Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

208. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)¹

New Delhi, March 18, 1967.

Dear Walt:

I am enclosing some documents in regard to the Svetlana episode which I think will interest you; you may want to show them to the President. I have sent a similar set to the Secretary.

These enclosures are (1) a play by play description of the series of events that took place here in Delhi; (2) a copy of Svetlana’s handwritten statement in which she described her family relationships and why she has determined not to return to the Soviet Union; and (3) a copy of a personal note of appreciation which she sent me from Switzerland.²

As you will sense from her Statement she is an extraordinary person.

Our operation here was a ticklish one and everyone concerned performed with competence. If we had refused to help her she would have gone to the press and the roof would have blown off at home. If we had gone directly to the Indians for “guidance” she would have pressured us formally for asylum and there would have been a major conflict among the Indians, Soviets and ourselves.

She is going to write a book (indeed it is already largely written) which will sell hundreds of thousands of copies.³ As I suggested in a message to the Secretary this book with some timely guidance from some American whom she trusts could be written in a way that would help, not hurt, US-Soviet relations. If, after dealing with the Stalin years, her emphasis were on the new more liberal Soviet generation and hopes that it can develop a cooperative relationship with America the favorable impact could be very great.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Chet Bowles

Attachment

New Delhi, March 15, 1967.

Memorandum for the Record⁴

SUBJECT

• Defection of Svetlana Alliloueva

1. At 7:30 pm on March 6, 1967, a neatly dressed woman carrying a small suitcase appeared at the main door of the Chancery. Speaking good but accented English she told the Marine Guard Cpl. Daniel Wall that she was a Russian citizen and she wished to talk to an Embassy officer.

2. According to standard procedure Cpl. Wall called the Consular Officer George Huey, Security Officer John St. Denis, and appropriate [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] officers and asked the woman to wait in the Marine Guard Office near the entrance until the officers arrived.

3. The Consular Officer, Mr. Huey, arrived at the Chancery at 7:35 pm shortly followed by the Security Officer, John St. Denis and the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] officers.

4. According to the woman’s passport she was Svetlana Iosifovna Alliloueva, born in Moscow, February 22, 1926 and entered India December 20, 1966. She was taken to the DCM’s empty office where she was interviewed by Mr. Huey and by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

5. The following are the pertinent points of the interview: (In addition, the text of a statement which she wrote out in longhand later in the evening is attached.)

A. Svetlana stated that she was the daughter of Joseph Stalin by his second wife, Nadezhda Alliloueva, and that she was the “common law wife” of Brajesh Singh, an uncle of Dinesh Singh, who had been an employee of the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow.

B. Svetlana stated she had arrived in India on December 20, 1966, accompanying the ashes of Brajesh Singh, who had died in Moscow in late October 1966. She and Brajesh had wanted to marry, but had been denied permission. This denial was conveyed to her by Kosygin personally. It was also Kosygin who personally approved her visit to India, evidently after strong representations from Dinesh Singh and T.N. Kaul.

C. The ceremony for immersion of Brajesh’s ashes in the Ganges took place on December 25, 1966, near Brajesh’s village in Uttar Pradesh. Dinesh Singh had wanted to use this occasion to demonstrate Indo-Soviet amity, and had invited the top Soviet Embassy officials, (neglecting to inform and invite many of Brajesh’s old friends). The Soviet Embassy, however, was under orders to keep everything quiet, so none of them attended.

D. She had long been disillusioned with Communism. It was not just the disappointments related to governmental interference in her personal life in the past few years (i.e. refusal to allow her to marry Brajesh), nor was it a result of the 20th Party Congress. Her disillusionment she said had begun long before, but recent events had provided her with both the additional incentive to make this critical decision and the opportunity to carry it out, which would probably never be repeated.

E. Her initial permission had been for a two week stay in India and she had simply defied the Soviet Government by remaining in the village for two months, ignoring requests, then orders, from the Soviet Embassy that she return immediately.

F. Svetlana stated that she had fallen in love with India and her first desire was to remain here. She considered her late husband’s family in U.P. her own; they felt the same way about her and wanted her to stay with them. She had discussed the matter with T.N. Kaul, who was strongly opposed to her remaining. In fact Kaul exchanged several letters with her while she was in U.P., urging her to return to Moscow. She also spoke with Dinesh Singh, who said that she could remain in India only if the Soviet Government gave her permission; “this was not the time when India could afford a disturbance in its relations with the Soviet Union.” She requested Dinesh Singh to take the matter up with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. He later told her that he had done so, and that she had agreed with him that it was impossible. With this hope gone she felt that her only hope of remaining in India rested with the Soviets.

