288. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President
Johnson1
Washington, August 20, 1968, 6:55
p.m.
Mr. President:
Attached are the notes for the background briefing, which I have prepared
for Sec. Rusk and me for
tomorrow.
I await your guidance.
Attachment3
Washington, August 20,
1968.
Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant
(Rostow) to Secretary
of State Rusk
Herewith some notes for your and my backgrounders tomorrow.
- 1.
- The agreement announced this morning that the President will
confer with leaders within the Soviet Union in early October is
the outcome of a long process.
- —it began in early 1964 when President Johnson first addressed
himself to Moscow on a range of major substantive
issues;
- —it is a natural follow-on from the two intensive
meetings at Glassboro in June of last year;
- —it is also natural that the Chiefs of Government of
the two countries should meet in the light of the
intense negotiating efforts undertaken over the 14
months since the Glassboro meetings.
- 2.
-
President Johnson’s
first major substantive message to the Soviet leaders was in
mid-January 1964.4 It proposed,
among other things, that the two nations address themselves
to the following objectives which would move the world
towards peace: [Page 684]
- —to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;
- —to end the production of fissionable material for
weapons;
- —to transfer large amounts of fissionable
materials to peaceful purposes;
- —to ban all nuclear weapons tests;
- —to place limitations on nuclear weapons
systems;
- —to reduce the risk of war by accident or
design;
- —to move toward general disarmament.
In general, President Johnson urged that the two nations work on
“specific problems”—such as these—rather than on “vague
declarations of principle” that might be agreed. That has
been the President’s approach to U.S.-Soviet relations since
then.
- 3.
- Progress was slow, but in the autumn of 1966, as a result of
discussions between Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Rusk, the outlines of a feasible
Non-Proliferation Treaty began to fall into place and work
intensified in that field. In November, 1966, the U.S.-Soviet
Civil Air Agreement was signed. In late January, 1967, the U.S.
initiated with the Soviet Union exchanges on the possibility of
limiting both offensive and defensive strategic weapons; and, on
the basis of a letter from Kosygin of late February, the President
announced on March 2 the willingness of the Soviet Government to
discuss this subject.5 During the
Middle East war of June, 1967, the Soviets initiated the use of
the hot line; and a cease-fire was achieved in New York on the
basis of intensive exchanges over that line (and otherwise)
between the two governments.
- 4.
-
Against this background it was natural that Chairman
Kosygin and
President Johnson
should find an occasion to meet when Kosygin came to the United
Nations meetings in New York on the Middle East late in
June. At Glassboro the two leaders took the occasion for two
days of exchanges covering a very wide range of topics,
notably:
- —the Middle East;
- —Vietnam;
- —the Non-Proliferation Treaty; and
- —the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet agreement on the
limitation and subsequent reduction of offensive and
defensive nuclear arms.
The President sought at that time a firm date and place for
the opening of strategic arms talks; but the Soviet
Government was not yet prepared for a decision.
- 5.
-
Since Glassboro, U.S.-Soviet cooperation has helped yield
some striking results-great and small:
- —The Non-Proliferation Treaty has moved forward
and been signed by 77 nations;
- —At the July 1, 1968, signing of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the two nations agreed to
hold talks on strategic arms limitation in the near
future. We expect a time and place to be set before
too long.
- —Between September, 1967, and April, 1968, a
treaty on the return of astronauts was negotiated
and signed;6
- —In August, 1968, with U.S.-Soviet cooperation, a
UN conference was
inaugurated on the future of the sea beds;7
- —In November, 1967, the U.S. and the Soviet Union
joined in support of a Security Council resolution
on the Middle East which is the basis of Ambassador
Jarring’s
mission;
- —In July, 1968, the first flights took place under
the U.S.-Soviet bilateral Air Agreement;
- —In June, 1968, the Consular Convention was
ratified and went into effect in July;
- —In July, 1968, bilateral U.S.-Soviet discussions
were inaugurated on the Law of the Sea;
- —In addition, progress was made in such other
bilateral matters as the Cultural Exchange
Agreement, Renewal of Atomic Energy Exchange
Agreement, and the negotiation to improve Embassy
sites.
In short, the year since Glassboro has been, certainly, the
most intensive and successful post-war year in U.S.-Soviet
relations despite failure to achieve full and effective
agreement on two great unresolved issues:
- —the Middle East; and
- —Southeast Asia.
President Johnson has
steadily emphasized both the reality of the progress
achieved and the reality of the dangerous unresolved issues
that remain between the two nations.
- 6.
- On March 31, when President Johnson withdrew from the presidential
nomination, he had very much in mind a desire to devote himself
as fully as possible to movement towards peace. He, therefore,
was pleased when, after preliminary exploration by both sides,
it was agreed that a meeting this autumn of the Chiefs of
Government of the Soviet Union and the United States made sense.
Before Glassboro, at Glassboro, and since Glassboro he has
worked to make the strategic missile talks a reality. The
question of time and place was dealt with in a number of
exchanges at the highest level, notably since the NPT moved towards reality in June.
If any one factor crystallized the decision in both governments
to move to a summit meeting it was probably the agreement to
proceed to strategic missile talks. We felt it might be helpful
if the Chiefs of Government could meet in roughly the same [Page 686] period as these talks
were inaugurated, because of the importance, the sensitivity,
and the complexity of negotiations on this matter—which
President Johnson has
often emphasized. We have no announcement to make at the present
time; but, as indicated earlier, we expect to be in a position
to make an announcement soon on the time, place, and level of
the strategic missile talks.
- 7.
- Although the opening of the strategic missile talks was
probably the catalyst that led to this decision by the two
Governments, the meeting of President Johnson with Chairman Kosygin will undoubtedly be the
occasion to consult on:
- —a variety of bilateral matters;
- —next steps in the implementation of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty;
- —the possibilities of bringing our positions closer on
the Middle East and on Vietnam.
