263. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
102228. For the Ambassador. Request you seek early appointment with Kosygin to make following statement: (If Kosygin not available within next day or so, you should see Gromyko and ask him to transmit to Kosygin soonest.)
Begin Text. The President has asked me to convey to the Chairman personally his gratification at recent development in Geneva which enabled our two representatives to table complete identical texts of a non-proliferation treaty on January 18. The President regards this as encouraging evidence that we can overcome differences in viewpoint and other obstacles in reaching agreement on an issue vital to the preservation of peace. He is hopeful that it will now be possible to move forward towards prompt approval of the draft treaty within the ENDC and the UN in order that it may be signed and brought into force at the earliest practicable time.
The President has asked me, at the same time, to convey to the Chairman his sense of urgency over two related pressing issues, namely, progress towards limiting the strategic nuclear arms race, and restraint in the delivery of armament to the nations of the Middle East.
The President recalls that, in his letter of May 22, 1967,2 to the Chairman, he had expressed the conviction that our task of persuading the non-nuclear powers to accept a non-proliferation treaty would be greatly eased if you and we could demonstrate concurrently our will and ability to bring the nuclear arms race under better control. This remains his strong view.
Furthermore, both our nations are now expanding enormous resources in the development and deployment of offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems which, by their impact on the security requirements of both countries, compel an ever-widening spiral of armament from which neither nation can expect to derive any greater security. On the contrary, with the rapid development of technology and the massing of increasingly complex arrays of weapons, the danger increases. The President has asked me to make clear that in proposing discussions between our Governments on this issue, he in no way seeks [Page 628] military advantage; on the contrary, he seeks a solution through a limitation on arms based upon full appreciation by each side of the national interests and security of the other—a security which he is convinced will not be served by a continuation of our present course. The President believes, therefore, it is in our mutual interest to begin official talks now in order to resolve this problem at the earliest practicable moment.
On the question of arms to the Middle East, the Chairman will have received by now Ambassador Dobrynin’s report of his conversation with Secretary Rusk on January 9. This matter, too, is urgent and the President has asked me to stress his deep concern at the impact that continued arms traffic may have on the Middle East situation. We know from past experience that resort to arms is an ever-present danger in the Middle East. Not only does such action not resolve the problem, but it poses the danger of the spread of war beyond the confines of the area. The President has watched with growing concern the extensive delivery of arms to the area from the Soviet Union. The United States is under considerable pressure, as a consequence, to take matching action. Despite this pressure, my Government has exercised great restraint, most recently in its agreement to provide Israel with only limited numbers of aircraft, without new models, and only in continuation of our agreement with Israel of 1966. By agreeing only to this limited extension of the 1966 agreement and by deferring decision on the introduction of new advanced aircraft into the area, we have exercised restraint and it is the President’s earnest hope that this will be reciprocated by the Soviet Government. In this way our two governments could assist Ambassador Jarring in carrying out his vital mission and thus make a substantial contribution to prospects for a just and peaceful settlement in the Middle East.3 End Text.
[Page 629]For Ambassador Bruce: You should bring this message to the attention of Prime Minister Wilson prior his departure for Moscow.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US–USSR. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Toon and Walsh; cleared by Rusk, McNamara, Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State Battle, and NSC Executive Secretary Bromley Smith; and approved by Walsh. Repeated to London.↩
- See Document 215.↩
- Thompson delivered the message to Kosygin on January 22 and reported Kosygin’s preliminary comments in telegram 2529, January 22, which is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume XX. On NPT, Kosygin stated that “Soviet and US views coincided” and the treaty “should be signed as soon as possible.” On strategic arms, he said the Soviets “are still studying the problem” and would “give their views later.” On the Middle East, Kosygin said “he felt the time had come for the US and USSR to join their efforts to achieve Israeli withdrawal,” for “if the problem of occupied territories were resolved, other things, including the question of armaments, would fall in place.” In its formal reply to the U.S. message, dated February 27, the Soviet Government again stressed that a speedy Israeli withdrawal was the key to a peace settlement. Rusk replied in a March 9 message to Gromyko, emphasizing the urgency of an arms limitation agreement without awaiting the “settlement of certain other aspects of the conflict.” Moreover, Rusk stated, the Soviet position that a peaceful settlement depended on a prior Israeli withdrawal was not consistent with UN Resolution 242. The February 27 Soviet message and Rusk’s reply, transmitted in telegram 127656, are scheduled for publication ibid. In a May 2 letter to Kosygin, the President again urged an agreement limiting arms deliveries. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Pen Pal Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special U.S.-U.S.S.R. File, Pen-Pal Series, 1968)↩