Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

270. Memorandum of Conversation Between McGeorge Bundy and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, April 26, 1968.

I had lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin on Friday, April 26. The meeting was at my initiative but at his Embassy. The vodka and lobster were excellent. This was the most informal and candid of all my talks with Dobrynin.

1. My business in proposing the meeting was to enlist the Ambassador in an effort to get Gvishiani to lead a Soviet delegation to the Sussex meeting on “common problems of advanced societies.” I described the situation as it now stands—the British lead, the widespread response, and the remaining Soviet hesitation over the German problem. I told him that we were still anxious not to press for governmental decision, and he strongly agreed with this approach. Indeed he pressed for evidence that the Sussex meeting was nongovernmental, and I cited the fact that the formal invitation would come from Sussex University. I described Zuckerman’s current proposal—that the Soviets could bring anyone they like as part of their own group (including, by implication, an East German) and I suggested that a non-German Eastern country could probably be included if that would help. I also said that while our first purpose had been and still was to open a new line of serious communication with the Soviet Union, the project was beginning to take on a life of its own because of the intense interest it aroused in many countries, so that I could not tell him that the idea would wait indefinitely for the Russians; the Sussex meeting, for example, was now sure to happen. Dobrynin told me that he remained personally favorable to the project and would raise the matter both with Gvishiani and through official channels.

2. After our discussion on the suggested center for the study of common problems of advanced societies, the Ambassador surprised me by opening the subject of the Middle East with some energy. He said that he thought nothing could be done as long as the U.S. would not use its influence on Israel, and when I asked whether the Soviet Union was prepared to use its influence on the U.A.R., he not only did not say no, but seemed strongly interested in the possibility—not today, but later, we agreed—that the U.S. and the Soviet Union might have very private talks to examine the terms that each might be willing to support with its friends in the area. We reviewed some of the familiar pieces of the puzzle and while Dobrynin did not depart from the basic Soviet line, he was less resistant than I expected to my assertion that anyone who wanted the Israelis to withdraw from the Canal would have to say something about Israeli shipping through the Canal. (I do not myself regard the Canal as the central element in the problem, but I made that obvious point in reply to his standard ploy on withdrawal.) The deposit which the exchange left in mind was that Dobrynin would be personally favorable to a policy of détente by little steps in this area, but that he was probably acting as a disavowable skirmisher. He also remarked that his government did not understand why we pressed the question of arms, when in its view the problem of arms was primarily a consequence and not a cause of the troubles there. I explained that the problem mattered greatly to us because it was an area where Soviet action was forcing U. S. action. He said that he himself recognized our problem but that it was hard to explain in Moscow. He also asserted with great firmness that his government had no intention of “fishing in troubled waters” in the Middle East. I expressed some skepticism, and he refined his point; he agreed that his government had interests and purposes of its own in the area, but he said it was not seeking military bases or a military position—he said that they could easily have much more of that sort of thing if they wanted. I told him I was not a believer in the theory that the Soviet Union was trying to outflank NATO by military means in the Middle East. I thought it had more sense. I said that I thought the real question was whether Nasser could or would accept any constructive moves. On that point Dobrynin mentioned refugees, and then by common consent we turned to another subject. But the exchange suggests to me that there may be more Soviet readiness for serious talk than I have thought.

3. My exchange with Dobrynin on the subject of a site for Vietnam talks was brief. I opened it myself by saying that I was sure he was a man who could understand that Warsaw really was unacceptable from our standpoint. He answered that he did now understand this because he had been given a full explanation by Walt Rostow. He did not contest the matter at all. I found this mildly interesting because in the past Dobrynin has nearly always taken just a few minutes to give me the standard brand of argument when his government was pressing a particular propaganda position with energy. He then went on to say that he thought the people in Hanoi had expected Warsaw to be acceptable to us and that he himself would have shared this judgment before our position became clear. I said that I could understand this error but that I myself believed that the President’s position was both persuasive and very firm indeed.

I did try to hint to Dobrynin that the unacceptability of Warsaw did not rule out a Communist capital. I did this by saying that in my own judgment Moscow would be a much better place than Warsaw. Dobrynin, as I expected, said that Moscow would be unacceptable for the Soviet Union because it would put them a shade too close to the action. I said I could understand that.

Dobrynin and I exchanged reminiscences about the selection of Glassboro. I raised the subject in order to demonstrate that agreement can be reached from quite different starting points in these matters. Dobrynin agreed, and told me what a hard time he had had in persuading Kosygin that the Americans were acting in good faith in proposing a military air base at one stage. He said that the Chairman had insisted that no one could be serious in proposing anything so obviously inappropriate. Dobrynin told me that this first reaction was based on the attitude the Soviets take toward their own air bases, to which no one is invited in any circumstances. Dobrynin said he had explained that the crazy Americans thought their air bases were dandy places for receptions and entertainment of all sorts, and eventually the Chairman calmed down and settled for a polite Soviet explanation to us that an air base would not be understood by third parties.

4. In speaking of Glassboro, Dobrynin made an interesting comment on the exchange between Bob McNamara and Kosygin on the ABM.² He said that both he and his Chairman had been gravely disappointed by McNamara’s presentation. Given the degree of Dobrynin’s candor on other subjects, I was much struck by the energy and firmness with which he associated himself with his principal on this point. He said that in their view McNamara had said nothing more than had already been said publicly by the Americans many times and had given them nothing concrete in terms of facts and figures which would show seriousness. I expressed my surprise, without arguing the point, and said that we on our side had been much disappointed by the Chairman’s polemical and even propagandistic response. I asked Dobrynin whether he thought this subject remained one on which there could be really serious private exchanges, and he said that he did indeed think so. He said one of the things which had bothered them about the McNamara démarche at Glassboro was that it had taken place in rather a large group at luncheon. Dobrynin told me that the President had checked with him briefly before giving McNamara the go-ahead signal, and my impression was that he blamed himself for not having tried to steer the President off this tack at the time.

I myself continue to believe that Bob McNamara made a much more serious effort than Kosygin and Dobrynin apparently give him credit for, but from the point of view of the future I think the interesting point is that Dobrynin himself clearly thinks something better can be done on both sides. My own impression is that the best way to explore this subject further would be for the President or the Secretary to designate either McNamara himself or some other trusted and highly knowledgeable individual to explore it directly with Dobrynin. Talks with Dobrynin can be wholly secure, and all the evidence suggests that what is discussed with him gets reported effectively to the highest levels.

5. In informal conversation before lunch, Ambassador Dobrynin displayed a high degree of understanding of election-year politics in the United States. He seemed to have a clear and sympathetic appreciation of the positions of the leading candidates, and as always I think we are fortunate that a man of his caliber is reporting on American affairs to Moscow.

McGeorge Bundy

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR. Secret. Drafted by Bundy on April 30. Notations on Bundy’s April 30 covering memorandum to Walsh indicate that Rusk saw Bundy’s memorandum of conversation and that copies were sent to Katzenbach, Kohler, Harriman, EUR, and NEA. Walt Rostow forwarded a copy to the President under a May 4 covering memorandum, which is marked with an indication that the President saw it. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XIX)
2. See Document 231.