122. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1
539. Deptel 475.2 I am deeply disappointed to learn from reftel and related newspaper accounts arriving here of possibility postponement ratification Consular Convention. I recognize Congress has been hard pressed with many matters during this session. However, understandable decision postpone East-West trade legislation, combined with possibility of long delay in ratification of Consular Convention with inevitable corollary of postponement action on Civil Air Agreement would literally remove all substance from our reiterated professions of desire to seek more normal relationships with the Soviet Union.
The Secretary’s testimony which I have just received admirably presented basic advantages of treaty to us.3 However, it was necessarily low key since it is tactically not possible to present publicly extent of these advantages without having undesirable counteraction here and I would wish there were some way of presenting these privately and convincingly to key Congressional opponents.
I consider the breakthrough in accomplishing a major change in the police practices followed by this society for forty-eight years as a [Page 320] major gain for the US and indeed for the entire world. Moreover the protection provisions are of inestimably greater value to us not only because of the differences in our systems but because the comparative flow of persons to this country from the US is of an order of sixty to one. As to immunity provisions I think historic practices began to become obsolete when the US combined its diplomatic and consular services in 1924. Moreover in view of Soviet practices this immunity has greater value for our personnel in this country than for their personnel in ours. While it is true that the treaty itself does not provide for the establishment of consulates, I would certainly anticipate that we would move as rapidly as possible to establish consulates after ratification. Here the order of magnitude of advantage is in my mind beyond calculation. The main hope of making this an easier society to live with is the extension of our contacts and influence on the evolution of this society by every means we can conceive of. What the Soviet Government will gain in our open society is infinitesimal in comparison. Certainly the KGB will make use of any new Soviet mission in the US and I can appreciate that from the point of view of his responsibility for internal security, the Director of the FBI evinces some concern. However, I thought the Secretary’s testimony dealt very effectively with this question.
I cannot, of course, from here judge the mood of the Senate but do feel that rejection of the treaty would be serious setback. Also as I said in Embtel 524, Aug 20,4 I consider it probable that Soviet side would defer ratification unless or until there is a change in Vietnamese situation. However, ratification on our part would give substance to our policy of seeking any possible improvement in US–USSR relations and make even more clear that any deterioration is due to Soviet and not American action or inaction. It seems to me that this would not only be consistent with but would strongly support our general posture in the Vietnamese crisis.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, CON 4 US–USSR. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram, but it was received in the Department of State at 10:29 p.m. on August 21.↩
- Dated August 19, it reported that Senator Mansfield had said he would not call up the Consular Agreement for a vote in 1965. (Ibid.)↩
- For text of Rusk’s statement on the Consular Agreement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 30, see Department of State Bulletin, August 30, 1965, pp. 375–378.↩
- Document 121.↩