles
- 2.
- Mideast
- 3.
- Vietnam
Soviets have come to realize same thing as McNamara about the strategic arms race. We would hope to announce some principles with Soviets to get it moving toward a peaceful settlement. In Southeast Asia, we are in a position to demand a lot from the Soviets. We did what they asked us to do—stop the bombing of a fellow Socialist Republic.
We think it would be good for the President and Kosygin to meet.
We want to know about the NPT coming back.
- 1.
- Would a new committee hearing be needed?
- 2.
- What kind of vote would you expect?
- 3.
- How much of Czechoslovakia still hangs over it?
- 4.
- What about talks with Kosygin. Should we try to get forward movement started?
Secretary Clifford: We wish to maintain close working arrangements with South Vietnam. We must keep up reconnaissance to protect our men. We must know if they are moving substantial number of troops and supplies north of the DMZ. Some black Monday they might pour over the DMZ and kill many of our men.
We have stopped bombing for 26 days—now it is time for them to produce.
Kosygin is having problems with cost of increased missile force.
They have start of an anti-ballistic missile system.
In DOD we are ready to discuss the elimination of a defensive missile system or a small defensive missile system to protect both of us from China.
We have every member of the JCS behind this plan now. We will lose two men on the JCS next spring—Wheeler and McConnell.2
If we wait for Nixon they will put off those matters they can put off.
[Page 765]It could be a year before a Nixon team is ready to do this.
If we get the talks started he will only have to continue it. We need the impetus of a start.
If talks were held in Geneva it could be valuable.
The two men might also talk about Korea. They have been exceedingly provocative. As of now, we do have some superiority in nuclear field. They would like to stop now, I believe.
If a freeze were to take place, DOD would like for it to stop now. It would give us a slight advantage. If the Soviets have other adventures in mind this meeting could be a deterrent in this regard.
We have just been through a serious monetary crisis. What we are concerned with is the solidity of the dollar.
We have a momentum going now. It started with the decision to stop the bombing. Now we will have Paris talks.
If we could get talks with the Soviets, there is a momentum toward peace.
Walt Rostow: I told Murphy the President wanted to know if he would support a special session of the Senate. Murphy talked to Nixon. On Sunday, Nixon said he wanted to talk to the leadership.
Nixon said the President had to make a decision. He was not able to form an independent judgment. He (Nixon) said he was a strong supporter of the treaty, but some members would resent coming back for a special session. Nixon gave neither a “yea” nor a “nay”.
The President: Senator Russell said he had to have more assurance than he has now before he would support it.
I do not like to see us wait. I do not know of anybody who would be hostile.
Senator Fulbright: There are five vacancies on my Committee. I would like to get it back to 15.
The key man is Dick Russell.
I didn’t ask Russell. If Russell would support it and Stennis would support it you would have.
My first reaction is to do it by the first of December—not around Christmas. It would be no great problem if you call them back. We could have a briefing hearing—jointly with Armed Services and Foreign Relations.
Russell is the key man.
Senator Fulbright: On the Antarctic Treaty3 the JCS were for it officially, and not privately.
[Page 766]You could pass it if Russell would pass it.
The Paris talks will keep Vietnam out of it. They won’t want to rock the boat if they are going.
If you can get Russell’s agreement and the JCS it is going through. I would also check on Hickenlooper.4 He has been very lukewarm.
If Nixon and Dirksen won’t oppose it, you are in good shape.
Would you feel out Aiken5 and Hickenlooper.
The President: What about talks with Soviets?
Senator Fulbright: It would be an excellent beginning for talks. It would be an excellent introduction for talks if this succeeded. I am very much in favor of talks and in favor of the NPT.
Secretary Rusk: If we brought this up and it failed it would be disastrous.
Senator Fulbright: I would question him. I would try talks with Soviets even if you do not have special session. I would do it at Geneva—not at Moscow.
I think the Soviets went into Czechoslovakia because they thought they were losing Czechoslovakia and Dubcek. It wasn’t directed toward NATO.
If Russell got CIA, JCS, and Secretary of Defense—I think he has great respect for them—I think he would come along.
- Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings. No classification marking. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid.) A tape recording and 51-page transcript of the discussion is ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recordings of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.↩
- General John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, Air Force.↩
- The Antarctic Treaty was signed on December 1, 1959 (entered into force June 23, 1961), by the United States, Soviet Union, and 10 other countries in Washington to demilitarize the Antarctic continent. For text, see 12 UST 794.↩
- Bourke Hickenlooper, Republican Senator from Iowa.↩
- George D. Aiken, Republican Senator from Vermont.↩