Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

261. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, January 11, 1968, 1455Z.

2404. Subject: Review of Past Year.

1. Today being the first anniversary of my current sentence to Moscow I have been reflecting upon the events of the past year. I can take little personal satisfaction from a record of no hits, no runs and I hope no errors. The limbo in which we have been placed by the Vietnam affair as well as the style and methods of the present leadership has reduced my function here largely to a holding operation. In the days of Khrushchev, chiefs of mission here had frequent contact with the leadership which, at least in the case of Khrushchev, was loquacious and provided much material upon which to base analysis and forecast. This has radically changed and even my French and British colleagues who have frequent contacts with the leadership because of many high-level visits and cooperative undertakings derive little profit from them. This is somewhat balanced for the Embassy as a whole by some increase in lower-level contacts and a marked increase in the amount and quality of general information and leaks that the missions here get either directly or through the press corps.

2. In view of the superabundance of material on the Soviet Union stimulated by the Soviets’ fiftieth anniversary and the fact that the Embassy is preparing a comprehensive annual review, I shall confine myself to flagging what appear to me to be the highlights of recent developments.

3. Perhaps the most important single issue is the role of the Communist Party. The party under current leadership has failed to adapt either its ideology or its methods to modern conditions. Hence there has been a widening gap between it and various elements of society, the most striking examples being the youth and the intellectuals. There has taken place a kind of fragmentation of Soviet society and while the party continues to run the show, the various interest groups have more influence than formerly. This may in part be due to Brezhnev’s lack of dynamic leadership and the fact that the Politburo must in most matters reach a collective decision leaving room for maneuver by the component elements of society. In any event it is clear that the military for instance have far more influence than before. Unfortunately the same is true of the KGB and their influence is clearly regressive. This is the more serious as under Andropov they are closely tied in to the leadership. Over the long run, however, I believe the pressures for liberalization are so strong that the regime will be obliged to take account of them.

4. An important factor in this picture is the program of economic reform. If the reforms are to succeed, the role of the party in the management of the economy on the local level will have to be reduced and this should result in greater liberalization. It is unlikely, however, that the reforms will be bold enough or carried out with sufficient vigor to resolve the basic problems of the Soviet economy and the fact of two good agricultural years in a row may obscure the continued need for drastic change in that sector. Apart from weakness of system and management, the Soviets cannot hope for startling economic progress so long as they devote such a large proportion of their resources to military and related purposes. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union has made little if any progress in its attempt to overtake the United States in industrial production, it has continued to expand its enormous military and economic power. Moreover its people seek evolution and not revolution and unless the regime should ignore the desires of the population completely they will remain securely in power, although changes in personalities are inevitable. Regardless of the direction which Soviet policy takes, even if Vietnam is settled, the highly competitive nature of the Russians combined with the compulsions of Communist ideology will insure continued rivalry with the United States. I continue to believe, however, that our interests lie in doing whatever we can to stimulate the liberal trends in this country in the hope of reaching a situation in which real coexistence will be possible.

5. In foreign affairs the Soviet record has been mixed. Continued deterioration in their relations with Communist China and with Cuba, and further weakening in the ties binding the Communist Bloc, were partly offset by French actions weakening NATO and the chaos in China which diminished its challenge to Soviet leadership of the Communist world. Serious errors were made in the Middle East crisis, but the overall result of that affair cannot be judged at this stage. Looking backward, however, there can be little doubt that Soviet influence in the Middle East is far greater than it was a few years ago.

6. In Southeast Asia I continue to believe that the Soviets would like to see a political settlement chiefly because of the risks involved in continued conflict, the possibility of eventual U.S. success damaging to the policy of support for wars of liberation, the prolonged humiliation of not being able to protect a fellow socialist country, the economic costs, and the frustration of the policy of peaceful coexistence. However, there are advantages to them in the present situation so long as the situation does not get out of control, and whether due to lack of leverage in Hanoi, the rivalry with China or divided views in Soviet leadership, the Soviets are unlikely to do much to bring about a settlement.

7. For the present the Soviets will maintain their policy of trying to isolate West Germany and to force recognition of the East German regime, but sooner or later they are likely to make a strong play for some kind of deal with the Federal Republic.

8. My general impression is that the Soviet leadership is somewhat muscle-bound. It is out of phase with the times internally, as well as in its relations with the Communist Bloc. In its relations with the West and the third world it is also hamstrung by adherence to an outmoded ideology. This is probably a transitional period and sooner or later the leaders will have to face many of the problems they have been evading or attempting to compromise. Given the underlying pressures, the eventual outcome should be in the right direction even though the present phase is retrograde.

9. Cultural and scientific exchanges, tourism and commerce are among the few means of influence we have and I would hope that post Vietnam, if not before, we can proceed to remove the barriers to expanded trade. But as long as policy making is in the hands of what is generally a narrow minded group of party officials who see the world through thick Marxist lenses, progress in accommodation with the West and liberalization internally will be slow.

Thompson

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 US–USSR. Secret; Limdis.