143. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large
- Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of USSR
As Amb. and Mrs. Dobrynin had been assigned to Mrs. Harriman and myself as our guests for the United Nations concert, we invited them to the house for a cup of coffee before going to Constitution Hall.
Most of the conversation was of a trivial nature. I did, however, have a few minutes talk with Dobrynin alone.
In reply to my question, he stated that the Soviet Government believed the cessation of bombing of North Viet-Nam for a long enough (not defined) period might well lead to discussions for peaceful settlement. He implied that the Soviet Government would encourage North Vietnamese, but dodged being specific on just what his Government would do or what made them believe that Hanoi would take a constructive attitude. He did say that it was the Soviet opinion that Hanoi, though influenced by Peiping, was not controlled in their decisions by Peiping.
He then asked me whether the United States Government had any desire at the present time to improve relations with the Soviet Union or to come to any understandings. He inferred that it was his opinion that we did not and referred to the delay in ratification of the Consular Convention, decision on Moscow-New York air service, failure to improve trade and nonproliferation, etc. I explained the reasons for the delay in the ratification of the Consular Convention and in proposals for Congressional action on the President’s building bridges trade policy. But I told him that from Mr. Kosygin’s statements to me and other evidence, we had gained the impression that the Soviet Union did not wish to come to any new agreements in the nuclear field until Viet-Nam was out of the way. I asked whether the more recent statements made by Soviet Government officials indicated that Soviet policy had changed and that the Soviet Government was now ready to come to an agreement. He replied in the affirmative. He then discussed the German problem and problems of other countries with potential nuclear capability in connection with nonproliferation. He gave me the standard [Page 360] line that if the Soviet Union and the United States came to an agreement, these matters could be dealt with as a second step.
He reiterated the impression he was gaining that the United States did not wish to improve relations at the present time. I denied this and pointed to some of the difficulties that the Soviets have placed in the way of reaching understandings.
I gathered he was doing a little “fishing.” The conversation was frank but relaxed.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL US–USSR. Secret. Drafted by Harriman, approved by S/AH, and initialed by Harriman.↩