Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

186. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 25, 1966, 1230Z.

2367. 1. As Soviet leaders who overthrew Khrushchev in 1964 begin their third year in power, it may be useful time to restate some of our conclusions and observations about character of this regime and its policies and how it fared during past year. These conclusions are set out in detail in Embassy’s A–765² and this telegram will deal primarily with foreign policy aspects of regime policies.

2. By and large Brezhnev and Kosygin must regard results of past year with satisfaction. They can count gains in foreign policy field which, especially from narrow perspective of the Kremlin, must seem quite impressive. In internal field, biggest grain harvest in Russian history gave the still flagging economy a solid boost and enabled regime to point exaggeratedly to virtues of its new agricultural policy. That they are still in serious trouble in getting their economy moving again is clear, but their lucky harvest could be counted on to blur effects of the deeper economic dislocations for a little while longer.

3. They will be most pleased by developments in foreign field where, with China virtually isolated in world Communist movement, they have helped achieve what Khrushchev conspicuously failed to do. This is especially satisfying to new leaders who had put their competition with China ahead of all other foreign policy problems, but they had other gains as well. They made further tangible progress in getting on better terms with their neighboring border countries to south, and they must believe they have weakened Western bloc with their improved relations with such countries as France, above all, but also with Italy and Canada. Indeed, despite a few setbacks as in Indonesia and Ghana, their relations with rest of world were improved generally and it was ironic but true that new Soviet leadership, while it continued to support insurrection against established order wherever this suited its interests, has been able to convince remarkably large body of world opinion that its basic purposes are peaceful.

4. To be sure, most of favorable foreign policy developments were not result of vigorous Soviet moves. On contrary, Soviet foreign policy since Khrushchev’s demise has been marked by lack of major initiatives. Yet it is probably this very quiescence of Soviet foreign policy that has significantly contributed to many of these changes. Isolation of Chinese Communists is of course result primarily of their own actions, but posture of restraint Soviets have maintained until very recently in Sino-Soviet dispute has undoubtedly contributed to it. In Europe, de Gaulle would have been unable to carry out his grand design so expeditiously if an atmosphere of Khrushchevian frolics had continued to prevail. Same consideration applies of course to tendency among Western Europeans, and others as well, to downgrade Soviet threat.

5. Heavy ideological mantle cloaking Soviet foreign policy cannot conceal fact that its basic contours are drawn by USSR’s own national interests. Although each Soviet move is always explained in ideological terms, its real aims are in most cases transparent. Indeed, in several cases over past year Soviets even disregarded need for ideological camouflage of their national interests. In their efforts to establish special relationship in Europe with France they almost completely ignored interest of French CP in last year’s elections. In order to promote their national interests in Latin America Soviets drastically curtailed their support for militant revolutionary groups, promoted “united front” approach, and engaged in fairly active effort to establish relations with several reactionary” governments.

6. In U.S.-Soviet context, Soviet propaganda speaks of American imperialism but Soviet policy is based on tacit assumptions and in some cases even overt cooperation with U.S. Thus while it continued to insist that warmer relations were not possible as long as U.S. engaged in “aggression” against a brother socialist state, and while its vilification of the U.S. in its propaganda extended into all spheres of U.S. foreign and domestic policies, not sparing even the President, Moscow still found it possible to cooperate with U.S. in some areas where two national interests converged. This reflected in signing of air agreement,³ intensified search for mutually acceptable formula on non-proliferation, and negotiation of outer space treaty.⁴ Latest offers by the President for closer U.S.-Soviet ties are also undoubtedly tempting to Soviets and, despite their public refusal to accept outstretched U.S. hand in present circumstances, possibility cannot be excluded that they will yet engage in some specific measures just as they have on air agreement.

7. The freeze, in other words, has been a controlled one, with Soviets undoubtedly calculating that it will not jeopardize a relatively easy return to more normal relations once tactical exigencies for a freeze no longer exist. Basic to this view is Kremlin’s knowledge at bottom that it could not live with an actively hostile United States. It also knows that its security problems cannot be definitively resolved without us. Eventually Moscow will need U.S. cooperation in handling awakening Chinese giant. In Europe it knows that however useful de Gaulle may be tactically, no final European settlement could be achieved without U.S. participation and sanction.

8. In Western Europe, Soviets are attempting, in essence, what U.S. is seeking to accomplish in EE, i.e., build bridges to individual countries and promote trend toward polycentrism. Despite certain success, Soviets are probably conscious of their inability to compete effectively in this game. They know they do not have much to offer to West Europeans-certainly not on major issue of German settlement-and are also concerned about unsettling effect their policy in Western Europe can have on their own alliance. This concern was evident last year in Soviet attempts to strengthen Warsaw Pact organization, presumably by instituting permanent coordinating body, and must have been compounded by failure of those attempts. Concept of unity in diversity being alien to Soviet system, Soviets must realize that effect of any overall decrease in cohesion is bound to have much more deleterious effect on Warsaw Pact than on NATO and it is probably because of this imbalance of risk that Soviets, despite a little bridge-building, are basically happy with status quo and still moving rather cautiously on European scene.

9. Regime itself remained nearly static during the year. Brezhnev emerged more clearly than before as first among equals, a primacy he conveyed most vividly when he usurped Kosygin’s and Podgorny’s offices to take his seat as de Gaulle’s opposite number during General’s visit here. As Brezhnev moved ahead, Shelepin, a prime contender for power, moved back, and it may have been that latter’s loss was simply by-product of former’s gain. These minor shadings did not change, however, an overall picture of surprising stability of leadership in a society in which struggle for power is endemic.

10. The personality of the regime also became more sharply drawn, especially at its do-nothing 23rd Party Congress in April. Proud of contrast it offers to free-wheeling of Khrushchev, present leadership is colorless, cautious, conservative and more realistic than its predecessor. It was clearer, too, that its instincts for caution led it in almost all cases to take the course of compromise, the approach of the lowest common denominator. From standpoint of U.S. security interest, these are qualities which make this regime more comfortable one to live with than was Khrushchev’s-it is clearly a regime less likely to confront us with sudden crises in Cuba or Berlin and it acts circumspectly to avoid direct confrontation with us in Vietnam. From standpoint of interests of Soviet people, its virtues are less clear. The excessive caution with which it has moved to carry out the seemingly bold economic measures of a year and two years ago and to solve its other growing problems in internal field raises the question whether this is the regime that will carry through the jarring changes necessary to enable Soviet system to compete efficiently in a world of advanced economic and technological societies.

Guthrie

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 1 US–USSR. Confidential. Repeated to Paris, London, Bonn, Belgrade, Bucharest, Sofia, Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Hong Kong.
2. Dated November 18, it transmitted the annual political and economic assessment. (Ibid.)
3. For text of the Civil Air Transport Agreement, signed at Washington, November 4, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 493–505.
4. For text of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, finally signed on January 27, 1967, see ibid., 1967, pp. 1072–1075.