241. Editorial Note
On July 20, 1967, the intelligence community issued National Intelligence Estimate 11–4–67, “Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy.” NIE 11–4–67 stated that the “Soviets almost certainly believe that their strategic position relative to that of the US has improved markedly” and that, while “Soviet foreign policy will continue to be based primarily upon political and economic factors,” the “military capabilities that the Soviets are developing and the military relationships that are evolving will affect their attitudes and approaches to policy, they will probably seek to gain some political or propaganda advantages from their improving military position, and may take a harder line with the US in various crises than they have in the past.” On August 9 the President’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow forwarded NIE 11–4–67 to President Johnson. In his covering memorandum Rostow commented that the situation described in the NIE was “not alarming; but I suspect it will be exploited as a political issue in 1968. The Soviets are increasing the number of their hardened ICBM’s while we are increasing the number of our warheads. Therefore, it will be argued, they are ‘closing our nuclear superiority gap.’” Rostow continued, “no one thinks we are moving to a position where a Soviet first strike is likely to become rational in the foreseeable future. But the numbers will be moving unfavorably over the coming year.” NIE 11–4–67 and Rostow’s covering memorandum are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume X.