Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

212. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Thompson)¹

Washington, May 1, 1967.

Dear Tommy,

I have been trying to arrange a reconsideration of the approach to the Soviets about Vietnam we have discussed at intervals ever since I came to the Department last fall. First my recent trip to Europe, then Punta del Este, and now Adenauer’s funeral have caused delays.

Meanwhile, the process of hostilities in Vietnam asserts a dynamic force which continues to cause both of us great concern. We-we, the civilians, that is-have failed to produce a political solution for the war. It is almost reflexive action to allow more leeway to the soldiers, and especially to the Air Force. In turn, the pressure on China and the Soviet Union mounts.

Your interesting telegram No. 4491,² and then 4566,³ as well as the corresponding message in the other series,⁴ leads me to write this letter, both to carry on our own conversation, and to try to clear my mind.

I believe, as you do, that we are on a tricky and dangerous course, and that relative success in South Vietnam is increasing the risk of a confrontation with the U.S.S.R.

The Soviets are putting more and more material into North Vietnam. So far-in use at least-it is material mainly to defend North Vietnam. They are sending us warnings—i.e., Zhukov’s talks here,⁵ and Brehznev’s latest speech calling on us to get out of Europe. And they are letting it be known that they think the following somewhat inconsistent thoughts: (1) that we are not interested in negotiation, but in military victory, which they say is impossible; and (2) that the recent move towards détente was at our initiative; that we need a posture of détente with them for domestic purposes; and that so far we have given them nothing in return (never mind that we can’t see what they have “given” us in this minuet).

Whatever these signals mean—whether they are preparations for serious talks between us, or serious warnings, or nothing in particular but noise—there is no doubt that at some point, over some issue, there is a risk of forcing them to a confrontation, and that the risk would be less if bombing could be confined to the infiltration routes. Dobrynin told me once there were some steps the Soviets could not tolerate. I suppose the loss of North Vietnam to the Communist camp would be one.

As you know, I have felt for some time that unless the war were settled, it would enter a more dangerous phase,—a phase of danger for the Soviet Union as well as for other people—and that sooner or later we should have to follow the procedure which, with some variations, led to the end of all the post-war crises, that is, a secret, low-keyed warning to the U.S.S.R., followed by joint or parallel U.S.-Soviet action to put out the fire.

I have recently checked with Dean Acheson about the stages of settlement in Korea.

The first step, according to Dean’s recollection, was a talk between George Kennan and Malik in the middle of June, 1951. George was about to go back to Moscow as Ambassador. He asked to see Malik in New York to go over the list of new men in the Soviet Foreign Office. In the course of that talk, he was instructed to talk along these lines: “His boss (i.e., Dean Acheson) was beginning to wonder if Malik’s boss knew where this thing was going. He couldn’t figure out Soviet intentions. He hoped they knew. Did they really want a blow-up?”

A few days later (on June 23) Malik made a speech which contained a hint. We followed it up in Moscow. This led to Kaesong.

I’m checking the files. But I remember Dean telling the story the same way some years ago.

My thought, as you know, is to convey both a warning and an offer to the U.S.S.R.: a warning that the present course could get out of hand, with results no one wants; an offer, in the spirit of our “special relationship” to join with them in procedures that could bring this affair to an end.

The essence of that approach (at least the second part: there was no visible warning) was put to Dobrynin by the Secretary in January,⁶ and recently followed up by Harriman and me. There are different ways to formulate the idea. It rests in the end on the assumption that we have a common interest in ending the war on the basis of the status quo ante, since further hostilities carry risks we both wish to avoid. How to get there? They will know best about how to bring influence on Hanoi. The essential is to face the issue in this form.

You say a proposal that the Soviet cut off aid to NVN could be interpreted as a move on our part to turn Hanoi over to the Chinese. Agreed. But it should be possible to meet that concern, both through our warning as to the alternatives, and through the suggestion that we jointly guarantee the outcome of the settlement, directly or indirectly. In that connection, I am intrigued by recent Soviet moves with regard to Laos. The 1962 agreement⁷ rests on the notion of joint guarantee, after all.

I’m sure that some people in the Soviet Union would like to see us continue to flounder in Vietnam, and to have the President punished politically in 1968. Such a result would paralyze American foreign policy for the forseeable future, and open the door to a renewal (or should I say intensification?) of Soviet adventurism in the many soft under-bellies of the world.

Even though there are risks, as you say, that efforts to involve the Soviets may be misunderstood or rebuffed, I remain convinced that the time has come to try. The alternatives are all worse. And we’ve been rebuffed by experts, after all.

I should think that we have nothing to lose by moving forward, and a lot to gain, even if we do no more than deter and diminish Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam. It should not be hard to work out a formula both for the warning, and for the offer—a statement calculated to allow them political credit as peace makers if they want it, to meet their political interest in North Vietnam, and to point the way to stability.

This is the only path I can see now for reaching the posture you mention in paragraph 7 of your 4491.⁸

It might help counter Zhukov’s campaign here-intended to make our flesh crawl-if you dropped the remark that some of your colleagues thought the situation in Vietnam was approaching that in Korea at the time of the Kennan-Malik talk.

Yours, as always,

Eugene V. Rostow ⁹

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XV. Secret; Official-Informal. Read forwarded a copy of the letter to Walt Rostow under cover of a May 5 memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. In telegram 4491, April 19, Thompson questioned whether the “continuing campaign of Vietnam peace moves” served to further the possibility of peace negotiations. So far as the Soviet Union was concerned, Thompson stated, initiatives with a remote chance of success, especially those involving the Soviets, “may be positively harmful as adding to Soviet suspicions of our sincerity.” For text, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. V, Document 137.
3. Dated April 24. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 USSR-US)
4. Not further identified.
5. Walt Rostow’s memorandum of his conversation with Yuri Zhukov on April 18 is at the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Subject Files, Z misc.
6. Regarding Rusk’s conversation with Dobrynin on January 5, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. V, Document 7, footnote 2. The resulting Sunflower negotiations during January and February, in which Kosygin played a major role, are documented ibid.
7. Dated July 23; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1075–1083.
8. In paragraph 7 Thompson proposed making a dramatic announcement, such as of a substantial increase of U.S. forces in South Vietnam combined with a leveling off of the bombing of the North, that would hurt the Viet Cong at the same time that it reduced the risk of increased Soviet aid to the North. Such a course might reduce criticism at home and thus North Vietnam’s hope of an early U.S. withdrawal.
9. Printed from a copy that indicates Rostow signed the original.