313. Editorial Note
In a memorandum to the President composed at midnight on October 27, 1968, Walt Rostow recounted his meeting earlier that evening with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. “I then explained bluntly the President’s dilemma in having to take such a major step [as halting the bombing of North Vietnam] at such a critical political period in the U.S. with nothing more from Hanoi or Moscow than assent by silence. I indicated the importance that the President attached to some positive indication from the Soviet Union that there was reason to believe that it was Hanoi’s intent to honor the understanding on the DMZ and the cities.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Rostow Files, Chlodnick File) Rostow handed Dobrynin an oral communication that specified the three assumptions on which the President was proceeding in the negotiations—that the South Vietnamese would be received at the conference that followed the bombing halt and that, while discussions continued, North Vietnam would “respect” the demilitarized zone and South Vietnam’s cities. The communication stated further that the President was “proceeding on these assumptions in the belief that Mr. Kosygin understands them and ‘has reason to believe’ that if the bombing stopped productive discussion could promptly follow.” The President was “very anxious to have any comments or reaction Mr. Kosygin may have to these three points” and would “carefully weigh Mr. Kosygin’s observations before making a decision.” (Ibid.)
On October 28 the Soviet Government passed the following note to the U.S. Government:
“The progress made at the meetings in Paris between representatives of the DRV and the United States on the halt of the bombings of the DRV, on the opening of political negotiations and on the participants of these negotiations, is being noted with satisfaction in Moscow.
“The representatives of the United States in Paris have had more than once an opportunity [to get convinced in] to become sure of the seriousness of intentions of the Vietnamese side in the search for mutually acceptable solutions. The Vietnamese leaders have repeatedly told us as well about the seriousness of their intentions. The most recent facts, in our view, convincingly prove, that the Vietnamese side is doing everything possible to put an end to the war in Vietnam and reach a peaceful settlement on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of the Vietnamese people.
“In this connection, it seems to us that doubts with regard to the position of the Vietnamese side are without foundation (groundless).” (Ibid. Brackets in the quoted paragraph.)