G. Consequently on March 6 she had lunch with Soviet Ambassador and Mrs. Benediktov and again requested that she be permitted to remain in India. But once again her request was bluntly refused. The tenor of the meeting left no doubt in her mind that she would never again be permitted out of the Soviet Union.

H. At one point either Dinesh Singh or T.N. Kaul (it is not clear which) suggested to her that, if she were determined not to return to the USSR, she might consider an approach to a “third country,” as India could not accept her.

I. Svetlana said that when Ambassador Benediktov made it clear that she would have to be on the flight to Moscow leaving Delhi early Wednesday morning⁵ and in view of the refusal of Dinesh Singh and T.N. Kaul to help her she resolved to appeal to the United States for help. On the evening of March 6 she packed one suitcase (leaving two others behind) in her room on the Soviet Embassy compound, called a taxi to the gate of the compound, and asked the driver to take her to the American Embassy. He did so without hesitation.

J. In response to persistent questioning Svetlana insisted that she definitely could not go back to the USSR, as she was determined to live her life as a free person. In the USSR she was not only subject to the restrictions that apply to all citizens, but to additional ones that applied to her because of her unfortunate position as some sort of “national relic.” If she returned to the USSR Svetlana was not sure that her defiance of orders during her stay in India would be punished, but she was certain she would never have another opportunity to travel abroad.

K. Since she could not remain in India, she was appealing to the United States, which was a country she greatly admired. She wrote and signed a formal request for asylum in the United States in which she stated she is CPSU member but no longer favors the Communist system. No promises of any kind were made to her.

L. Svetlana was also told that we could not at this point definitely promise asylum to her, and asked her what other courses were open to her. She replied that if the United States could not or would not help her she did not believe that any other country represented in India would be willing to do so. Since she was determined not to return, her only alternative was immediately to tell her story fully and frankly to the press in the hope that she could rally public support in India and the United States.

M. Svetlana was reminded that at this time the Soviet Embassy, being occupied with a full formal reception in honor of Marshal Zakharov, was still probably unaware of her departure, and if she chose to return she could still do so without them being aware that she had ever left. She clearly and forcefully stated once again that she could not and would not go back.

6. During the evening [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Roger Kirk, the Embassy Soviet Affairs Specialist, and Richard F. Celeste, the Ambassador’s Personal Assistant, were also called in. The interview was interrupted at approximately 9:00 pm to permit the preparation of a Flash cable⁶ to Washington.

7. The initial part of this cable summarized the facts outlined above and indicated that in our estimate we could count on no more than four hours before the Soviet Embassy discovered that Svetlana was missing. The message also pointed out that once her defection was discovered and the GOI informed we would almost certainly be prohibited from assisting her. The message concluded that “unless advised to contrary we will try to get Svetlana on Quantas Flight 751 to Rome leaving Delhi at 1945Zulu” (1:15 am March 7 local time) and stated that she will be accompanied by Embassy officer [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

8. This cable to Washington was transmitted at 9:40 pm (March 6, 1610Z) and its receipt was acknowledged by Washington eleven minutes later.

9. At this point it was explained to Svetlana that we could not guarantee her asylum in the United States, but we were willing to assist her in leaving India for Rome immediately if she should choose to do so. She was cautioned that this would mean burning her bridges behind her with no clear idea of what lay ahead. She asked whether we would abandon her in Rome if it should be decided not to let her go to the United States. She was told that if we could not grant her asylum we would certainly continue to assist her until she did find a haven. Svetlana then stated that she chose to proceed to Rome.

10. At this point, since a number of arrangements had to be made, Svetlana was asked whether she would be willing to write out a brief life history. She agreed to do so and spent the rest of the evening until her departure for the airport writing. The text of this longhand statement has been transmitted separately.

11. From Svetlana’s statement to Embassy officers it was clear that (a) she was not prepared to return to the USSR; (b) she wanted to stay in India but that this had been ruled out by the GOI unless the Soviet Government would approve and she was told that such approval would not be forthcoming; (c) she wanted the assistance of the United States Government, at a minimum, to leave India and find a safe place to live and, at a maximum, to grant asylum in the US; and (d) if she could not get US assistance her only recourse would be to contact the press and appeal publicly for the help and support of the people of India and of the United States.

12. While awaiting response to the Embassy’s cable to Washington I carefully reviewed the options with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Roger Kirk and Richard Celeste. Four courses of action were discussed.

