Office of the Historian

214. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bator) to President Johnson1

Washington, May 12, 1967, 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Port Restrictions on Soviet Ships

The Russians are once again putting pressure on us (Kosygin-Thompson) to reduce our present tough restrictions on access by Soviet ships to U.S. ports. On the face of it, they have a beef. They treat U.S. ships on a par with others. We keep them out of all but 12 of our ports, and put them through a lot of red tap, frisking, etc. before we let them in anywhere—restrictions which we do not apply to non-communist nations. The result is that they almost never use our ports. Our ships don’t much use theirs either, but that is by choice.

On the basis of an interagency staff level recommendation, Nick Katzenbach suggests that we explore with key labor people (Meany, Gleason, et al)—and then on the Hill—the possibility of some careful easing of the restrictions. A brief summary of the kind of easing we have in mind is at Tab A.2 It would be designed to forestall a row with Moscow, without any risk to the security of our ports. (The present arrangements were designed to keep the Russians from sneaking nuclear weapons into U.S. big-city harbors. This made some sense in the mid-50s before the Russians developed intercontinental missiles with hydrogen warheads. It makes little sense now. In any case, we would maintain enough control to hedge our bets.)

In any case, we must proceed carefully. This is the sort of thing that could cause a rapid rise of George Meany’s temperature. And he would have plenty of allies among the more edgy of our security people, who tend to think there is a communist under every bed.

The recommendation to consult comes from Katzenbach and has the support of the appropriate people in the other agencies, including Defense and the Chiefs. If you approve, we would go ahead only3 after it is clear that the current game of naval chicken in the Sea of Japan [Page 485] does not develop into a pattern. And after taking soundings, we would lay out for you the choices for final decision.

FMB

OK for Katzenbach, Wirtz/George Weaver, et al, to take soundings with Meany/Gleason and then on the Hill4

No

Speak to me

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XV. Secret. Bator forwarded the memorandum to the President under a May 12 covering memorandum which stated: “The Russians last gave us a prod on this two or three days ago. Nevertheless, we would hold up on consultation until it is clear that the game of naval ‘chicken’ in the Japan Sea [in early May the USS Walker was scraped by two Soviet destroyers] does not show a pattern.” (Ibid.)↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. “Only” is underlined in pen.↩
  4. None of the options is checked, but to the right of Bator’s signature, Rostow wrote “OK.” The President wrote, “I would hold this for the present.”↩