Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

276. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson¹

Washington, June 29, 1968.

SUBJECT

• US-Soviet Exchanges Negotiations

Our negotiations in Moscow for renewal of the US–USSR Exchanges Agreement for 1968–69 have reached an impasse on two major provisions-exhibits and performing arts groups. Most other portions of the text are agreed or are unlikely to pose serious difficulties.

In the two programs at issue, the Soviets have insisted that they are unable to continue at the levels provided in the last agreement. Specifically, they have offered to exchange three performing arts groups against five provided for in the 1966–67 agreement (of which the Soviets sent only four, although we sent five), and one exhibit against two in the last agreement (of which they sent only one, while we sent two).

Soviet reluctance concerning exchanges with the US in cultural and informational fields is not new, but is now probably increased by difficulties in the Soviet Union with the intellectual community, as well as by Moscow’s problems with Czechoslovakia and intrabloc solidarity as a whole.

Although the Soviets have negotiated in a constructive fashion on a number of other portions of the agreement, including a potentially useful arrangement for improved distribution of Amerika magazine, they have stood absolutely firm on the two disputed programs.

Overall, the prospects for the program under a new agreement, apart from the two in dispute, are as follows: General procedural provisions are entirely consistent with our position, including protective language to assure full reciprocity in performing arts and other programs. Program levels range from those specified in the last agreement downward to those actually implemented in 1966–67. Academy of Science and American Council of Learned Societies annexes are at pre-existing levels. An annex on cooperation in atomic energy has been agreed, ending a Soviet-enforced lapse since 1965.

Ambassador Thompson, who returned to Moscow June 25, has now expressed the view that we cannot expect significant improvement in the Soviet position. He has serious doubts as to the utility or desirability of any high-level appeal, and believes that we would be well advised to move ahead to conclude an agreement soon if it is decided that the terms are acceptable.

Unless we are merely to continue talking with little apparent prospect of significant improvement in the program for the new agreement, we face a decision among the following options:

1. To suspend or terminate the negotiations unless the Soviets accept some compromise in exhibits and performing arts.

2. To accept the Soviet position and conclude an agreement on that basis.

3. To accept the Soviet position on performing arts and exhibits, but to invoke countervailing reductions from Soviet-proposed levels in exchanges of primary interest to them, e.g. technical and agricultural, in order to restore a balance among the ingredients in the total program.

Clearly the reduced performing arts and exhibits programs will decrease the impact of the exchanges program. Nevertheless, I believe that it is in our best interests to continue-even at reduced levels-rather than to break off the negotiations. I very much doubt that we can force the Soviets to back down from their present position. To terminate the talks now would fly in the face of everything you have tried to do with the Russians since Glassboro.

If you decide that we should conclude an agreement at the reduced levels, I believe that our position would be improved by imposing some countervailing cuts, as suggested in option 3. We would then be able to explain the agreement as maintaining its normal balance, although at a lower level than we would have liked.

After you have given us your decision on how to proceed we will instruct Ambassador Thompson to make a last effort to obtain some modification of the Soviet position. We will ask him to try for Soviet agreement to receive our exhibit in up to three more cities, making a total of six (as the proposed agreement now reads we can show our exhibit in three cities). If we can get the Soviets to agree to this change it would achieve much of the value of two separate exhibits. Even if Thompson failed, we could proceed under either option two or three.

I have talked to Dean Rusk and Len Marks who agree that we should follow option three.

Options:

1. Terminate negotiations unless the Soviets accept some compromise.

2. Accept the Soviet position and conclude an agreement.

3. Accept the Soviet position on performing arts and exhibits, but reduce the levels of certain of the exchanges of interest to the Soviets.²

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XX. Confidential. Rostow forwarded the memorandum to the President under a June 30 covering memorandum. (Ibid.) Another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Arthur Wortzel (EUR/SES) and concurred in by SCI, CU, USIA, and Toon. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, EDX 4 US–USSR)
2. This option was checked. A note on Rostow’s covering memorandum, made by his secretary, Lois Nivens, states that on June 30 Rostow notified Walsh of the approval of option 3. The agreement was signed at Moscow on July 15 by Thompson and Nikolai M. Lunkov, Director of the Cultural Relations Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, August 5, 1968, pp. 154–159.