A. To deny Svetlana our assistance and encourage her to return to the Soviet Embassy compound;

B. To keep Svetlana in the Chancery or Roosevelt House until her future could be resolved with the GOI and the Soviet Government;

C. To grant her a visa to the United States (Svetlana’s Soviet documentation was in order and unrestricted) which would enable her to leave India and proceed to another point while the matter was considered further;

D. To spirit Svetlana out of India covertly in the hope that the US role in her departure could be kept secret.

13. I immediately ruled out alternatives A and D. In regard to the first option to reject Svetlana’s appeal for assistance would be completely contrary to our national tradition. When it became known that the United States Government had refused an appeal for assistance from the daughter of Joseph Stalin, the public outcry in the United States and elsewhere would have been overwhelming. Moreover, since she had stated her intention to make a public appeal if we refused to help her a profoundly embarrassing situation would also be created with the Governments of India and the USSR.

14. Since it was impossible to confirm Svetlana’s identity during the brief time at our disposal, since the possibility of a Soviet provocation could not be ruled out and, most important, since any US role would almost certainly eventually come to light I considered that the fourth option, i.e. to spirit Svetlana out of India covertly, involved unacceptable and unnecessary risks.

15. Thus the choice was between keeping her in the Chancery and informing the Indian Government that she sought asylum in the United States, and assisting her to leave India as quickly as possible. Careful consideration was given to both alternatives.

16. If Svetlana had been kept at the Embassy and the GOI informed, an issue between our Governments and that of the Soviet Union would have been immediately joined. The Government of India, under heavy pressure from the Soviet Union, would have demanded Svetlana’s “release” to Indian custody. We would have had to refuse since it was clear that the GOI could not be relied upon to permit her to stay on in India peacefully. The fact that Stalin’s daughter had sought and received refuge in the United States Embassy would become known within a short time and the Chancery and Roosevelt House would be besieged by the world press. Thus the matter would have become an issue between the three governments in a most contentious fashion and in a situation which would leave us little room for maneuver. A first class international Donneybrook would have been inevitable with the outcome unpredictable.

17. The appeal of assisting Svetlana to leave without officially deciding the matter of asylum in the United States was manifold. In the first place it could be done openly and legally since her Soviet and Indian documentation was in order. This would protect the United States against charges of another CIA plot and against the accusation of kidnapping her against her will. Secondly it would provide a breathing spell in which her future status could be considered without the direct glare of publicity and without the involvement of the new Government of India which would be almost certainly bound to bow to Soviet pressure if she were still in India.

18. At approximately 11:30 pm I decided that we should provide Svetlana with a visa and I confirmed the tentative arrangement to place Svetlana on the Qantas flight for Rome, accompanied by an American officer, unless we received contrary instructions from Washington in response to our earlier cable in the meantime.

19. With my concurrence Mr. Huey, the Consular Officer, endorsed a B–2 Visitor Visa in her passport, valid for one entry if used within three months (i.e. before June 6, 1967). The visa did not contain any mention of an INS waiver. Mr. Huey issued the visa on the understanding that in fact Svetlana would not proceed beyond Rome unless an appropriate determination were made in Washington that this was desirable. Only with such a valid visa would the commercial airlines accept Svetlana as a passenger to the West on the basis of her own documentation.

20. At 12:15 Svetlana was driven to the airport by Mr. Huey, accompanied by Marine Sgt. Michael Watson in civilian clothes and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Roger Kirk. There they met [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] who had proceeded to the airport to purchase the airline tickets. At Palam Airport Svetlana checked through both Government of India immigration procedures and Government of India customs procedures in the normal manner, using her own documentation. Thereafter she waited in the public international departure lounge at the airport for approximately one and a half hours (the plane departure, which had been scheduled for 0115, was delayed for an hour and a half due to a leak in its hydraulic system). The absence of any effort at secrecy or coercion can be and has been attested to by numerous Indian immigration, customs and airport officials as well as the airline officers and employees with whom Svetlana was in contact.

21. As no contrary instructions were received from Washington, at approximately 0245 Svetlana departed New Delhi on the Quantas flight [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Svetlana Alliluyeva. Secret; Eyes Only. Rostow forwarded the letter to the President under cover of a March 24 memorandum in which he stated: “Herewith Chet wraps up his end of the dealings with the lady. He feels he acted properly; and, in retrospect, I agree.” (Ibid.)
2. The first enclosure is printed below; the other two were not attached.
3. Reference is to Twenty Letters to a Friend, published by Harper & Row in October 1967.
4. Secret; Noforn. Prepared by Bowles. Another copy is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 30 USSR
5. March 8.
6. Not found.