Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIV, Soviet Union

125. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, September 9, 1965.

SUBJECT

• U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
• Ambassador Foy D. Kohler
• John C. Guthrie, Minister-Counselor

Ambassador Kohler told Ambassador Dobrynin that he had been shocked at the Soviet decision to postpone the staging of the Soviet Achievements in Space exhibit in the U.S. and the U.S. Hand Tools exhibit in the U.S.S.R. He said that it was most important that we not let our political differences interfere with what we had going in other fields. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to recover lost ground.

Ambassador Dobrynin responded with by now familiar references to events in Vietnam. He asserted that Soviet public opinion would not understand it if the Soviet Government permitted the staging of an American musical comedy such as “Hello, Dolly” while at the same time American planes were bombing North Vietnam, a friendly country, at the rate of a plane every few minutes. Every day, he said, the Voice of America carries news items on just such massive raids. To the people of the U.S.S.R., who had known massive air raids during World War II, these news items carried far greater significance than they did to the American public, which regarded them as statistics. He had just returned from a month’s leave near Yalta where people, upon learning that he was the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, constantly asked him to explain U.S. actions in Vietnam.

Ambassador Dobrynin carried his argument further to criticize U.S. unwillingness to ratify the consular convention or to sign the civil air agreement. While stating that the convention in itself was not very significant, nevertheless he had been assured by Secretary Rusk, he said, that the convention would be ratified and had so reported to his government. Now that ratification was put off, people in the Soviet Government were asking how there could be any agreement with the U.S. on important matters if the U.S. was unwilling to ratify so unimportant an agreement as the consular convention.

Ambassador Kohler replied that the U.S.S.R. made it extremely difficult for the U.S. to take such steps. Hostile propaganda attacks against the U.S., including attacks on the President personally,² created a climate which militated against intergovernmental agreements.

Dobrynin sought to distinguish between newspaper attacks and those of the government. He also asserted that if positions were reversed and the U.S.S.R. were bombing a country friendly to the U.S., there would not be one U.S. Government official who would dare to say anything good about the U.S.S.R.

When asked why the Supreme Soviet did not ratify the convention without waiting for the U.S. Senate to act, he said that the U.S.S.R. had its pride and would not seek a public rebuff, knowing that the Senate did not plan to take up the convention this year. In reply to Ambassador Kohler’s request for his opinion as to Soviet action if the Senate did ratify the convention at this session, Dobrynin expressed the view that there might be some deferment of action under present circumstances, but that the Treaty wouldbe ratified.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL US–USSR. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; it was transmitted as enclosure 1 to airgram A–425 from Moscow, September 13. The meeting was held at Kohler’s residence.
2. In Research Memorandum RSB-92, September 13, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research noted that personal attacks on the President by top Soviet Leaders, which had ceased in late June, were resumed in a speech by Brezhnev on August 27. The paper concluded that the reasons were obscure but suggested that the renewed attacks may have been an effort to reassure North Vietnam or to counter mumblings in the neutralist and socialist worlds that the USSR was not doing enough to aid Hanoi, or may have been an expression of Soviet frustration at being unable to take effective action to counter the growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Vol. XI)