134. Intelligence Memorandum1
RUSSIA WITHOUT KHRUSHCHEV
Summary
A year after the fall of Khrushchev it is still difficult to define the character of the new regime in Moscow. The new leaders’ internal policy has been directed in large part toward rectifying Khrushchev’s mistakes in economic organization and administration. They have initiated an economic reform program which has a strong liberal cast, while in other matters a more orthodox hard line seems to be emerging.
In foreign policy too there has been some ambivalence. Party Secretary Brezhnev and Premier Kosygin have reaffirmed the major changes in post-Stalin policy. At the same time they have adopted new tactics in dealing with the challenge from China, tactics which have improved the Soviet position in the Communist world but have led to involvements in a war over which Moscow has little control. As a result, Soviet freedom of action on other East-West issues has become narrowly limited.
A clearer picture may emerge at the 23rd Party Congress in March. Collective leadership seems to be functioning effectively, but Brezhnev’s power is growing. Political maneuvering should be stimulated by approach of the congress, and the need to present a new five-year economic plan, thereby outlining the regime’s priorities, could lead to political trouble.
1. Following the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964, the new Soviet leaders hastened to guarantee the continuity of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Their promise has been kept in the sense that there has been no fundamental reversal of post-Stalin policy. However, differences in approach and shifts in emphasis have accumulated, many of Khrushchev’s major programs have been undone, and the new leaders have left their own imprint on almost every field of policy. Their foreign policy decisions have resulted in significant changes in the USSR’s international position and their domestic proposals could, if implemented, produce important transformations in Soviet society.
[Here follow sections on “The Top Leadership” and “Domestic Policies.”]
[Page 338]Foreign Policy
13. The extensive changes in internal policies make it clear, in retrospect, that Khrushchev was probably overthrown in order to rectify his past blunders and to head off whatever further internal changes he had in mind last fall. From the vantage point of the present, it also appears that the new leaders considered Khrushchev’s tactics in meeting the Chinese challenge to be self-defeating. At the outset it was apparent that they had no intention of forcing the issue with Peking, or of continuing to wage the conflict of Peking’s rules, i.e., through an exchange of vociferous polemics. Beyond this, it became evident that they would try to reassert their influence in the Communist world, even at the expense of Khrushchev’s détente with the West.
Vietnam
14. This change occurred last winter, before Kosygin visited Hanoi and the Pleiku incident. It is still not clear how the Soviets estimated the outcome of the Vietnamese war at that time. Perhaps they saw a cheap opportunity to gain some credit for the successful conclusion of the war, with no great risk. In any event, once committed to winning over the Vietnamese and North Koreans, the Soviets have had little choice but to become increasingly involved. Thus, the Vietnamese war and its repercussions for Sino-Soviet relations have become pivotal issues in the USSR’s foreign policy, setting fairly narrow limits on its freedom of action in other East-West issues.
15. This attempt to regain the initiative within the Communist movement has been a moderate success. There is no doubt that the Soviets have made gains in Hanoi and Pyongyang. But the strong Chinese challenge continues to do damage to the Soviet position and the Vietnamese war has added one more acute issue driving the Soviets and Chinese apart. Moreover, the Soviets are in the unenviable position of being unable to advance in Vietnam without higher risks or to retreat without great loss of prestige. To be sure, the Soviets can carefully control the scope of their own involvement and the extent of their commitment, and for this reason the Soviet leaders probably regard gains in the Communist world worth the potential risk of a US-Soviet confrontation. Nevertheless, the Soviets are involved in a war over which they have only limited control, and the initiative remains largely in the hands of Hanoi, and to some extent with China and the US.
16. The obvious way out for Moscow is a negotiated settlement. From the very beginning of their involvement, the Soviets have proposed this course to the other Communist powers. This attitude has led to constant Chinese accusations of seeking to sacrifice the Vietnamese on the altar of US-Soviet détente. At the same time the Chinese have effectively blocked Soviet attempts to promote a common [Page 339] Communist policy. In the face of this impasse, the Soviets will probably have to continue their present efforts: supplying military aid, playing down their own involvement, and seeking opportunities to urge the US and North Vietnamese to negotiate.
17. If the Soviets have now settled down for a long haul, they may have also decided to try to limit some of the damage to Soviet-American relations. Some recent gestures suggest this. For example, the talks between Secretary Rusk and Gromyko were held in a relaxed atmosphere, free of recriminations over Vietnam. After sitting quiescent through the Geneva disarmament talks, the Soviets now seem to have decided to make a more active effort so as not to foreclose the possibility of an agreement in nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the US-Soviet cultural exchange negotiations are in doubt. On a number of other issues the Soviets have no choice but to mark time or substitute propaganda for policy. Thus the Soviets will probably maintain the current “freeze” in relations with the US, as long as their new line in Vietnam seems to be paying dividends within the Communist world.
[Here follow sections on Soviet foreign policy in other areas of the world.]
The Outlook
42. Although the leadership has survived a year intact and has been able to make decisions on important issues, it is still too early for any firm predictions for the future either of this leadership or of general Soviet policies. A clearer picture should emerge at the Party Congress in March. The surprising degree of harmony displayed by the present leadership has been in marked contrast to the immediate and obvious struggle for power which began after Stalin’s death. In advance of the party congress, however, political maneuvering will probably intensify. Such maneuvering is likely to be aggravated not only by the important economic choices [of] the leaders, but also by the other questions such as the proper historical and political perspective of Stalinism, or de-Khrushchevization, both of which can become important divisive issues. Finally, the leadership is likely to want to redefine foreign policy in an authoritative way at the congress, and this means that the Sino-Soviet question must be treated. Congresses have historically marked crucial turning points in Soviet history, and the 23rd Congress is likely to be a watershed for the new regime.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 72 D 139, USSR. Secret. Prepared in the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence.↩